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1. Why a projeCt on food risk CommuniCation 
and Consumers’ trust in the food Chain?
Donato Romano
1.1. Why a projeCt on food risk CommuniCation and Consumers’ 
trust
On October 5th 005, in a context characterised by the increasing concern about 
the impacts of the incoming bird flu on European citizens’ health and by the spas-
modic quest for H5N1 virus within the EU, a top officer of the European Food Safety 
Authority (EFSA), that is the institution responsible for food risk assessment and 
communication in the EU, released the following statement:
“We don’t have any evidence that the virus can be transmitted through food. But we 
can’t exclude it either”.
(Herman Koeter, EFSA Scientific Director, quoted 
from the Financial Times, 5th October 005)
this statement caused immediate commotion and concerns throughout the EU, 
especially with reference to the possible transmission of avian flu through the con-
sumption of raw eggs. A briefing was promptly called by the European Commission 
(EC), that is the institution responsible for risk management in the EU, to react to the 
above EFSA statement. the main message was the following:
“Veterinary controls on the farm and at the slaughter, and the flow of information 
from stable to table, protect European consumers against any potential risk (…) 
these measures ensure that poultry products on sale in the European Union do 
not pose a risk for consumers (…) We wouldn’t advise everybody to eat raw eggs. 
We don’t think there is a risk of avian flu from the consumption of eggs whether 
raw or cooked”.
(Philip tod, spokesman of the EU Commissioner
to Health and Consumer Protection, quoted
 from Reuters, 6th October 005, : p.m.)
On October 6th, EFSA played down comments by its Scientific Director, sending out 
an official press release that updated its recommendations on avian flu and food safety: 
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“the European Food Safety Authority advises that there is no evidence to suggest to date 
that avian influenza can be transmitted to humans through the consumption of food, 
notably poultry and eggs. the European Food Safety Authority further confirms that 
there should be no change to longstanding food safety advice that poultry products be 
properly cooked in order to protect consumers from possible risks of food poisoning”.
(EFSA press release, 6th October 005)
the impact on egg consumption of these rather contrasting statements was immediate 
and raw egg consumption fell dramatically. For example, despite later reassuring state-
ments by both the EFSA and the EU Commission, one week later the average drop of raw 
egg consumption was around -10% at EU level, which translated into a non trivial drop of 
egg prices that ranged between -5% in Belgium and -10% in the Netherlands.
this is a paradigmatic example of how food risk communication can have dramat-
ic impacts if not properly managed. But this example tells also something more. It is 
the story of something intangible, difficult to build, but very easily to loose, which can 
have long-lasting effects on consumer behaviour and is at the root of any effective food 
risk communication strategy: consumers’ trust. Consumers’ trust is in fact a key factor 
in dealing with rising concerns about food safety and food quality and it strongly af-
fects public responses to food-related hazard management. More specifically, it is clear 
that, as good risk communication may be, without consumers’ trust it will fail. trust 
thus emerges as a key factor for any risk communication programme. 
Quite surprisingly, despite a number of studies have dealt with consumer at-
titudes and choices towards food safety issues, virtually none of them has tried to 
model the process of consumer response to food risk communication and trustful 
market relationship building. this is why the EC decided to list, under the Key 
Action 1 on “Food, Nutrition and Health” of the Fifth Framework Programme 
for Research and technological Development, a priority – namely, priority 1.3.1 
on “Consumer needs, attitudes and responses with regard to food products, food 
processing and labelling” – which aims at developing strategies to better interpret 
consumer demands, attitudes and perceptions and communicating issues surround-
ing food risk to consumers more effectively.
the contributions collected in this volume report the main findings of a project 
financed under this programme – the so-called tRUSt project1 – aimed at analysing 
and assessing trust along the food chain, its relationship with food risk communica-
tion, and the impact of alternative institutional arrangements on it. More specifically, 
the tRUSt project investigates the antecedents of trust in information sources and 
risk management along the food chain and the mechanisms that determine the social 
diffusion of trust, examining the interplay of the various psychological, sociological, 
demographic and economic factors at individual, market, and social level. It focuses 
on the evaluation strategies brought about by consumers in assessing the reliability 
1 the project “tRUSt – Food Risk Communication and Consumers’ trust in the Food Supply Chain”, 
was financed by the EC under the last call for proposals of the Fifth Framework Programme 1998-00, in 
January 00. the project activities started on December 1st 00 and ended on November 30th 005.
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of the message, the way consumers process risk information with regards to different 
food hazards, and the cultural gaps between professional risk managers and laypeople. 
Eventually, it assesses the welfare impact of alternative food risk communication poli-
cies on consumers and producers and on the society as a whole.
1.2. the state of the art of researCh on trust and food risk 
CommuniCation
Public concerns about the risk from food hazards have increased in recent years, in-
fluenced by a number of well publicised food scares such as the mad cow disease (bovine 
spongiform encephalitis, BSE) or Salmonella in eggs, and dioxin and bird flu in chicken 
(Miles and Frewer, 001). Similarly, people have become suspicious about the impact of 
new biotechnologies, such as genetically modification of organisms, perceived by many as 
an alteration of natural world order (Marris and Wynne, 1997; Frewer, 1999). A second 
relevant trend is the growing contentious character of risk assessment and risk manage-
ment. Contrasting views, controversy and overt conflict have become an usual feature of 
the interaction among experts and between experts and the public.
this has been partly caused by the different perspective from which experts and 
laypeople form their judgements (Wynne, 1995). Experts’ assessment is based on the 
probability of occurrence and the outcome of an event (Slovic, 1987 and 000), whilst 
public risk perceptions are rather shaped by factors such as the severity of the outcome, 
the awareness about the hazard, the involuntary nature of risk and the size of exposed 
population (Sparks and Shepherd, 199; Fife-Show and Rowe, 1996; Marris et al., 
1997; Grobe et al., 1999). In order to bring experts and laypeople into alignment and 
resolve the conflicts, huge efforts have been devoted to develop efficient risk commu-
nication strategies. However, there is little evidence of their success in reducing the gap 
between experts’ technical assessment and public perceptions of risks (Nature, 1999). 
Converserly, political activism to reduce risk and the role of mass media in distributing 
risk information have led to further distrust in risk managers (Slovic, 1993).
One of the main causes of this communication failure can be attributed to the lack 
of trust (Wynne, 1980; Slovic, 1993; Fischhoff, 1995; Fischhoff and Downs, 1997). 
trust in risk information sources and risk managers is indispensable for a satisfactory 
risk communication process. One of the main question addressed by the risk commu-
nication literature is why some sources of information are trusted and others are not. 
Both psychological and social phenomena have been recognised to be at the core 
of trust. Social psychology stresses the importance of source and food hazard charac-
teristics as determinants of the trustworthiness of risk information sources (Frewer et 
al., 1996). On the one hand, competence of the source, fiduciary responsibility and 
sharing of public values are among the potential reasons for trust while absence of 
accountability and expertise do not seem to be influential; (Douglas and Wildavski, 
198; Johnson, 1999; Kee and Knox, 1970). On the other hand, distrust seems to 
be related to perception of deliberate information biases and past history of releasing 
erroneous information (Frewer et al., 1996).
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However, factors other than source credibility affect consumers’ attitude and trust 
in released information. Initial beliefs (priors) strongly influence the persuasive effects 
of source credibility (Sternthal et al., 1978; Frewer et al., 1998). Complex interactions 
of source credibility, hazard type and persuasiveness in determining trust in food risk 
information have been reported as well (Frewer et al., 1997). 
trust is likely to depend not only on structural factors but also on dispositional 
factors such as personality, social, demographic and cultural characteristics (Johnson, 
1999). While extensive research has been carried out on how socio-demographic at-
tributes influence risk perceptions and priorities for risk reduction for several hazards 
(Frewer, 1999; Grobe et al., 1999; Kraus and Slovic, 1988; Langford et al., 1999), less 
effort has been devoted to study consumer segmentation with respect to factors affect-
ing trust in different information sources and distinct food hazards.
the sociological perspective stresses how group characteristics, ideology and or-
ganisational rules that influence lifestyles and values are relevant to risk perception and 
trust in food risk communication and management (Krimsky, 199). According to 
this approach risk is a social construct. Different cultures select different risks (Doug-
las and Wildavski, 198) because the associated practices of risk avoidance provide 
group stability and reinforce its identity. In this context, trustful relationship may be 
hampered by difference in the beliefs system of different social group (Wynne, 199). 
In addition food has a symbolic value of identification and this role needs to be taken 
into account when dealing with food risk issues (Fonte, 000). Conversely, few studies 
have been conducted so far on the economic impacts of widespread diffusion of dis-
trust among food consumers. the scanty research on this topic focuses mainly on con-
sumer learning processes in face of recurrent food scares (Böcker and Hanf, 000).
A further perspective on trust is brought about by behavioural economics that – us-
ing tools developed by computational economists – has investigated the properties of 
aggregate models of consumer behaviour (artificial adaptive systems) which deal with 
information processing, learning, and socially evolving preferences (Arthur, 1991; Aversi 
et al., 1997). Mental models (or satisfying inferential machines) as well as simpler heu-
ristics, such as the Bayesian one, can be reproduced by algorithms upon which artificial 
economic agents can be built. this approach was recently used to investigate the social 
diffusion of trust in financial markets (Orléan, 1998; tordjman, 1998). No study has 
been published up-to-date using such an approach to study food consumers’ informa-
tion processing and learning as well as the evolution of their preferences.
Such a complex intertwining of social, economic and psychological aspects make risk 
communication a sensitive task. Research agenda and findings need to be shared and 
discussed among stakeholders. there is a large consensus that western societies institu-
tions (political but also scientific) are experiencing a “credibility crisis”, which separates 
them more and more from civil society (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 199 and 1993; Nature, 
1999; Yearley, 000; Irwin, 001). It can be argued that, in order to start filling the 
gap, a revision is necessary of the ways in which risks are assessed and managed. Such 
revision cannot but include a discourse on “deliberative democracy” (Elster, 1998) for 
the promotion of a dialogue (and possibly a collaboration) between a number of actors, 
each with their own stakes, attitudes, beliefs, values, rights, etc. (De Marchi and Ravetz, 
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001). All such actors must be heard if one wants to gain an appropriate understanding 
of the complexity of risk issues, in terms of assessment, perception, regulation, etc. (Levi-
dow and Carr, 1997; De Marchi and Ravetz, 1999; De Marchi, 001), without leaving 
aside potential key aspects connected (e.g. cultural significance, ethical beliefs, etc.). 
1.3. innovative features and expeCted aChievements of the 
trust projeCt
the main conclusion that can be drawn from the above assessment of the litera-
ture on trust and food risk communication is that a thorough understanding of social 
diffusion of trust with regards to different information sources requires an in-depth, 
multidisciplinary research approach, based on comparisons among social groups as 
well as different types of hazards. Combining psychology, sociology, marketing, con-
sumer science, and economics is therefore a prerequisite for investigating the dynam-
ics of trust building and disruption in information sources and risk management in 
the food chain. the tRUSt project explicitly acknowledges and accepts this claim. 
therefore, the tRUSt project involves different expertises. this is mirrored in the 
composition of the research consortium, where each partner was chosen for its own 
skills and strengths to contribute to the project and to develop the complementarity 
it requires (table 1.1). 
table 1.1. the partners of the tRUSt project
the achievements of the tRUSt project have been twofold, methodological as 
well as empirical. From the methodological point of view, the multidisciplinary ap-
 
Partner Country Institution Expertise
1 I Dipartimento di Economia Agraria e delle Risorse Territoriali, Università di Firenze
Welfare economics 
Consumption economics
2 I Dipartimento di Scienze Cognitive e dell’Educazione, Università di Trento Experimental psychology
3 NL Departement Maatschappijwetenschappen, Wageningen Universiteit en Researchcentrum
Rural sociology 
Consumer sociology
4 UK Department of Agricultural and Food Economics, The University of Reading
Food marketing 
Food economics
5 D Institut für Agrarökonomie, Christian Albrechts University zu Kiel
Computational 
economics 
Artificial intelligence
6 I Istituto di Sociologia Internazionale di Gorizia Sociology of riskRisk analysis
7 F Centre de Recherche pour l’étude des conditions de vie – Département Consommation et Marketing, Paris
Consumer science 
Marketing analysis
8 N Statents Institutt for Forbruksforskning, Lysaker
Consumer science 
Food science
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proach that brings together a wide range of expertises – psychology, sociology, market-
ing, consumer science, and economics – is an advance in itself when compared to the 
traditional sectoral approach adopted by most studies carried out so-far. For instance, 
the sociological perspective complements the cognitive approach adopted by psychol-
ogists and provides new insights in the way trust in food risk information develops.
Another innovative feature of the tRUSt project is its contribution to a better under-
standing of the aggregate outcome of the interaction of complex trust evaluation strategies 
and political and administrative actions. In doing so the project built an artificial intel-
ligence multi-agent systems that takes into account the trust evaluation strategies adopted 
by individuals belonging to different groups when facing information about specific food 
hazards originating from different sources. this system is able to assess the aggregate out-
comes compatible with the behavioural assumption derived from psychological, market-
ing and sociological analyses. It also provides a framework where the market consequences 
of trust and distrust in food risk information can be assessed leading to costs and benefits 
evaluations that provide explicit guidance for decision-making criteria by risk managers.
From the empirical point of view the project findings are extremely important in 
developing new concepts for more effective communication strategies to the consum-
ers and for reinforcing consumer confidence in the safety of the food supply. the un-
derstanding and assessment of consumers’ trust building and risk perception processes 
can eventually lead to the creation of more transparent consensus platforms. Moreo-
ver, it can also contribute to the development of new predictive models of consumer 
choice which facilitate innovation of products in the food chain.
1.4. the struCture of the trust projeCt
the tRUSt project is a three-stage research aiming at analysing and assessing trust 
relationships in the food chain (Figure 1.1). the first stage of the project was devoted 
to link the economic aspects with those arising from the psychological and sociologi-
cal literature (work package 1, WP1). therefore, preliminary laboratory experiments 
(WP) and focus groups (WP3, phase I) have been designed to assess the multifac-
eted nature of trust formation in food market relationships. Source characteristics are 
believed to be one of the main factors affecting trust in information. However, when 
information is about risk, the characterisation of risk itself plays an important role. 
thus, trust about food related risk is investigated with reference to source types and 
hazard domains. In order to set up a model of trust diffusion and subsequent changes 
in consumer behaviour, psychological, sociological, and marketing researches provide 
information that allow economists to define and estimate operational behavioural 
models. However, trust depends not only on structural factors but also on disposi-
tional factors, such as personality and attitudes, as well on the socio-cultural environ-
ment. Hence the necessity to study this type of determinants.
the second stage of the tRUSt project investigated the interplay of social, demo-
graphic and economic factors in determining trust in different risk information sourc-
es or risk managers. Several methodologies have been used to pursue this objective.
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Figure 1.1. the structure of the tRUSt project
First, a segmentation analysis (WP) was performed to try to identify socio-demo-
graphic and personality segments that determine differences among consumers’ attitudes 
towards specific food risks and to assess the trust they place upon various information 
sources. then, an analysis of the socio-economic determinants of trust in different food 
markets for different categories of retailers and information sources was carried out through 
causal model estimation. In particular, a modified model of the so-called “theory of planned 
behaviour” was estimated to take explicitly into account the role of trust in consumer’s 
buying decisions. Both market segmentation and causal models have been based on a large 
survey that covered five European countries – UK, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Italy, which represent a balanced mix of diversities and similarities.
While those research activities focus on interrelated but complementary aspects of 
investigating the determinants of trust in information sources and food risk managers, 
another analysis (WP5) modelled the processes that underlie the diffusion of social con-
WP2 :
Judgement 
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Experiments
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Focus groups
WP4 :
Socio-Economic 
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Surveys and 
estimations
WP5 :
Social Interaction
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modelling
WP6 :
Economic 
Assessment of Risk 
Communication 
Strategies
Policy simulations
First Stage :
Linking Psychological, 
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Aspects of Trust
Second Stage :
Trust Modelling
Third Stage :
Policy Simulation
WP1 :
Comparative Analysis of Psychological, Sociological, and Economic 
Perspectives
Documentary Survey
WP7 :
Engaging Policy 
Debate
Participatory 
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sensus and trust across society. this was achieved building an artificial intelligence multi-
agent system and using it for simulating the social interaction among agents and analysing 
the aggregate outcomes as a consequence of the adoption of different heuristics or trust 
evaluation strategies. the objective was the development of a model that reproduces some 
relevant features of the observable aggregated behaviour in real markets. this required the 
calibration of model parameters with the observed regularities collected in the previous 
research activities as well as in a second round of focus groups (WP3, phase II).
the third stage of the tRUSt project was devoted to policy simulations and to the 
dissemination of the project results. Policy analysis exercises (WP6) have been carried 
out through the simulation of the impacts of different risk information policy options, 
using the multi-agent model to reproduce the observable aggregated behaviour of real 
society and market conditions as well as a more traditional tool, that is the assessment 
of welfare changes due to a variation in the trust level under alternative scenarios. Fi-
nally, in this stage the involvement of stakeholders (WP7) through the organisation of 
policy focused discussion groups and policy briefs ensured a continuous feedback on 
and the dissemination of research findings.
1.5. the issues addressed by the trust projeCt
the general objective of the tRUSt project is to contribute to a more in depth 
understanding of the nature, determinants and processes of social diffusion of trust in 
food risk information and food risk managers. In pursuing this objective, the tRUSt 
project addressed a number of specific questions (Figure 1.). the structure of this 
book is organised around these questions, namely:
Figure 1.. the issues addressed by the tRUSt project
The TRUST project
A better understanding of 
the role of trust and food 
risk communication during 
food scares
WHY?
Sociological and psycholo-
gical determinants
• What happens to people 
during a food scare
• Why they change their 
behaviour and attitudes
HOW?
From lack of trust and risk perce-
ption to buying behaviour
• How different population 
segments act
• What the impact of lifestyles, 
attitudes and contexts
WHICH EFFECTS?
Assessing the cost of information
biases in a food scare
• How much does it cost a longer 
than necessary food scare
• In which food scare it pays to 
intervene and in which it 
doesn’t
WHEN?
Evolution of a food scare
• What happens when the 
same information is 
released through different 
media
• Differences between 
loose and compact 
network contexts
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a) Why do food scares determine a change in people’s behaviour?
 the project has investigated the determinants of trust at the psychological 
level as well as the evaluation strategies and cognitive models individuals 
adopt in contexts where they are exposed to food risk information (Chapter 
). Moreover, the role of social interaction and culture has been examined in 
relation to the process of trust building in food risk management (Chapter 
3). Addressing these issues made possible to get some insights on how policy-
makers and food agencies should dialogue with people about food safety is-
sues before and during a food scare.
b) How do these changes happen across the population?
 the project has investigated how trust in alternative information sources and 
in risk managers varies across segments of consumers identified by levels of 
trust, social, demographic, and psychographic characteristics across different 
EU countries (Chapter ). the analysis of the relationships between trust, 
socio-demographic variables and purchasing behaviour has also been carried 
out (Chapter 5), proposing a new model of consumer purchasing behaviour 
that explicitly takes into account the influence of trust in standard and food-
scare contexts. this part of the tRUSt research provides some insights on 
what policy-makers need to know to understand how a food scare affects 
consumption behaviour.
c) When do these changes happen?
 the project has investigated the evolution of a food scare, by means of a 
multi-agent simulation model, with emphasis on the social diffusion of trust 
(Chapter 6). Here, the expected output is twofold: some insights on what are 
the key elements a policy-maker should monitor to understand the dynamics 
of information spread and a tool to simulate the evolution of risk perceptions 
through different networks.
d) What are the effects determined by these changes?
 the project has reviewed current public information campaigns across Europe 
and assessed the economic impacts of alternative risk communication strategies 
evaluating their costs and benefits (Chapter 7). the comparison of the social 
costs of a food scare vis-à-vis the cost of an information campaign will help in 
designing effective food risk communication campaigns, providing also some 
good practices for information campaigns on food safety issues.
Policy recommendations and the main findings from the tRUSt project are sum-
marised in the concluding Chapter (Chapter 8).
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2. food ChoiCe in the Context of a food hazard: 
insights from psyChologiCal experiments
Michele Graffeo, Lucia Savadori, Nicolao Bonini, 
Luigi Lombardi, Katya Tentori, and Rino Rumiati
abstraCt
This Chapter describes two studies on consumer decision-making in the context of a food hazard. The 
first part discusses the role of commitment in inducing consumers to buy a possibly contaminated food 
product. The second part examines the relative weights of various factors that may affect a consumer’s 
decision to accept a food product in the context of a food hazard. The findings reported show that 
consumer decision-making is influenced by both emotional aspects and the perception of shared values 
rather than by socio-economic variables. The consumer’s commitment also affects his/her likelihood 
of accepting a possibly contaminated food product. However, the commitment effect depends on the 
type of product and on the cultural context. 
Keywords: trust, attitude, commitment, value, decision-making
2.1. introduCtion
the EU has experienced several food crises in recent years, such as the so-called 
“mad cow disease”, the dioxin contamination of chicken and salmon, and more re-
cently the chicken flu. A typical pattern emerges from the analysis of such crises. Pub-
lic authorities and scientists seek to persuade consumers that the threat is marginal, 
or that there is no scientific evidence to justify a change in consumer food behaviour. 
Nevertheless, many consumers change their usual consumption patterns, e.g. not buy-
ing possibly contaminated food products.
the change in consumption patterns causes social problems and economic loss-
es. Moreover, distrust is generated by the food crisis. Distrust is a cost not only in 
economic terms but in social and political ones as well. As suggested by Kramer 
and tyler (1996), a failure of public trust may decrease the citizens’ willingness to 
cooperate with institutions.
the analysis of food crises shows, however, that there are marked cultural dif-
ferences that frame how consumers react to a food threat. For example, the chicken 
flu crisis affected more severely chicken consumption in Italy than in other Euro-
pean countries (Corriere della Sera, 7 October 005, p.6). Another example is the 
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“mad cow disease” (bovine spongiform encephalitis, BSE). In Italy and Germany, beef 
consumption declined by as much as 30% to 50% in 1990 and 1998 (Verbeke and 
Viaene, 1999). Other studies showed that BSE produced a stronger reaction among 
German consumers than among American and Dutch ones (self-reported measures in 
Pennings et al., 00). Moreover, German consumers reported that they were more 
risk averse (“For me eating beef is not worth the risk”) than their American or Dutch 
counterparts. While BSE has never been a problem in the USA, which can explain 
more soft tones among American respondents, Dutch consumers were indeed exposed 
to it. Nevertheless, significant differences were reported in their reactions to BSE in 
comparison with German consumers. One explanation for these different reactions 
may be that American and Dutch consumers trust more the information they receive 
from their own governments1. 
Although cultural differences play a role in the way consumers react to a food 
threat, the dissemination of information on the risk of contaminated food is gen-
erally associated with a sharp fall in its market demand. this social phenom-
enon may be affected by many factors, such as the opportunity cost the consumer 
should incur in changing his/her consumption behaviour or the availability of 
food substitutes.
this Chapter focuses on consumer decision-making in the context of a food 
hazard. Specifically, it investigates how psychological variables may affect the deci-
sion to buy a possibly contaminated food product. the next Section reports the 
outcomes of an experiment which assess the role of commitment on consumer’s 
decision making in a risky context. the subsequent section reports the results of 
statistical analysis of determinants such as commitment, trust, attitude and socio-
demographic variables on consumption decision under risk. the final section sum-
marizes the main findings discussing the implications for the design of policies aim-
ing at off-setting the adverse effects of a food crisis.
2.2. heuristiCs in Consumer deCision making
the scientific literature on individual decision-making reports that consumers 
often use heuristics to evaluate economic transactions and to make their choices. 
A heuristic can be defined as a rule of thumb or a cognitive process which people 
use to make a choice or a judgment. the main function of heuristics is to simplify 
decision-making. For example, people may use the price of a product as an in-
dicator to judge the product quality: the higher the price, the better the expected 
quality. Another example is provided by studies on the subjective value of money, 
which found that people are strongly affected by nominal prices and by their dif-
1 For example, 83% of the US population trust the Food and Drug Administration (Wansink 
and Kim, 001).
 On the use of heuristics in economic and food decisions see Bazerman (1998), Bonini (005), Green 
et al. (003), Rumiati and Bonini (001), and Russo and Schoemaker (00).
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ferences. the tendency of consumers to rely on displayed prices induces them to 
underestimate inflation, determining “money illusion” (Shafir et al., 1997)3. 
Consumers use heuristics not only to assess the expected quality of a good or its 
costliness, but also to decide whether and how to act under risk. Let us turn to social 
consensus heuristic and to personal commitment, which play an important role in 
decision-making in the context of a food threat.
2.2.1. The heuristic based on social consensus and the effect of previous commitment
the social consensus heuristic is based on information concerning the behaviour 
of other people. If a large number of people act in certain way in a given context, this 
is a good reason for acting likewise. Information about the behaviour of other people 
also affects how the observer interprets what she/he sees. If many people display simi-
lar behaviour in a given circumstance, the observer tends to attribute that behaviour 
more to the context features than to the individual characteristics of those showing 
that behaviour (see Cavazza, 1996; Cialdini, 1993).
the use of testimonials is an example of how the social consensus heuristic is 
exploited. By means of this technique people are persuaded to perform an action 
by being shown that other people are performing it. the analysis of food or envi-
ronmental crises shows that stakeholders spontaneously exploit this heuristic. For 
example, during the chicken flu crisis three ministers of the Italian government had 
themselves photographed eating chicken offered by an Italian farmer association 
(Corriere della Sera, 3 October 005, p.19). In France, during the mad cow crisis, 
President Jacques Chirac agreed to be photographed while eating his favourite dish 
of calf ’s head stew. However, the most extreme case of the use of testimonials oc-
curred in California in the 1980s, when the Republican B.t. Collins drank a glass of 
diluted malathion in public in order to demonstrate that it was innocuous, and that 
it could be safely used as a spray to counter the “med fly” epidemic then threatening 
the state’s agriculture.
Stakeholders spontaneously use another commitment-based strategy to cope with 
a food crisis. During the mad cow crisis, for example, several national associations of 
breeders in Europe organised large-scale street barbecues and offered free steaks to 
people. this situation is alike to generate the consumer’s commitment to an action 
(e.g. buying beef steaks), as discussed by Cialdini (1993) in his extensive survey of 
persuasion techniques. Another example of the use of personal commitment is pro-
vided by the consumer strike called on 1 September 005 by the principal Italian 
consumer associations to protest against inflation. Consumers were invited not to 
go shopping for the entire day and not to use electricity for only five minutes. this 
3 Moreover, consumers evaluate a good as more expensive when its price is displayed in a currency 
with a high (e.g. Italian lira) rather than low (e.g. euro) nominal value. this phenomenon is known as 
the “euro-illusion’ (Burgoyne et al., 1999; Gamble et al., 00; see also Del Missier et al., 005 on market 
price estimate of goods across different currencies and European countries).
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was a minor request but it had high symbolic value. Its acceptance would generate 
commitment in consumers that would induce them to accept similar but more de-
manding requests in the future.
A distinction should be drawn between the effects of personal commitment and 
social consensus. In the former case, the consumer freely adopts a behaviour with low 
cost (both economic and cognitive) and strong symbolic value which will affect his/
her similar future decisions. For example, a consumer who agrees to eat a free barbe-
cued steak should be more likely to buy the same food product even in the context of 
a food hazard. In the latter case, the consumer does not personally perform an action 
but observes other people as they do so. this observation should make him/her more 
likely to perform the same action in a similar context.
In social psychology, commitment is described as “a pledging or binding of the 
individual to behavioural acts” (Kiesler and Sakumura, 1966). For example, a specific 
behaviour is said to commit to the purchasing of a certain product if it is the execution 
per se of that specific behaviour that increases the person’s likelihood of purchasing the 
product as opposed to a value-maximising purchasing strategy.
Studies on commitment have focused on the variables by which this effect can 
be manipulated. In particular, the degree of commitment has been proved (Kiesler 
and Sakumura, 1966; Joule and Azdia, 003) to depend on the acts performed by 
the subject (their number, importance, explicitness and irrevocability), and on other 
aspects concerning the condition of the subject when performing these acts (as his 
volition or accountability).
Kiesler and Sakumura (1966) describe commitment as a consequence of a real 
change in a subject’s attitudes. this interpretation derives from Festinger’s (1957) 
“cognitive dissonance” theory. It maintains that when people feel an opposition be-
tween cognitions (for example, when they agree to lie without being given sufficient 
justification for doing so), they are inclined to change their previous belief system in 
order to resolve the discomfort associated with experiencing an inconsistency with the 
behavioural acts that they are induced to perform (to continue the previous example, 
they will convince themselves that the lie they are asked to tell is the truth). In this 
perspective, the commitment may generate a real change in attitude: if individuals can 
be made to act in ways that are inconsistent with their attitudes, they will change their 
attitudes to make them consistent accord with their actions.
Commitment has been studied from another point of view by considering the fac-
tors that influence a person’s willingness to comply with a request by another person. 
Freedman and Fraser (1966) apply commitment to a persuasion technique named the 
foot-in-the-door strategy. First a minor request is made (e.g. displaying a small sign on 
one’s car), knowing that most people will agree to perform a trivial task (“the foot is 
placed in the door”). then a larger request, the real goal of the persuasion technique, 
(e.g. installing a big sign in one’s front garden) is made. those who accepted the first, 
minor request feel commitment to their previous action and often agree to the larger 
request as well, and the door opens completely.
the anecdotal evidence on how stakeholders spontaneously react to a food crisis 
suggests that a consumer’s previous commitment may affect his/her decision to buy 
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a possibly contaminated food product. However, to the best of our knowledge, ex-
perimental analysis of the efficacy of commitment in those circumstances has not yet 
been conducted. this was the aim of the experimental study by Graffeo et al. (005) 
discussed in the next Section.
2.2.2. The effect of commitment on consumer decision in the context of a food hazard
Graffeo et al. (005) studied the effect of previous commitment on consumer 
decisions in the context of a food hazard. A total of 11 Italian consumers were in-
terviewed in a shopping centre, and randomly distributed across four conditions. 
Here we report and discuss the main findings relative to three conditions to which 
consumers were exposed to specific information on the possible contamination of a 
food product (chicken and salmon) by dioxin, namely
a) commitment to consume chicken,
b) commitment to consume salmon, and
c) absence of commitment to consume either chicken or salmon.
In the two conditions with the presence of commitment, consumers were asked 
to imagine that their usual butcher (fishmonger) had offered them a chicken (a 
salmon fillet) for free in order to celebrate the reopening of the store after refurbish-
ment. they were also asked whether they would have eaten the food product of-
fered. the decision to eat the food product offered can be described as the first step 
in the foot-in-the-door selling technique. On the commitment hypothesis, con-
sumers previously committed to that action should be more likely to make a more 
demanding and similar future decision.
to test the commitment hypothesis, all consumers across the three conditions 
were exposed to specific information on the possible contamination of salmon 
and chicken by dioxin. to make the social scenario more realistic, the consumers 
were given an excerpt from an article published on the magazine of a well-known 
Italian consumer association. After exposure to the food threat information, the 
consumers were asked whether they would buy chicken (salmon) for an already-
planned family dinner.
Below is an excerpt of the Altroconsumo article which shows the detailed and spe-
cific nature of information provided.
“DIOXIN: A REAL PROBLEM FOR HEALtH. A considerable threat to our health, 
disappointingly very seldom detected, is the risk posed by the consumption of food 
contaminated by dioxin. Dioxin is extremely toxic and it is used especially as an additive 
 A parallel study was run with British consumers. However, there were two main differences 
between the two studies: the Italian consumers were interviewed individually, and the sample was 
double in size.
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in oils for motors and condensers. Getting rid of old machinery which has used dioxin 
is difficult and costly. For this reason, in the absence of effective controls by the autho-
rities, careless people dump dioxin in the environment. Once it has been abandoned, 
dioxin is deposited in vegetables. these products are then used as fodder for a wide 
range of breeding animals. the main risk posed by dioxin is its tendency to accumulate 
in animal fat, so that lower initial concentrations in the fodder increase at every pro-
cessing phase, and ultimately attain high risk levels in breeding animals. Researchers 
have demonstrated that dioxin has a large variety of effects on the human body. the 
organs most at risk are the liver, the reproductive and neurological apparatus, and the 
immunity system. the EPA (Environment Protection Agency) has classified dioxin as 
a probable cancerous substance”.
(Altroconsumo, no. 15, September 00)
to make the food threat personally relevant, consumers were also falsely in-
formed that “officials in charge of the safety controls had recently discovered some 
cases of chicken (salmon) infected by dioxin in triveneto”, which was their area of 
residence (the participants were told that the information provided was false when 
they were debriefed).
After the consumers had decided whether to buy the chicken (salmon) for their 
planned family dinner, they were asked to assess the extent to which they trusted 
each of the main actors in the food chain: producers, suppliers and control authori-
ties. they were also asked to assess their attitude towards the consumption of each 
of the two food products.
2.2.3. ANOVA analysis
the commitment manipulation proved to be successful, since nearly all the sub-
jects declared that they would eat the salmon (90%) and the chicken (89%) when it 
was offered for free.
The effect of commitment on the purchase intention
the results show that the percentage of subjects willing to buy the salmon was 
higher among those with the commitment on the salmon (60%) than among those 
without such commitment (30%) (Chi-square (1) = 9.1, p < 0.01). However, no 
significant difference was found between the two conditions with the chicken5. 
The effect of commitment on trust
the participants were asked 15 questions on trust. there were five questions for each 
actor in the food supply chain and for each food product. the replies were pooled across 
the “actor” dimension, since a reliability analysis confirmed that they were closely cor-
related (Cronbach’s alphas were α = 0.8, α = 0.86, α = 0.93 for breeders, suppliers, and au-
5 Nor was the commitment effect found with the English sample of consumers.
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thorities, respectively). A parallel analysis was performed on the participants’ judgments 
of their trust in the actors in the chicken food supply chain. A mean judgment of trust 
in breeders, suppliers, and authorities was therefore computed on the five items. 
two  x 3 ANOVAs with “commitment” as the between factor at two levels 
(commitment vs. no commitment), and “type of actor” as the within factor at three 
levels (breeders, suppliers, authorities), were performed on the mean trust judge-
ments for salmon and chicken, respectively. the ANOVA on the judgments on 
the salmon food supply chain showed a significant effect by the “type of actor”, F 
(,08) = 3.90; p < 0.001, and no effect by “commitment” as well as by the inter-
action between the two factors. the commitment manipulation therefore had no 
effect on judgments of trust in the actors in the food supply chain as regards salmon. 
However, trust in the food supply chain actors changed according to the type of 
actor: authority was the most trusted actor (M = .91) while suppliers were the 
least trusted (M = .35), with breeders lying in between (M = .6). the ANOVA 
on trust judgments concerning the chicken food supply chain yielded very similar 
results: the “type of actor” had a significant effect on trust, F (,16) = .08; p < 
.001, but there was no effect by either “commitment” or the interaction between 
the two factors. As for the salmon food supply chain, the participants in the study 
placed most trust in authorities (M = .9), and the least in suppliers (M = .33) 
with breeders in between (M = .5); but these trust judgments were neither in-
creased nor decreased by the commitment manipulation.
The effect of commitment on attitude
the attitude toward salmon and chicken consumption was measured by a set 
of eighteen bipolar scales. two factorial analyses were performed on the scales (one 
for salmon and one for chicken) in order to extrapolate the dimensions of attitude. 
the extraction algorithm used the principal components method and the matrix 
was rotated using the Varimax method with Kaiser normalisation. the number 
of factors to be extracted was not predefined; therefore, the factors extracted were 
those with an eigenvalue above 1. Rotation converged in five iterations for salmon 
and in six for chicken. 
the attitude scales loaded in three factors for both salmon and chicken. the fac-
tors were rather similar in the two analyses, but some scales loaded on different factors. 
these differences were not levelled prior to computing a mean scale value for each 
factor because they described our sample’s distinctive perception of the factors of each 
single dimension underlying the attitude towards the two types of food. the three 
factors were as follows:
a) the “experiential factor” represents the belief that eating salmon (or chicken) is 
pleasant and good behaviour. this dimension therefore captured the affective 
component of attitude. this factor is described by scales like “unpleasant-pleas-
ant”, “bad-good”, and “negative-positive”,
b) the “instrumental factor” represents the belief that eating salmon (or chicken) 
is convenient, advantageous and opportune behaviour, and
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c) the “moral factor” which captures the idea that eating salmon (or chicken) is 
ignoble, wrong and despicable behaviour.
two  x 3 ANOVAs were performed with “commitment” as the between subjects 
factor at two levels (commitment vs. no commitment) and “attitude” as the within 
subjects factor at three levels (the three dimensions of attitude) on the attitude judg-
ments, one for salmon and one for chicken.
the  x 3 ANOVA on the attitude toward salmon consumption showed no signifi-
cant effect of “commitment”, but a significant “commitment x attitude” interaction, 
F (,08) = .7; p < 0.0, and a significant effect of “attitude”, F (,08) = 50.8; 
p < 0.001. tests of within-subjects contrasts showed that all three levels of the factor 
“attitude” significantly differed for p < 0.00. Salmon was judged more positively on 
the experiential factor and least positively on the instrumental factor, with the moral 
factor in between. A one-way ANOVA on each of the three levels of the “attitude” 
factor was run to illustrate the differential impact of “commitment”. Analyses showed 
that “commitment” significantly increased the favourability of attitude in the experi-
ential dimension, F (1,10) = 5.70; p < 0.0, but not in the moral and instrumental 
dimensions (Figure .1).
the  x 3 ANOVA on the attitude towards chicken consumption yielded a signifi-
cant effect of “attitude”, F (,16) = 5.01; p < 0.001, but no effect of “commitment” 
nor of the “commitment x attitude” interaction. tests of within subjects contrasts 
showed that only the third level of the factor “attitude” was significantly different 
(for p < 0.001) from the other two levels: chicken consumption was judged more 
positively on the experiential dimension of attitude than it was on the moral and 
instrumental dimensions.
Figure .1. Mean attitude on salmon consumption between the two commitment conditions
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2.3. the determinants of Consumer deCisions in the Context 
of a food hazard
We now report a comparative analysis of the roles performed by several variables 
that may affect consumer decisions in the context of a food hazard. the following 
variables were studied: previous commitment, trust, attitude, and socio-demographic 
variables. the relative magnitude of the variables was assessed estimating both a logit 
regression and a structural equation model.
2.3.1. Logit regression analysis
Graffeo et al. (005) also assessed the effect of previous commitment on the 
purchase intention in the context of a food hazard, while trust, attitude and so-
cio-demographic variables were simultaneously considered. this analysis showed 
the impact of previous commitment on the purchase intention relative to the 
other variables.
two logit regressions were performed, one on the intention to buy the salmon 
(table .1) and one on the intention to buy the chicken (table .). the variables 
included in the logit regression equation were: status, education, age, gender, trust 
in the food chain, attitude towards the food product, and previous commitment 
to the food product6. the other variables were the “age” of the respondent, his 
“trust in the food chain” (retrieved through the tRUSt cross-country survey, cf. 
Chapter ), and his “attitude towards the food product” (again from the cross-
country survey).
the results of the logit regression on the intention to buy the salmon show 
that “attitude” and “previous commitment” were the only statistically significant 
predictors. In the case of chicken the only statistically reliable predictors were “at-
titude” and “trust”7. 
Again, the effect of the previous commitment plays a crucial role only in the deci-
sion of buying salmon. More specifically, the odds ratio of buying salmon was three 
times more favourable in the condition with previous commitment to the same food 
product than it was without such commitment. Vice versa, the odds ratio of buying 
the chicken was nearly the same between the two conditions. 
6 the categorical variables were coded as follows: “status” (single vs. married vs. separated/wid-
owed), “education” (middle school vs. high school vs. university degree), “gender” (male vs. female) 
and “previous commitment” (without vs. on chicken vs. on salmon).
7 the important role of “attitude” in predicting the intention to buy a potentially contaminated 
food product was also confirmed by parallel logit regressions conducted on the English sample 
of consumers.
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table .1. Probability to buy the salmon in the context of food hazard
* Significant at the 0.05 level
table .. Probability to buy the chicken in the context of food hazard
* Significant at the 0.05 level
Variable B Sig. Exp(B)
Status 0.704
Status (1) 1.229 0.439 3.419
Status (2) 0.713 0.608 2.040
Education 0.806
Education (1) -0.615 0.574 0.541
Education (2) 0.061 0.915 1.063
Age -0.022 0.475 0.979
Gender (1) -0.079 0.880 0.924
Commitment 0.987
Commitment (1) -0.105 0.870 0.900
Commitment (2) -0.040 0.950 0.961
Trust in chicken food chain 1.278* 0.048 3.590
Attitude to chicken 0.630* 0.054 1.877
Constant -3.792 0.176 0.023
Cox and Snell R-squared 0.216
Variable B Sig. Exp(B)
Status 0.781
Status (1) 0.479 0.750 10.614
Status (2) -0.026 0.985 0.974
Education 0.795
Education (1) -0.726 0.501 0.484
Education (2) -0.166 0.769 0.847
Age -0.043 0.225 0.958
Gender (1) 0.347 0.561 10.415
Trust in salmon food chain 0.062 0.908 10.064
Attitude to salmon 0.723* 0.035 20.061
Commitment 0.184
Commitment (1) 0.400 0.531 10.492
Commitment (2) 1.220* 0.069 3.389
Constant 0.027 0.991 10.027
Cox and Snell R-squared 0.26
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the attitude variable affected the intention to buy salmon as well as chicken. More 
specifically, the greater the positive attitude towards the food product, the higher the 
likelihood that it would be bought.
2.3.2. Structural equation model analysis
Graffeo et al. (00) tested a model of consumer’s decision under a food threat based 
on trust in another person/party and the attitude towards the food product. In this 
case, socio-demographic variables were not included. Moreover, the factors “trust” and 
“attitude” were analytically studied by decomposing them into their main components. 
Finally, a more homogeneous sample of consumers was used, i.e. only participants who 
were exposed to the food threat and previously committed to the food product were in-
cluded in the structural equation model. the aim of the study was not only to assess the 
effect of trust (attitude) as a general variable, but also to assess which antecedents of trust 
(attitude) affect the intention to buy a food product in the context of a food scare. 
the variable “trust” was decomposed into four antecedents, while the variable “atti-
tude” was decomposed into three antecedents. As suggested by Mayer et al. (1995), trust 
in another person or party may be based on (i) competence (ability), (ii) benevolence, 
and (iii) shared values (integrity). Competence is defined as the perception that the 
trustee is capable and expert in the specific domain concerned. Benevolence refers to the 
extent to which a trustee is believed to willing to benefit the principal, aside from any 
egocentric profit motive. Benevolence suggests that the trustee has some specific link to 
the principal. Finally, the notion of “shared values” refers to the principal’s perception 
that the trustee adheres to a set of principles that the principal finds acceptable. 
the fourth antecedent of trust used in the model was “the perceived truthfulness of 
information provided by another person or party”. this antecedent was introduced because, 
in the context of a food scare, consumers may be very confident in the competence, benevo-
lence and shared values of the actors, but they may also feel that these actors do not provide 
them with true information, perhaps for reasons of public order, or for some other purpose.
the variable “attitude” was decomposed into three antecedents: experiential, instrumen-
tal and moral. these were the main factors emerging by a factorial analysis on a set of eight-
een bipolar semantic differential-type scales used in the cross-country survey (cf. Chapter ). 
the “experiential factor” represents the belief that eating salmon (or chicken) is a 
pleasant, good and positive behaviour. this antecedent therefore captured the affective 
component of the attitude. the “instrumental factor” represents the belief that eating 
salmon (or chicken) is convenient, advantageous and opportune. Finally, the “moral fac-
tor” captures the idea that eating salmon (or chicken) is ignoble, wrong and despicable.
the final model resulting from structural equation analysis on salmon8 is shown in 
Figure ., where the variables have the following meaning: 
8 χ (6, N = 103) = 13.1, p < 0.05; NNFI = 0.95, RMSEA = 0.11, CFI = 0.99. Standardised regression 
coefficients in bold are significant at p < 0.05. Note that non-significant paths of the base model have been 
removed. Subscript values in parentheses are standard errors for the regression coefficient.
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• COMS: to what extent do you think that Italian salmon fishmongers/breed-
ers/authorities in charge of food safety are competent in their work?; 
• BENS: to what extent do you think that Italian salmon fishmongers/breeders/
authorities in charge of food safety are concerned about your health?; 
• SHAV: to what extent do you think that Italian salmon fishmongers/breeders/ 
authorities in charge of food safety share your values?; 
• AttE: the experiential attitude; 
• tRtH: to what extent do you trust Italian salmon fishmongers/breeders/au-
thorities in charge of food safety to tell the truth about salmon meat?; 
• tRUS: to what extent do you trust Italian salmon fishmongers/breeders/au-
thorities in charge of food safety; 
• INtES: Intention to eat salmon.
the structural equation model analysis for chicken9 is shown in Figure .3, where 
the variables have the same meaning as before, except for the inclusion of the variable 
AttI, which refers to the instrumental attitude.
Figure .. Final path model for salmon, with standardised regression weights
9 χ (9, N = 103) = 10.81, p = 0.8; NNFI = 0.99, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 1.00. Standardised regres-
sion coefficients in bold are significant at p < 0.05. 
COMS 
BENS 
SHAV
ATTE 
TRTH 
TRUS 
INTES 
0.37 (0.09) 
0.22 (0.09) 
0.21 (0.10) 
0.28 (0.10) 
0.31 (0.09) 
0.37 (0.09) 
0.26 (0.07) 
0.32 (0.09) 
0.25 (0.10) 
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Figure .3. Final path model for chicken, with standardised regression weights
the intention to consume salmon in the context of a food scare was affected by the 
extent to which the consumer believed that the breeder, fishmonger or the authori-
ties shared his/her own values (0.37). It was also affected by the extent to which the 
consumer liked the consumption of salmon, that is, believed it to be pleasant, good 
and positive behaviour (0.3). An interesting finding was that trust in the actor was 
predicted by competence and shared values, as well as by truthfulness of information, 
but it had apparently no effect in orienting consumer decisions, whereas one of the 
trust antecedents, i.e. shared values was the best predictor. 
A very similar model was plotted for chicken (Figure .3). Here, the relationships 
among the variables were somewhat stronger than those observed for salmon. the inten-
tion to consume chicken was significantly affected by the extent to which the consumer 
believed that the main actors in the food chain shared his/her own values (0.5), and by 
the extent to which she/he had a positive experiential attitude towards the consumption 
of chicken (0.8). It was also affected by his/her belief that the consumption of chicken 
is convenient, advantageous and opportune (0.). As in the previous model, no signifi-
cant relationship was found between trust and the intention to consume chicken.
these results confirm the influence of the consumer’s attitude on the decision to buy a 
potentially contaminated food product. Specifically, it shows the importance of the emotion-
al component of the attitude: the greater the consumer’s expectation that consumption of the 
product will be pleasurable, the higher the probability becomes that she/he will buy it.
COMS 
BENS 
SHAV
ATTI 
ATTE 
TRTH 
TRUS 
INTEC
0.22 (0.07) 
0.32 (0.07) 
0.39 (0.08) 
0.34 (0.08) 
0.26 (0.08) 
0.45 (0.08) 
0.22 (0.07) 
0.28 (0.08) 
0.40 (0.08) 
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the findings reported also show that only one antecedent of trust affects the inten-
tion of the consumer to buy a possibly contaminated food product. this is the percep-
tion of shared values: the greater the perception of shared values with the main actors 
in the food chain, the more likely purchase of the food product becomes.
2.4. disCussion and ConClusions
the results of the analyses summarized in this Chapter suggest that traditional 
persuasion techniques based on the manipulation of the source/content of the mes-
sage are not enough to offset the adverse effect of the spread of information on a 
food threat (Flynn et al., 001). For example, the message conveyed by public au-
thorities and scientists seeking to convince consumers that the threat is marginal, 
or that there is no scientific evidence to justify a change in consumer food choices, 
is not enough to persuade consumers to maintain their consumption patterns. the 
relative inefficacy of a persuasion technique based on manipulating the content of 
the message and its source (e.g. by using a testimonial) is consistent with previous 
results (see, among others, Lewin, 197) 10. 
A model of consumer decision-making in the context of a food threat emerges from 
the reported analyses. this model is characterised by counter-intuitive features, and 
it also highlights three psychological factors (attitude, trust and commitment) as be-
ing relevant to description and prediction of consumer decisions. Contrary to a naïve 
model of the decision-maker, our results show that socio-demographic variables are 
not good predictors of consumer decisions. this conclusion is also supported by the 
analyses based on the tRUSt cross-country survey reported in Chapter : consumer 
decisions seem to be independent of the level of education, gender or social status.
Attitude is the best predictor of the decision to buy a possibly contaminated food 
product. It affected both the Italian and English consumers in their decisions whether 
to buy salmon or chicken products11. Our studies allow to enucleate which compo-
nent of attitude performs the main role in mediating risky consumption decisions. 
the structural equation models show that the emotional component of attitude is the 
principal determinant of the decision to buy a possibly contaminated food product, 
while the instrumental and moral components seem to be less relevant.
Again contrary to a naïve model of the decision-maker, a further counter-intuitive 
finding emerged from the analysis of the trust factor is that the perception of the level 
of the “competence of the other person” does not affect a risky consumption deci-
sion. Hence the perception of the public authority as more or less competent in its 
10 After the Second World War, the US Administration gave Lewin the task of designing a communi-
cation policy that would persuade housewives to use beef offal in their household diets. In his pioneering 
work, Lewin found that traditional persuasion techniques were outperformed by active discussion groups. 
He showed the importance of active participation and personal experience in the form of what was later 
labelled “self-generated persuasion”.
11 the role of attitude is also borne out by the findings of the European survey (see Chapters  and 5).
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institutional activities appears not to affect the consumer’s intention to buy a possibly 
contaminated food product. the same finding applies to the “perceived truthfulness 
of information provided by another person or party”. However, the perception that 
the other person “shares your own values” is a strong and consistent predictor of the 
intention to buy. In general, the greater the perception of shared values with the main 
actors in the food chain, the more likely the food product purchase.
the consumer’s commitment also has a role in mediating a risky consumption 
decision. In the case of salmon, there is a 30% increase in the intention to buy in 
the with-commitment conditions vis-à-vis the no-commitment conditions. this 
is a large percentage difference if one considers, for example, that the steepest 
decline in UK beef consumption per head during the mad cow crisis was 3% (a 
comparison of the 1996 vs. 1986 periods of consumption). Moreover, when trust, 
attitude and socio-demographic variables are assessed simultaneously, commitment 
is one of the strongest predictors. the odds ratio of buying salmon is twice as much 
favourable in the with-commitment situation then in the no-commitment condi-
tion. However, the effect of commitment is tied to the type of food product and 
the nationality of consumer. 
In sum, consumption experience, commitment, and the perception of shared val-
ues are the factors that most strongly affect a consumer’s decision to buy a possibly 
contaminated food product.
the importance of the emotional dimension of the consumption experience sug-
gests that a policy aiming at strengthening the consumer’s emotional attitude towards 
the food product is likely to be a good “antidot” against food crises. this could be 
achieved, for example, designing a policy that increases positive food tasting experi-
ences, or to enhance the emotional context in which such tasting experiences takes 
place. this is exactly what the so-called “sensory marketing” aims at1. 
the perception of shared values is also a factor that strongly affects the decision to 
buy a possibly contaminated food product. Although we do not know which shared 
values are the most important (this was not the purpose of the reported studies), this 
finding per se suggests another line of attack to prevent or offset a drop in the demand 
for a food product under threat. the intervention policy should strengthen public 
communication or personal experiences by consumers which show that the main ac-
tors in the food chain and consumers share common values. At a purely speculative 
level, one may argue that shared values relate to a set of ethical rules. Values such as 
honesty and environment and animal welfare protection are general moral principles, 
and they certainly count for a great deal. However, relevant questions that should be 
addressed in designing such a policy are: when do consumers perform their evaluation 
of similarity between their values and those of a supplier? What else do they consider? 
What type of message is able to convey these values?
1 For example, the British shirt retailers thomas Pink use the sense of smell as a marketing tool. they 
have installed sensors in some of their stores that emit the evocative smell of freshly laundered cotton 
(air-dried linen) when customers pass by. Floorgraphics Inc. are designing in-store supermarket adverts 
that feature smell, sound, and vision (Ellison and White, 000).
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Some insights can be drawn form the study on the effectiveness of different 
strategies of meat labelling since the BSE crisis carried out by Roosen et al. (003). 
the BSE crisis caused a dramatic fall in EU beef demand, and in order to coun-
teract this fall, beef producers and retailers attempted to signal the quality of their 
products. Origin labels were rated by consumers as the most important among the 
solutions proposed, even if differences among countries were significant. Origin 
labels presumably convey a message relative to geographic origin, physical produc-
tion environment, but most of all to traditions of agricultural practices and food 
processing. It is likely that these traditions involve principles or values similar to 
those embraced by consumers.
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3. trust from hope to aCtion
Bruna De Marchi, Susanna Greco, Luigi Pellizzoni, 
Bettina Bock, and Jo-An Wiersum
abstraCt
The Chapter begins with a brief discussion of the main socio-cultural perspectives on food consumption, 
risk, trust and policy legitimacy. Subsequently it describes the design of the sociological research and 
its main findings. Two rounds of focus groups were carried out in five countries (France, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands, and the UK) in order to investigate the social and cultural dimensions of 
trust in relation to food issues, focusing particularly on safety and communication. The participants’ 
views of food safety and the related trust investments turn out to be remarkably multi-faceted in 
all countries. The meaning of safety encompasses much more than the mere absence of risk, and is 
embedded in a broader notion of quality. Safety considerations thus influence consumption choices 
indirectly, rather than in a straightforward manner, through concerns for quality, defined by several 
criteria and pursued by a number of buying strategies. Opinions on the different actors involved 
in the food chain, including regulatory and control agencies, are diverse, complex, and sometimes 
contradictory. Trust in the different actors of the food chain is largely absent, whereas a need for it is 
largely shared. In the impossibility of grounding trust on solid foundations, some participants develop 
attitudes of resignation, hope, a kind of “solipsistic self-reliance” or total distrust. Food scares do not 
seem to be the main or only source of anxiety and distrust, being perceived as the tip of an iceberg, 
suggesting structural problems in the food market. These are often judged as inevitable and partially 
unmanageable, being entrenched in the overall functioning of society. Consumption habits tend to 
change temporarily, rather than permanently, as a consequence of food scares, with some notable excep-
tions, depending partly on personal sense of agency. Negative judgments prevail as to the handling of 
information during and after food crises. From the participants’ comments, a number of indications 
are drawn for more effective risk communication and policy.
Keywords: focus group, food consumption, food crises, food safety, agency, legitimacy, policy, respon-
sibility, risk, risk communication, interpersonal trust, systems trust, uncertainty.
3.1. risk, trust and legitimaCy
the understanding of the concept of risk differs widely across disciplines and 
among scholars. Among sociologists, a widely accepted definition of risk is that given 
by Luhmann (1991), who maintains that we can talk of a risk only when the occur-
rence of an event (positively or negatively evaluated) is linked to a decision. On the 
contrary, when the occurrence of a (negatively evaluated) event is independent from 
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any decision, he argues that we should talk of danger. While any and every culture and 
human community have developed the concept of danger, that of risk gains relevance 
only in connection with the modern mechanistic and manipulative (or instrumen-
tal) view of the relationship between humans and nature, as well as between humans 
themselves. the individual is seen as a free and rational subject and on that ground 
domination over nature is established and praised.
As humans increasingly attempt to control nature (and society), dangers are 
transformed into risks, and society becomes, in Ulrich Beck’s words, a “risk society” 
(1986). In many respects we (in the Western world at least) live a less dangerous 
life than – say – a century ago, but at the same time we live a riskier life. When ap-
plied to food, this change means that, thanks to scientific-technical advancements, 
food production and consumption satisfy more and more human needs and desires. 
However, this does not imply that producing and eating food is less risky than be-
fore. On the contrary, such activities are riskier for the very reason that they entail 
more and more decisions. this perspective helps us understand why risks grow in 
connection with technological innovation. Innovation introduces new sources of 
risk because it opens up new spaces for decision. Before the era of gene manipula-
tion, genes could be a source of danger, but not risk.
Another key point to take into account is the particular significance assumed by 
uncertainty. While uncertainty is by definition an existential condition of human life 
and a basic component of scientific research, the rise of uncertainty as a social and 
political issue is fairly new and depends on several factors. the first element to be 
considered is that the type of uncertainty embedded into many environmental and 
technological issues is not the same as the one typically faced by the rational decision 
maker. Rational choice theory usually deals with finding the most suitable means to 
achieve a given goal. An emergent feature of many environmental and technological 
issues can indeed be called “radical” or “epistemological” uncertainty (see Funtowicz 
and Ravetz, 1993; Pellizzoni, 003). this term refers to situations where not only the 
means, but also the goals and structure of a problem are ill-defined. Cases in point are 
issues (and sometimes crises) such as climate change, BSE, the use of GMOs in agri-
culture, and electromagnetic fields. In all such cases, uncertainty derives from com-
plexity, indeterminacy (too many variables to take into account, open-ended causal 
chains, etc.) or actual ignorance (we don’t know) (Wynne, 199; Stirling, 1999).
though the outlined approaches to risk and uncertainty may look quite sophisti-
cated, an appreciation of the implications of human attempts to control nature and 
society is by no means out of reach of “ordinary” people, as testified by various stud-
ies. these reflect the public’s growing scepticism towards science and its distrust of 
scientific and political institutions (see Irwin, 1995; Pellizzoni and De Marchi, 00; 
Eurobarometer, 001). Moreover, socio-cultural perspectives throw light on very im-
portant processes related to risk as a social phenomenon. For example, the “cultural 
theory” of risk, developed by the anthropologist Mary Douglas and her followers 
(Douglas and Wildavski, 198; Schwarz and thompson, 1990) argues that there is 
a close connection between social structure and culture, and that the different risk 
constructions of social communities or groupings derive from different cultural per-
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spectives. In other words, within society there are different basic orientations towards 
risk, which are deeply rooted in individuals and groups and cannot easily be overcome 
simply by means of communication and persuasion strategies.
Moreover, there are important processes of “social amplification of risk”. the 
idea behind this concept is that “events pertaining to hazards interact with psy-
chological, social, institutional and cultural processes in ways that can heighten or 
attenuate perceptions of risk and shape risk behaviour” (Kasperson, 199). In other 
words, social organisation can play a significant role in heightening or lowering 
public attention to specific risks. two elements deserve particular attention here. 
On one side, there are institutional constraints. the structure or the very existence 
of an institution can modify the social prominence of an issue. For example, the cre-
ation of the EFSA and its organisational characteristics does not simply respond to 
pressing policy problems, but is deemed also to contribute actively to shaping them. 
Another important aspect of the social dimension of risk is that people, groups and 
organisations actively compete to impose their own perspective on a certain risk is-
sue as the dominant one in the public sphere, in order to “control” its insertion in 
the policy agenda and the solutions envisaged (Hajer, 1997).
to sum up, from a sociological perspective risks may be interpreted as “social prob-
lems” (Griswold, 199), that is as public issues which emerge neither simply by virtue 
of their own nature, nor solely because of the clash of the different world views co-
existing within complex societies. Rather they emerge as a consequence of a number 
of institutional constraints and of the deliberate and non-deliberate (or occasional) 
actions of a plurality of social actors.
the concept of trust is closely connected with those of risk and uncertainty. the 
relationship between risk and trust is evident in most current definitions of trust. 
According to the prevailing accounts, trust consists of expectations which have a 
positive influence on the social actor and are formulated under conditions of un-
certainty (see Mutti, 199 for an overview). In other words, we can talk of trust in 
a situation where an actor is not sure of what another will do, but has good reasons 
to be confident that the latter will conform to his own expectations. Similarly, ac-
cording to Mayer et al. (1995), trust is one subject’s readiness to be vulnerable to the 
actions of another subject, based on the expectation that the other will behave in a 
way that is important to him or her, irrespective of his or her ability to monitor or 
control such behaviour. trusting means taking risks, even if usually we don’t think 
explicitly in those terms (Lagerspetz, 1998).
Mayer et al. (1995) identify three major antecedents of trust: perceived ability 
(expertise, experience, training and education, success, etc.), benevolence (altruism, 
loyalty, sincerity, empathy, etc.) and integrity (adherence to principles, consistency 
of past behaviour, congruence between words and actions, etc.). A decline in trust 
would thus mean that the way risk issues are handled has brought into question 
the ability, benevolence and integrity of regulators, controllers, expert bodies and 
business actors. Such a conclusion actually finds wide empirical support (see Euro-
barometer, 1998 and 001; Grove-White et al., 1997; Irwin et al., 1999; Pellizzoni 
and De Marchi, 00).
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Fiduciary expectations replace uncertainty with some degree of certainty and 
reassurance. they are never entirely based on hope or emotion: they also have a 
cognitive content, although the balance between cognitive and non-cognitive mo-
tivations is highly variable. Correspondingly, trust cannot be entirely described in 
cognitive terms, otherwise we would fall back to the familiar ideal type of the ra-
tional decision maker. trust entails a commitment to something, rather than just a 
cognitive understanding (Giddens, 1990).
trust is a foundation of society because it reduces the range of conceivable al-
ternatives of action due to the contingency of social relations (I don’t know what 
your intentions are, you don’t know mine, and I know that you don’t know them, 
etc.). Fiduciary expectations are largely based on norms and shared values. this 
means that the uncertainty inherent in trust is connected to the normative frame 
of the situation. the normative dimension of trust takes the form of expectations 
linked to individual or organisational roles. In this sense, Sztompka (1999) talks 
of “anticipatory trust”. Moreover, normative expectations (i.e. expectations based 
on value commitments) may affect both cognitive beliefs and emotional orienta-
tions. For example, if I trust a fireman’s ability to extinguish a fire it is not because 
I have previously seen him at work. Rather I believe in his professional expertise, 
and I do so not because I have actually checked the quality of the firemen train-
ing courses, but because I have a normative belief, a commitment to such an 
organisation and I believe in the firemen’s competence and goodwill (i.e. his own 
commitment) as a matter of principle. Of course, the lack of any normative frame 
represents an almost impossible case. therefore, “the degree of coherence and 
completeness, of ambiguity and manipulability of normative systems becomes 
crucial in the explanation of generative processes of social expectancies and of 
uncertainty reduction” (Mutti, 199, p.8).
Normative beliefs represent an important element of what Giddens (1990) calls 
“systems trust”, i.e. trust in expert systems (e.g. airplane transport) and symbolic 
tokens (e.g. money). Such beliefs are accompanied by a factual one, by which we 
recognise that although we cannot actually assess expert and symbolic systems’ reli-
ability, we cannot but rely on them1. to describe this kind of trust, Giddens often 
uses the term “confidence”. the difference between trust and confidence is clarified 
by Luhmann (1988). According to him, trust exists when we believe we can affect 
the evolution of a situation; confidence when we maintain that we cannot affect 
the events, when we feel we are in a strongly compelling situation with little or no 
chance of getting out. In the first case we consider alternatives, in the second case we 
do not. this distinction is obviously linked to that between risk and danger. It can 
also be connected with the different levels of uncertainty characterising the fiduci-
ary relation. the fewer the alternatives, the higher the uncertainty we are bound 
1 Sperber (198) has elucidated the difference between a factual and a normative belief. the former 
indicates a subject’s conviction that something is a fact. the latter, which Sperber calls a “representational 
belief ’, describes a subject’s conscious decision to adhere to a representation, that is to the normative 
content (moral, political or else) of his or her own belief.
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to accept before withdrawing (if possible). thus an attitude of confidence, rather 
than trust, implies that a high level of uncertainty is inherent in the situation one 
is confronted with.
to sum up, all the perspectives on trust outlined above are relevant for the pur-
poses of this study:
• the interpersonal level (e.g. relations between consumer and shopkeeper),
• the systems level (e.g. the consumer’s judgement on the reliability of controls in 
the food chain),
• the cognitive and emotional components, and
• the normative framework (e.g. the credibility and legitimacy of regulatory in-
stitutions).
the last point should not be underestimated. the legitimacy crisis of core institu-
tions of present society is a much-debated phenomenon. In the environmental and 
health fields the deterioration of the relationship between citizens and institutions 
seems particularly evident, often being described in terms of declining public trust 
in regulators’, scientists’ and entrepreneurs’ willingness and ability to cope with the 
challenges posed by the exploitation of natural resources and the increasing pace of 
techn ological innovation (EC, 000a and 000b; Eurobarometer, 1998 and 001; 
Pellizzoni and De Marchi, 00; UK House of Lords, 000).
Why is the legitimacy crisis so manifest in the environmental and health fields? 
Various reasons have been advanced (Pellizzoni, 005). the first is changing relations 
among the actors. the food sector provides major evidence of that. As Brom (000, 
p.18-19) observes, in the emerging global market for food and other agricultural 
products, the distance between consumer and farm has widened. In Western society, 
most consumers have no direct contact with the farms where their food is produced. 
Nearly all food, in the city as well as in villages, is purchased in supermarkets. Food 
comes from exotic countries and there is little real life experience with modern farm-
ing. Moreover, farmers often consider critical questions raised by consumers about 
agricultural practices as typical “city-issues”.
the increasing intricacy of the food chain is a second aspect, particularly stressed 
by scholars following the “systems of provision” approach (Lockie and Kitto, 000). 
they assume that the growing physical and mental distance between the actors affects 
their relationship, in terms of both power and trust. Relations are further complicated 
by the recent counter-tendency towards the localisation of production and consump-
tion, that is towards the re-creation or maintenance of short supply chains, where 
the value of the place of production or the identity of the producer play a major role 
(Hinrichs, 000; Marsden et al., 000).
the third reason is the increasing importance of professional expertise, accompa-
nied by a decline in its ability to deal effectively and efficiently with environmental 
and technological issues. the proliferation of regulatory policies fosters a tendency to 
delegate powers to non-elected bodies, for which practical results represent one of the 
main sources of legitimation (Majone, 1999). Delegation is practised for various rea-
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sons, including the ability of these bodies to ensure continuity in the development and 
implementation of policies thanks to lack of electoral constraints, and the high techni-
cal content of policy issues. Since effectiveness is a key criterion for the legitimacy of 
policy action, a reduction in the former cannot but affect the latter.
the legitimacy of the market economy is also deeply rooted in its promise of 
effective and efficient resource allocation (Shearer, 00). If such promise is not ful-
filled, as it happens with the over-exploitation of natural resources, legitimacy weak-
ens. the same can be said of science. In their search for effectiveness and efficiency, 
business and regulators rely heavily on science and technology. However, the growing 
intertwining of science, politics and business brings into question one fundamental 
source of the legitimacy of science: disinterestedness. Moreover incidents, crises and 
long term threats provide evidence of limited control on the social and environmental 
impacts of scientific advancement and technological innovation. In turn, this trend 
brings into question another source of the legitimacy of science: the promise of objec-
tive and reliable knowledge.
3.2. soCiology of food Consumption
Food is a very specific consumption good. It is a basic need but also has important 
social meaning and significance. It is one of the most fundamental expressions of care 
for others and an important means of establishing and maintaining personal (social) 
relations. It entails the nurturing and educating of children and is at the same time an 
expression of love and friendship (Caplan, 1997).
Eating structures our day and the preparation of food takes up a considerable 
amount of time each day, even nowadays. Moreover what to eat and how to prepare 
food is a basic element of individual, social, cultural and national identity. But food 
production and food supply has to do with power and difference in power as well. 
One example is the dependence of many developing countries on food supplies 
from the industrial nations, which are also used as a political weapon (den Har-
tog, 198). the food industry is an important economic power, employing a lot of 
people, making a lot of money, having an important political voice but receiving 
a lot of political/governmental attention and control as well. Food is precious, but 
dangerous too.
3.2.1. The social meaning of food consumption
Among the sociological approaches to food consumption, the focus on the social 
meaning of food consumption is most prominent (Gofton, 1986). Changing food 
consumption patterns are analysed and explained as an element of civilisation. the 
way food consumption is regulated, prescribing what, how and when to eat for 
different social groups, underlines its force as a means of social control, regarding 
broader areas of (proper) behaviour as well:
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“Ideas about food, and beliefs about the properties and effects of food, also embody social 
values, and notions of morality and proper behaviour which reflect the relationships 
between different age and gender groups, as well as the social classes”.
(Gofton, 1986, p.19)
Other peoples’ or other nation’s eating patterns are often described as uncivilised, 
primitive and unhealthy or unclean. Every society is worried about the healthiness, 
safety and “purity” of food but what is considered healthy, clean, safe and “pure” is 
differently defined. Healthiness and appropriateness of food may even vary within the 
same society depending (among other things) on age and gender. Bourdieu has ap-
plied his theory of habitus to food practices in France and demonstrates the important 
symbolic and cultural significance of food.
“He suggests that peasants and the industrial working class exhibit ‘an ethic of convivial 
indulgence’ and thereby resist ‘the new ethic of sobriety for the sake of slimness’, which 
is more recognised at the highest levels of the social hierarchy”.
(Bourdieu, quoted in Warde, 1997, p.0)
In former times the situation was quite different, with the rich indulging in con-
spicuous consumption and waste of food as a demonstration of wealth and luxury, 
whereas the labouring class had barely enough food for subsistence. But again there 
was much more differentiation within society also in those times. Elias points out 
that among religious people, especially in monasteries, self-denial and abstention 
were preached, restricting the consumption of meat. But the definition of meat as 
meat differed between the type of animals it was taken from, thus allowing for the 
consumption of specific meat even as part of a sober and ascetic diet. Some food 
was even legally reserved for the upper class, and other foods were considered im-
proper and unhealthy for women and children as they might “inflame the passions” 
(Gofton, 1986, p.10; Caplan, 1997).
3.2.2. Theoretical explanation of modern food consumption
Food consumption has changed a great deal in the course of time. the same is 
true of food preparation, the cost and availability of food and the ideas about safe 
and healthy food. Individualisation and informalisation are important trends for 
food consumption. People now eat more often alone and in different places. When 
to eat and what to eat is less dependent on the time of the day, the day of the week 
or the season. Ideas about the necessary qualities of “good” food have also changed, 
as exemplified by the increase in convenience food but also the increasing demand 
for “natural” food.
Sociologists have aimed at analysing, characterising and explaining the most im-
portant current trends. Following Warde (1997), there are four major trends:
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–  a trend towards individual diversity;
–  the development of post-Fordist food;
–  the birth of mass food consumption in a mass society;
–  but also the persistence of food consumption as a means of social differentiation.
As social regulation of food consumption loses influence, what food to eat and 
not to eat becomes increasingly a matter of individual choice. According to Fischler 
(quoted in Beardsworth and Keil, 1997) that does not result in more freedom and self-
realisation but increases the uncertainty and anxiety of individuals who feel left alone 
and incapable of making the right decision
the development toward more individualist food consumption patterns may 
also be interpreted in a positive way, actually as an expression of self-realisation or 
constitution of new self-chosen groups (or so-called neo-tribes). this differentiation 
is explained as movement away from uniform consumption patters, as liberalisation 
from social pressures and as growing cultural pluralism. As a result we see more vari-
ety in food consumption and more volatility in consumer preferences. In the future 
Urry (quoted in Gofton, 1986) expects an increasing use of commodified and pre-
prepared food. But at the same time he foresees a growing interest in “natural” food 
as a reaction to industrial mass food, and a proliferation of consumers’ organisation 
and pressure groups.
What food to eat may be individually chosen but is also an expression of mem-
bership in a specific group or socio-political or cultural movement (vegetarianism, 
organic food, “slow food”). these new groups set up their own rules and regulations 
regarding food consumption and may even restrict individual freedom, but now this 
restriction is self-imposed.
Mass consumption may be related to industrialisation and mass production and 
to what is called the “McDonaldisation of society”. Certain foods and brands have 
become available on a global scale, offering uniform meals all over the world. Uni-
form food consumption patterns are also related to national contexts. Countries share 
a culinary tradition and specific ideas about proper meals and proper eating times, 
which are reflected in national health campaigns. But the same campaigns take the 
economic interests of the national food industry into account as well. Imports of food 
are regulated and restricted on the basis of health risks but also as a method of market 
protection. Moreover, culinary traditions are consciously used to promote countries 
for tourist purposes.
What is considered as a “proper meal” has only partly to do with what is eaten. It 
also reflects who is preparing food, where it is eaten and by whom. It entails gendered 
identities and gender-specific norms. Generally speaking, a “proper meal” is consid-
ered to be a home-made meal, cooked by a mother or wife for her loved ones. Offering 
these proper meals is part of being a good carer, a good mother and wife, and is an 
important element of (gender-specific) education and socialisation (Charles and Kerr, 
quoted in Warde, 1997).
Although many scientists have stated that structural characteristics like class, gen-
der, ethnicity, nationality and age have less impact on consumption decisions, there 
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are also scientists who point to the persistence of social distinctions and class-based 
differentiation. Bourdieu’s theory of taste as cultural capital is still valid today al-
though distinctions may be less pronounced and certain culinary habits more wide-
spread. Warde (1997) remarks that the significance of food as demarcation of classes 
may differ by country, depending on the significance of food. He refers to the UK, 
where other things such as education, leisure activities and accent are (or have been) 
more important communicators of class than food (although food has become more 
important recently). the same is probably true of the Netherlands and perhaps of 
northern countries in general. these countries have traditionally given little attention 
to food and have preached austerity in food consumption (among other things) as part 
of the Calvinist religion and tradition.
3.3. the study: aims and method
the foregoing offers a conceptual background for addressing the main results of 
the sociological study. the purpose of the study was to investigate the social and cul-
tural dimensions of trust in the food field, with specific reference to issues of safety, 
by means of a series of focus groups (FGs). the choice of the focus group technique 
precludes the drawing of statistical inferences from the results obtained. However, 
FGs allow a broad and deep understanding of people’s views, opinions, concerns, ways 
of reasoning and so on (Barbour and Kitzinger, 1999; Krüger, 199; Morgan, 1997). 
thus, great insight can be gained on the framing of the issue by lay people, an insight 
which can greatly contribute to effective communication and policy. FGs provide the 
opportunity to elicit dimensions which may not surface in or cannot be appropriately 
addressed by the survey technique.
two rounds of four FGs were carried out in each of the five participating countries. 
the first round took place in late summer 003 and the second in September 00. 
A protocol for conducting the first round of group discussions was prepared 
by the Italian team in collaboration with the Dutch one (see Annex 1). the topics 
included: food choices, consumption habits, consumers’ information, trust, respon-
sibility, food safety, causes and effects of food scares, regulations and controls, and 
the participants’ sense of agency.
In the second round of FGs the protocol concentrated mainly on food scares. 
Participants were invited to report their behaviour in past crises and compare it 
with “normal” situations. they discussed the relevance of imitative behaviour and 
evaluated the importance of centralised sources of information (such as public and 
private institutions and organisations, communicating mainly through the mass 
media), as opposed to personal networks (such as family, friends, trusted individu-
als, organisations or experts, available through private relationships). Evaluation of 
information included its practical usefulness, accessibility, comprehensibility, con-
gruence; the presence of “negative” vs. “positive” information (the former address-
ing the emergence and development of a food crisis, the latter its conclusion); its 
reliability and trustworthiness.
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As standard practice in the FG technique, the protocols were intended mainly as a 
guide for the facilitators, with minimal directivity on their part.
the criteria for selecting the participants in the first round of FGs took into ac-
count food consumption styles as clues to different underlying beliefs, values and 
opinions. Four different categories of consumers were singled out.
the first category, labelled “Pleasure”, included people for whom food represents 
an important aspect of their lives; persons who invest time, intellectual energy and 
money in selecting quality food, driven by criteria of enjoyment and satisfaction 
(taste, cultural and aesthetic value, social status, etc.). the typical representative of 
this category is the quality food shop customer, the quality restaurant client, or the 
“slow food” associate. Participants were recruited using such channels. 
the second category, labelled “Concern”, included people who consider food 
also in its social, ethical and environmental implications, including equitable distri-
bution, religious and ethical aspects of consumption, animal welfare, the ecological 
impact of farming, etc. the typical representative of this category is the fair trade 
shop customer. Also the organic food shop customer can fit in this category, if 
moved by the motives listed above. 
the third category, labelled “Care” included persons who feel or are responsi-
ble for the well-being of people dependent on them (small children, disabled or 
elderly people, etc.). their choices are particularly attentive to nutritional, health 
and safety factors. 
the fourth category, labelled “Survival/indifference”, included people for whom 
food is mainly a matter of necessity. their choices are mainly driven by economic 
considerations, out of financial constraints, scant attention to nutrition, health and 
safety, or perhaps conviction that food is basically the same in supermarkets and in 
organic or “dedicated” food shops. the typical representative of this category is the 
hard discount customer.
Recruitment of participants in the second round of FGs followed a different set of 
criteria, based on two sets of hypotheses, namely that:
- consumer behaviour during and after a food scare is significantly connected 
with the use of information sources, that is to say it is affected by the preferen-
tial use of centralised vs. network sources. this preference, in turn, depends on 
the different “trust investments” of consumers in information sources;
- views of and reactions to food scares may be significantly affected by the con-
sumers’ personal experience and memory of past events.
In the light of the first set of hypotheses, participants were assigned to different 
groups according to their response to a “filtering” question: 
“Let us suppose there are rumours that a certain food may be unsafe. Which of the 
following best describes your behaviour:
A) I inquire about indications provided by the health authorities.
B) I ask for the opinion of persons I trust (e.g. relatives, friends, shopkeepers)”.
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Age was used as an indicator to differentiate participants in relation to past experi-
ence. Half the groups were composed of people from 18 to 30, half of people over 50.
3.4. main findings
Overall, participants in the FGs discussed food-related issues in a reasoned and 
articulated way. In other words, their approach proved far from simplistic or purely 
emotional. On the contrary, it was very reflective and insightful. A common trait of 
group talks was the propensity to establish connections between specifically food-
related issues and other, more general ones referring to the overall functioning of 
society with its related opportunities and constraints, cultural habits and peculiar 
modes of thinking.
Here we will offer a synthesis of the most significant findings.
3.4.1. Consumers’ choice
Consumers’ choices depend on a wide range of factors, some specifically related 
to food (such as the experienced credibility of a brand), others to family composi-
tion. Such factors cannot be ranked in any definite order. Moreover, some of them 
are multifaceted.
One such multifaceted factor is price, regarded as both a constraining element 
for the consumer and a dominant criterion orienting both sides of the food market 
– producers/retailers on the one hand, consumers on the other – to the detriment of 
quality. Food quality is in turn a multifaceted concept, encompassing many different 
meanings, from taste to naturalness, from nutritional value to ethical acceptability. 
Although information is conceived as a major resource, there are concerns about 
the possibility of adequately assessing its completeness and reliability. this is partly 
because information is increasingly coming from “distant” sources, ones with which 
consumers have no direct relationship or long-established acquaintance. Advertising 
in itself is not the subject of much criticism. However, there is a shared sensation that 
an “advertising style” is permeating all types of messages from whatever sources, with 
“partisanship” predominating over neutrality.
there are mixed feelings as regards consumers’ agency. Industrialisation of pro-
duction and intensification of world trade are seen as either enhancing or reducing 
it. Food agency is connected to both the actual possibility of choice of each con-
sumer and its aggregate effects on the market. Consumers’ agency is not perceived 
as being connected to citizen agency, i.e. the possibility to influence food policies 
 A more detailed account is provided by the national and cross-country reports in the working paper 
series of the trust project (De Marchi et al., 003a; Renn et al., 003; Lobb and traill, 003; Couvreur, 
003; De Marchi et al., 003b). Available online at www.trust.unifi.it.
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and regulations.
Opinions on GM food are reasoned and disenchanted. In general it is regarded 
with some diffidence, but is not stigmatised in principle. It is judged that GMOs 
can provide some important benefits, improving production and reducing the use of 
pesticides. In the meantime there is great scepticism about them possibly being (and 
being presented) as the solution to world hunger. GMOs are also considered as a pos-
sible source of long term problems, still insufficiently explored, such as the reduction 
of biodiversity or delayed negative health effects. Environmental problems (reduction 
of biodiversity etc.) take on remarkable importance in group discussions. Concerns 
for information and actual possibility of choice are also expressed. Occasionally, some 
confusion appears between GM and organic food.
3.4.2. Food safety, trust and responsibility
Food safety is another multifaceted concept not simply equivalent to absence of 
potential damage. It is connected to quality, including “naturalness” (absence of ad-
ditives etc.), taste, nutritional value, freshness, hygiene, conservation, geographical 
origin and preparation.
Awareness is widespread that complete safety is unattainable, that it is impossible 
to eradicate all types of risks. Many participants stress that one should not become 
“obsessed” with food safety. their major concern is for “healthy” styles of consump-
tion. In the meantime sensations of anxiety and uncertainty are widespread. In other 
words, participants don’t think of food safety all day long, nor do they think they 
should. However, they feel mostly unhappy about how safety issues are addressed by 
the relevant institutional and economic actors.
As regards the quality of food nowadays, it is judged to have improved consider-
ably with regard to the sanitary aspects of preparation and preservation. However, 
other important aspects are felt to be neglected, namely those relevant to “tradi-
tional”, “local”, “natural”, “nutritionally sound” food. technological innovation, 
industrialisation of food production and intensification of world trade have con-
tradictory effects on quality and safety: enhancing some components, while failing 
to address others. 
there are mixed feelings as regards the reality and the adequacy of controls. When 
mentioned, European regulations are criticised for their excessive formalism and ri-
gidity. Also there is some suspicion that the stakes and constraints of regulatory bu-
reaucracies and the interests of strong lobbies may prevail over safety considerations. 
European controls are seen as neither particularly efficient nor relevant. In each coun-
try national regulations and control procedures are felt to be the most stringent and 
satisfactory. this view, however, overlaps with a widespread sensation of low protec-
tion on the part of authorities.
Information on food safety is drawn from a number of sources and channels: 
direct (news, ads, labels, newspapers, consumer and supermarket magazines and 
leaflets, communication exchanges with shopkeepers, relatives and friends, generic 
How safe is eating cHicken?
word of mouth) and indirect (price, product and dealer brands). Reliance on per-
sonal ability to choose safe and quality food plays also a role. Labels, and particularly 
expiry dates, are indicated as elements for evaluation, while the role of advertising 
and the media seems limited to providing very general, basic information (such as 
on new products). Information on nutritional values and the geographical origin of 
food is also deemed relevant.
Family habits and consumption styles play a role in driving the participants’ con-
sumer behaviour.
All the actors in the food chain are deemed accountable for food safety, including 
regulators and controllers. Consumers’ responsibility for their choices is also stressed 
to a remarkable extent. Consumer responsibility entails the idea of an “active con-
sumer”, who is committed and able to make safe(r) choices and, through such choices, 
to influence the food market.
trust is central to the whole food issue, with particular regard to food safety. It 
is relevant in both its traditional dimensions: interpersonal and systems trust. the 
former develops in a context of interpersonal relations, for example between consumer 
and shopkeeper; the latter in a context of activities led by socio-technical organisa-
tional structures, such as those responsible for ensuring the quality of food from the 
sanitary viewpoint. Interpersonal trust is affected by the declining importance of di-
rect, long-established relationships in the assessment of food quality/safety.
there are mixed feelings about the effects of market competition on quality and 
safety and about the effectiveness of regulatory and control systems. this suggests 
that the grounds of systems trust are rather unsteady. It also takes an “interpersonal” 
connotation to the extent that it is affected by a perceived “link” with the addressee of 
trust, for instance by means of consumer acquaintance with a brand or a firm. 
trust is connected with authority through the attribution of responsibility. to the 
extent that authoritative subjects are considered responsible for the well-being of those 
who rely on them, trust investments gain importance. Such considerations involve 
the economic actors, as implied by the importance ascribed to the credibility of a 
brand or a firm. Government authorities are mainly considered as untrustworthy, 
while consumer organisations receive more positive judgements. Opinions are divided 
as regards experts and research institutions.
Besides interpersonal and systems trust, the dimension of “confidence” is also rele-
vant. It refers to the perceived necessity to rely on actors and procedures, whose “good-
will” and effectiveness cannot be assessed. Confidence emerges when no possibility of 
“exit” from a situation of dependence on such actors and procedures is felt to exist.
Yet another orientation is a “no trust at all” one, that is to say a “self-reliant” posi-
tion. this can be analytically distinguished from both trust and confidence. It entails 
some sense of agency, but that is limited to a practical, experience-based ability to 
make safe choices.
to sum up, the FGs highlight two contrasting perspectives on the issue of food 
safety. Most interestingly, the two often coexist. the first one is represented by the 
idea of an active, responsible consumer. It highlights the benefits of the increasing 
variety of food and availability of information, as well as the improvement of regula-
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tions and controls. the other perspective is that of the sceptical or fatalist consumer. 
It highlights the overwhelming role of structural constraints, from the predominance 
of corporate interests to the imposition of “unhealthy” lifestyles, inattentive to the 
value of food. the intricacies and “unknowns” of food production and trade imply a 
growing difficulty in assessing the safety of food, on the part of consumers as well as 
institutional and business actors. this perspective finds expression in a deep sense of 
“loneliness”, of “being held hostage”, of “groping in the dark”. trusting is thus some-
thing of a necessity, a constraint, an obligation, rather than a well-grounded option.
3.4.3. Food scares: Issue framing and effects on consumers’ behaviour
the issue of food scares does not seem to play a crucial role in shaping overall 
perspectives on food safety and consumers’ present behaviour. Although the issue is 
a focus of research, usually it does not emerge until the facilitator raises it. the BSE 
crisis is most frequently mentioned, but quite a few others are recalled, such a ani-
mal epidemics (influenza, salmonella etc.), hormones, foot and mouth disease, plastic 
packages, GMOs, dioxin and other chemicals discovered in animals, vegetables or 
products like wine, water and oil.
Memory of crises is often vague and imprecise (period, origin, nature of problem, 
etc.) and differences exist among groups and countries. For example, the Chernobyl 
issue is recalled in Italy, Germany and France, while the implications of SARS for 
Chinese food are mentioned only by younger Italian participants.
On one side they are regarded as the tip of an iceberg, at the same time signalling 
and hiding broader and complex problems of safety and quality. In other words, they 
are understood as occasional events, but events which are not independent from the 
broader context of food production, sale and consumption. 
People become quite reflective when discussing food scares and their arguments 
can be grouped under the following headings:
a) framing, that is to say the connection between food scares and the operations 
of the food sector: desire for rapid profit, lack of adequate controls, corruption, 
etc.;
b) information, that is the role of the media in raising public attention to food 
scares; features – mostly negative – of media communication and their conse-
quences for consumer response;
c) features, that is the territorial scale of scares; involvement of one or more types 
of food; capability of anticipating problems; options for treatment of negative 
health effects; chance for consumers of adopting protective actions, etc.;
d) ethics, that is the connection between food scares and unnatural practices, dis-
regard for animal welfare, and so on.
the effects of food scares on the participants’ behaviour can be summarised 
as follows:
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a) temporary change of behaviour. this is the prevailing and most immediate 
reaction. It ranges from temporary interruption to reduction of consumption 
of “hazardous” foods and entails shift to different types of food, brands, etc.;
b) durable change of behaviour. this is a fairly frequent response. It may be the 
consolidation of an already present consumption orientation (such as a low 
use of meat) or a change in shopping preferences (such as turning from super-
markets to small shops). Sometimes changes in the family composition, such 
as the birth of a child, play a role in fostering behavioural change, beyond 
food scares. Once taken up, new habits often come to be considered healthier 
than the previous ones, beyond the specific protective function they had been 
originally adopted for;
c) no change of behaviour. this reaction characterises a minority of participants, 
who judge their consumption habits sufficiently self-protective or resolve that 
it is pointless to change them. they maintain that when a warning is issued, it 
is already too late to adopt effective “preventive” measures.
the reasons provided by participants for resuming original behaviours are basically 
the following:
a) tedium with the issue, feeling that “enough is enough”. this is usually con-
nected with an overload of information from unremitting and pervasive 
media coverage;
b) forgetfulness, gradual “fading away” of personal concern. this is usually parallel 
to a decline in media coverage;
c) practicality, that is to say difficulties in persisting with restrictions in diet;
d) reassurance from the media, friends, shopkeepers. Few participants mention 
this motive and they generally judge it as the least important.
It is worth noticing that explanations in terms of imitative behaviour are given 
little credit by virtually all participants. However it is not easy, either for the con-
sumers themselves or the researchers, to distinguish actual imitation from influence 
by significant others3 (relatives, friends, trusted dealers, etc.). Also, some partici-
pants may be reticent to admit their imitative behaviour publicly even when they 
are aware of it.
3.4.4. Food scares: Effects of media communication and lessons learned
Feelings are mixed as regards the role of the media. they are considered to play 
a crucial role. the media – particularly the tV, but also the radio, newspapers and 
3 Significant others usually means the people who play a particular role in providing the actor with 
cognitive, normative and affective behavioural models. See Mead (193).
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magazines – set the agenda, providing some initial and baseline information on food 
scares. Subsequently personal styles of information seeking, active to varying degrees, 
are enacted. Access to the Internet for finding further information and different sourc-
es is frequently mentioned, in particular by younger participants who are familiar with 
the use of the computer in their professional or leisure activities.
Overall media coverage of food crises is judged negatively: uninformative, sensa-
tionalist, inconsistent, and possibly driven by vested interests. However, the media 
are also praised for their capacity to alert public attention and broadcast warnings. 
A positive consequence of highly publicised food crises is the introduction of stricter 
norms and controls.
A closer look at the criteria according to which information is evaluated provides 
the following results:
a) approach to communication. this includes complaints about sensationalism 
(though possibly justified in the initial phase of a crisis), untimeliness, and 
inconsistency. the main consequences are public boredom, annoyance, anxiety 
and diffidence;
b) characteristics of the media. this includes considerations of the trustworthiness 
(independence, reliability, accuracy, competence) of different media, broadcast-
ers and sources, as well as particular programmes and communicators. there 
are complaints about the limited space for “independent” scientific advice;
c) information content. this includes considerations about the predominance of 
“negative” content (information on food crises and their “bad” effects) over 
“positive” content (advice on appropriate behaviour). Complaints also regard 
deficiencies in clarity, completeness, precision, consistency, practical usefulness 
and reasoned arguments. A few participants judge that the withdrawal of some 
information may be justified by concerns about spreading panic.
It is maintained that bad news gets more attention than good news. Not only is 
“negative” information more widely and repeatedly disseminated, it is also more fre-
quently believed (and therefore effective) than “positive” information, which is often 
regarded with scepticism. Many participants complain that only negative events are 
reported by the media, and there is no clear indication about the end of a crisis.
It is worth noticing that the distinction between “source”, “channel” and “broad-
caster” seems to some extent blurred in the group discussions. In other words, when 
talking of centralised sources of information, participants refer on the one side to 
particular newspapers, tV channels and programmes, to the professional communica-
tors who prepare and present information, or broadcasters for one particular channel 
(such as radio vs. tV). On the other side, they refer to those who talk through these 
channels or whose claims and opinions are reported. Sometimes they refer to both of 
them at the same time.
 On the difference between source, channel and broadcaster see the classic studies by Klapper (1960) 
and Hovland et al. (1953).
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Declarations of interest in more information and facilitated access to different 
sources contrast with the scant efforts made to this end. Motivations refer to the defi-
ciencies of the information system and their negative psychological effects.
Interpersonal communication (with relatives, friends, shopkeepers etc.) is very 
important in either providing additional information or mediating the processing 
of that derived from the mass media. this appears as a confirmation of the classical 
“two-step flow hypothesis” of mass communication, suggesting that interpersonal 
communication plays a remarkable role in filtering and interpreting information 
from centralised sources, thus orienting behavioural decisions (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 
1959). Evaluation of information from interpersonal sources is based on trust in-
vestments, where “affective” elements coexist with attributions of specific compe-
tence and insight in a certain issue.
there are mixed feelings about official communications. Overall, acquaintance with 
designated authorities is limited. Official statements are often regarded as unsatisfactory, 
untimely and reticent, although hardly groundless or misleading. trust investments ap-
peal to the authorities’ competence and responsibility. Mistrust derives from suspicion 
of vested interests or a lack of honesty. Official information remains a baseline which 
sets the agenda for media communication as well as personal reflections and responses to 
food scares. Consumer associations, when mentioned, are mostly regarded as potentially 
reliable sources of information. Occasionally possible vested interests are mentioned. 
technical competence is considered crucial but worryingly missing in politicians, who 
are the actual decision makers. there are contradictory feelings about safety enforce-
ment. On the one hand it is judged that, as a result of food scares, experts now have a 
greater influence on setting up regulations and control procedures. On the other, con-
trols are seen as inadequate or ineffective as events remain unpredictable, partly because 
of deficient, inconclusive or reticent evaluation on the part of the experts.
the lessons learned from past food crises largely coincide with the “durable effects” 
already mentioned above. they can be ascribed to two main categories:
a) behaviour: increased attention to safety issues in food choices; shift to healthier 
consumption styles; upgrading of controls;
b) issue framing: crises are seen as a manifestation of the “way things go”. Other 
crises are expected in the future, resulting from a combination of unbecoming 
conduct and some unpredictable factors connected with technological inno-
vation and social change. Crises are again going to trigger different and even 
contradictory individual responses, including bafflement, mistrust and disen-
chantment as well as enduring trust, confidence and self-reliance.
3.5. Comparative remarks
We regard as a major finding of this study the fact that the results outlined above 
have been obtained with a high degree of consistency across the various groups 
in each country. In other words, similarities largely prevail over differences. Most 
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noticeable is the usually similar articulation of arguments in both rounds of discus-
sions, though their focus was not identical. Sometimes consistency goes down to 
specific details (such as the reference to “humans playing God” with reference to 
GMOs, typical of the French groups). Also clearly manifest is the same articulation 
of the dimensions of trust (interpersonal and systems trust, confidence, self-reli-
ance). Overall there are no significant differences between participants’ opinions 
and feelings according to gender. Only in the second round of FGs did British 
female participants seem more concerned than males about food safety and more 
inclined to imitative behaviour.
though they provide no indications of any clear trend, it may be worth pointing 
out some minor differences that emerge between groups and between countries. Let 
us consider first cross-national differences. As said, knowledge of the control systems is 
generally low, at both national and European level. However, in the Netherlands and 
the UK awareness of who is in charge of national food safety is higher while national 
standards and controls are generally regarded as more reliable than “foreign” ones. In 
some countries considerations are more critical than elsewhere. In France some are 
worried about the weakness of sanitary controls, due to financial and personnel limita-
tions. In the British FGs only, the BSE crisis is often described as a prominent cause 
of the decline of trust in the government. And while BSE is mentioned everywhere, 
other scares are cited only in some countries (Chernobyl in Italy, Germany and France 
and the implications of SARS for food consumption only in Italy). 
the importance of ethical and environmental information is emphasised mainly 
in the Netherlands and UK, while the ethical implications of food scares are dis-
cussed in Germany, France and the Netherlands, focusing mainly on “unnatural 
practices” and disregard for animal welfare. these types of considerations are practi-
cally absent in Italy. 
Some sources of information are more valued in some countries (such as the 
Internet in UK), while distrust in the independence and reliability of information 
is stronger in France, Italy and the UK. In France, however, there is more evidence 
of trust investments in “centralised” vs. “network” information sources. Moreover, 
trust in official communication on food scares is greater here than elsewhere. In the 
Netherlands interpersonal communication is less important than elsewhere while 
there is a recognition of the role of “positive” information (official information 
concerning the end of a food crisis) in restoring importance attributed to original 
consumption styles.
In France and Germany consumer organisations are more consistently indicated 
as trustworthy. Scientist and experts are generally appreciated. In the Netherlands 
there is a mainly positive evaluation of them, while in France and the UK the decline 
of trust also involves those working in universities and research institutions, who are 
believed to be influenced by private fund providers.
Finally, the “active consumer” argument is endorsed more prominently in the 
Netherlands, whereas confusion, scepticism, diffidence and fatalism find stronger ex-
pression in France and Italy. the UK and Germany offer a somehow contradictory 
picture, with differences between the first and second round of FGs. 
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Let us now consider between-group differences in more detail. As regards the first 
round of FGs, “Care” and “Concern” group members are to some extent more inter-
ested in collecting and assessing information. Particularly in Italy and the Netherlands, 
the “active consumer” argument is endorsed to a lesser extent in some groups (“Care” 
and “Indifference” in Italy; “Indifference” and “Concern” in the Netherlands). Some 
predictable discrepancies characterise the “meaning” of food and the ranking of the 
criteria of choice. Participants in the “Pleasure” groups tend to downplay the func-
tion of food and to highlight its cultural value and its taste, which also has nutritional 
health connotations (what is good to eat is also healthy because produced in the right 
way, using quality components). they also consider food as an indicator of “class”. the 
appreciation of “naturalness” and nutritional aspects are stressed more by participants 
in the “Concern” and “Care” groups5, while attention to price is more marked in the 
“Indifference” group. However, similarities are also largely predominant in this case. 
It is striking, for example, that members of the “Indifference” group are quite close to 
the others in attributing importance to taste, freshness, quality and safety. Sometimes 
they seem even more concerned than many participants in the other groups.
In sum, in each country inter-group discrepancies do not override intra-group 
ones. this finding partially contradicts those studies which stress the relevance of in-
stitutional and cultural differences on fiduciary relations in the food sector (Sassatelli 
and Scott, 001; Berg et al., 005).
In all countries FG participants describe food-related issues in similar terms. there 
are differences in how such terms are combined and how the argumentation is devel-
oped. However, no national trend is detectable.
Even from the second round of FGs, no outstanding differences emerge on any 
of the topics addressed in the discussions, according to the “trust investment” (prior-
ity assigned to centralised or network information sources) or “age” variables, which 
were the two criteria considered in the composition of the FGs. As regards the former, 
differences are minor and erratic. there is some evidence that age makes a difference. 
For example, “antagonistic” behaviour in response to a food scare (going on with or 
enhancing the “risky” consumption style) seems mostly typical of young (male) par-
ticipants. At the same time, being a teenager when a scare occurred, particularly BSE, 
seems to have produced particularly strong effects on food consumption styles (such 
as becoming a vegetarian).
In general younger participants show a higher level of interest and appreciation for 
reasoned arguments and comprehensive explanations. they take a more disenchanted 
stance towards authorities, experts, business and the media, being more aware of their 
specific agendas. Moreover, they are not easily captured by the rhetoric of “what ought 
to be” and seem more concentrated on “what is likely to be”. Overall they are fairly 
confident in their own ability to filter, select and process information, using a number 
of resources and strategies.
5 In the second round of FGs, particularly in France, participants with children tended to show more 
concern for food safety and information.
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3.6. ConCluding remarks
Several indications can be drawn from the above. the overall picture of the con-
nections between trust, food safety, risk information and consumption is somewhat 
blurred. there are many different and at times contradictory opinions about the roles 
of individual consumers, public authorities and the different actors in the food chain, 
as well as about the positive and negative aspects of the regulatory and control systems 
and of the market as a regulatory mechanism. Attributions of responsibility are very 
difficult to establish, due to the intricacy of the food chain and the weaknesses of the 
regulatory and control systems. Recent major food scares are not indicated as the main 
causes of general mistrust and social pessimism. this situation clearly has many caus-
es, although BSE, dioxin-chicken and the like did nothing to improve it. Food scares, 
moreover, seem not to have significantly modified consumers’ behaviour, which is 
seen as primarily dependent on the “structural” factors shaping the food sector.
A shared opinion (or rather feeling) is that no subject or institutional setting really 
addresses the preoccupations and concerns of the citizens, in a context characterised 
by high levels of uncertainty. As a consequence, individuals seem to “wander” in search 
of someone or something to trust, being ultimately driven by their own idiosyncrasies. 
this is confirmed by the apparent lack of any consistent trend based on national be-
longing or other discriminating criteria, such as those adopted in the composition of 
the groups. As already mentioned, the FG technique does not allow for generalisation 
of findings, yet the latter do allow the formulation of some sound hypotheses in the 
light of the discussions among participants.
the lack of ultimate discriminating power in the variables considered in the 
design of the study may be interpreted in three different ways. the first is that this 
is the actual situation. Contradictions are found precisely because people are con-
fused. the second is that (contrary to the hypotheses which drove FG formation) 
participants’ views are linked neither to food consumption styles nor to trust invest-
ments in information sources. 
the third interpretation is that there is a linkage between trust and the variables 
considered, but it is an indirect one, with other factors acting as intervening variables 
(Pellizzoni, 005). Group discussions provide some support to this interpretation. For 
example, we are aware that the filtering question for the second round of FGs was apt 
to grasp only a very basic or generic trust orientation, while the participants’ positions 
are actually much more nuanced, as group discussions showed. In each country, and to 
some extent across Europe, all participants share a largely common ground as to expo-
sure to and possible selection of information sources. Also the lines of argumentation 
are likely to be fostered, to some extent, by the very opportunity of reflection offered 
by the FGs, an opportunity which clearly was not there when the filtering question was 
asked. However, it is unlikely that such “reflective” attitudes were built from scratch in 
the group discussion setting. It is more likely that the latter provided the participants 
with the opportunity to “crystallise” and verbalise some underlying orientations hitherto 
“unattended”. Group discussions show that “reflective” responses to food safety issues 
predominate, with “reactive” ones mostly concentrated in the initial phases of a crisis.
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As already pointed out, even participants in the “Indifference” groups choose hard 
discounts not because they are not concerned about food quality and safety, but be-
cause their assessment of the issue drives them to particular conclusions. this is con-
veyed by statements about the unjustified cost or doubtful quality of organic food, or 
the debatable relevance of labels and brands in terms of safety.
What types of intervening variables one should look at? the relevance of so-
cio-demographic ones (age, gender, income, etc.) can better be explored by other 
research techniques, such as the survey (see Chapter ). Possibly, orientations on 
food safety, trust and responsibility are part of a Weltanschauung, a worldview which 
assembles attitudes, values, opinions and normative and factual beliefs on different 
but somehow related matters such as the pros and cons of science and technology, 
the reliability of public authorities, the role of the EU, the reliability of one’s own 
network of relations. 
If the preceding considerations grasp something real, as FG discussion suggest 
– that is if consumers’ orientations on issues of food safety are highly reflective and 
connected with a broad set of value commitments and factual considerations about 
one’s own situation and the context in which one’s choice has to be made – then the 
conclusion is that any policy approach aimed at restoring people’s trust in food safety 
and in the credibility and reliability of the various actors present in the food chain 
should not dismiss this complex scenery. No ready-made information strategy is likely 
to succeed. Credibility and trust – including consumers’ trust in their own ability to 
choose safely and responsibly – are unlikely to be obtained without a sustained effort 
to behave consistently and reliably on the part of the political, economic and scientific 
parties in the food sector. Overall, group discussions showed that individual respons-
es to food scares are likely to depend on several factors, namely: personal consumer 
experiences and already existing consumption habits; sense of agency; information 
from the mass media, with particular reference to source and content of communica-
tion; information from interpersonal relations, with reference to existing networks 
and the related trust investments (attributions of goodwill, technical competence, 
factual knowledge); personal situation; socio-demographic characteristics (age, gen-
der, household composition, income, etc.); basic value-orientations towards political, 
economic, scientific and cultural institutions. these factors should be taken into ac-
count in the design and implementation of food safety policies and more specifically 
of communication strategies.
A possible outline of the latter, as it may be drawn from group discussion on infor-
mation needs, includes the following five partially overlapping phases.
First phase: basic information and warnings. In the initial phase communication 
should provide the public with basic information, warnings and advice on the prob-
lem in question. Some sensationalism may be tolerated, as it arouses public attention. 
Journalists, political actors and health authorities should have the floor.
Second phase: emergency actions. there should be more detailed accounts of 
what is being done (at regulatory, control and market levels) to deal with the crisis 
as well as advice to consumers on how to protect themselves and contribute to 
damage control.
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third phase: analysis. this is the time for more detailed accounts of the causes and 
dynamics of the crisis, including different possible interpretations and management 
strategies. A major role should be taken by scientists, experts, independent research 
bodies and scientific journalists. Dedicated programmes should be broadcast by radio 
and tV, special articles should be published in newspapers and magazines; informa-
tive leaflets should be widely disseminated to targeted audiences and so forth. the 
communicative approach should pursue pragmatic outcomes while increasing space 
for reflection in connection with in-depth consideration of possible multiple causes of 
a crises and related possible strategies for its governance.
Fourth phase: re-solution. the media should report on the implementation of the 
devised management strategies, providing accounts of their achievements, failures, 
difficulties, costs, benefits and drawbacks. there should be reasoned forecasts about 
the expected end of the crisis and competent advice on resuming consumption of the 
“incriminated” food product. Information should catch public attention by combin-
ing “quick news” with more “reasoned” accounts of what is going on.
Fifth phase: end of crisis. In this phase there should be clear, unambiguous ac-
counts of how, or to what extent, the problem has been “solved” and the crisis is 
exhausted. A combination of “quick news” and more detailed explanations is again 
advisable. the floor should be taken mainly by official health authorities and the 
government. Information should include devised changes in food production and 
consumption which are likely to be durable and positive for health, safety and quality. 
there should be accounts of the inputs provided to the food market to enable it to 
reorganise accordingly.
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4. trust aCross europe: results from a  
Cross-Country survey
Alexandra E. Lobb, W. Bruce Traill, 
Mario Mazzocchi, and Diane McCrea
abstraCt
The paper presents the survey instruments developed in order to collect data on attitudes toward 
chicken consumption, food risk perception and trust in the food chain actors at a the European level. 
Consumers segments in five European countries are illustrated with respect to the trust they place upon 
various information sources through a cluster analysis. The final results evidence the presence of three 
kinds of consumers characterised by different level of trust in food chain actors and in information 
sources. Thus influence consumption choices indirectly, rather than in a straightforward manner, 
through concerns for quality, defined by several criteria and pursued by a number of buying strate-
gies. Opinions on the different actors involved in the food chain, including regulatory and control 
agencies, are diverse, complex, and sometimes contradictory.
Keywords: food consumption, food crises, food safety, consumer segmentation, food attitudes.
4.1. introduCtion
In recent years the agricultural and food sectors have experienced repeated food crises 
and the level of trust in food safety information has become increasingly topical in both 
the public arena, and from a research perspective. Consequently consumers and policy 
makers have begun to focus their attention on risk communication. Many interesting 
differences between European consumers and foreign consumers have emerged (USDA, 
00). Food scares in the USA are generally more isolated and have small impacts on 
consumers’ demand. the main reasons for such differences are related to the high degree 
of confidence in American regulation of the food supply chain (Buzby and Ready, 1996) 
vs. the mixed confidence in European governments’ public controls.
the research problem addressed in the tRUSt project is the understanding of the na-
ture, determinants and process of social diffusion of trust in food risk information. three 
key components of the above research problem can be recognised: (1) to identify socio-
demographic and personality consumer segments differing in their attitudes towards spe-
cific food risks, with respect to the trust they place upon various information sources; () 
to test the causal relationship hypothesised between socio-demographic factors and trust 
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and between attitudes towards food risk and trust (see Chapter 5); and (3) to compare the 
determinants of trust across EU countries. In order to answer to the above objectives, pri-
mary data needed to be collected within the tRUSt survey, explicitly taking into account 
the inputs from psychological experiments and focus groups (see Chapters  and 3) and 
providing the necessary information for the subsequent research phase.
this Chapter has two fundamental objectives: firstly we introduce the main meth-
odological aspects related to the survey conducted in Spring 00 in five European 
countries (Italy, UK, France, Germany and the Netherlands) in order to analyse so-
cio-demographics determinants of trust in food chain actors; secondly, we present the 
fundamental characteristics of European consumers in terms of consumption habits, 
food quality and safety perception and trust in food information sources, in descrip-
tive statistical terms, as well as through the use of segmentation analysis to identify 
consumers who may have a greater propensity to behave in a certain way, thus allow-
ing policy makers to direct a message at that group.
the Chapter is structured as follows: Section  briefly summarises literature on 
different definition of trust. then, in Section 3, the survey design is outlined fol-
lowing options and discussions from tRUSt’s partners during the first phase of the 
project. Section  underlines the final choice of surveying method, along with some 
descriptive results. A segmentation analysis is conducted with results reported in Sec-
tion 5. Finally, some conclusions are drawn.
4.2. survey design and referenCe population
In order to collect consumer data developing a cross-country analysis, as in our 
case, a survey was planned, as shown in table .1.
table .1. Steps to be followed in developing a survey
Source: authors’ elaboration from Malhotra (1999)
thus, a first issue is the choice of the sampling unit, which is closely related to the 
definition of the reference population. the information required as it emerges from 
the research questions is strictly related to decision-making and action and would 
be strongly biased if the respondent were not involved into making food purchasing 
a) Identification of the reference population 
b) Definition of the research questions 
c) Choice of sampling criteria 
d) Definition of the estimation methodology for making inference on the surveyed parameters 
e) Choice of sample size 
f) Choice of the data-collection method (method of administration) 
g) Questionnaire design 
h) Costs evaluation 
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choices, being in this context, the economically relevant person. the sample is also 
expected to be probabilistic and nationally representative in order to minimise differ-
ences between those living in different countries/cultures.
However, having a sampling frame for food shoppers which is also significant at the 
national level is virtually impossible. Hence, it is convenient to maintain the house-
hold as the sampling unit and ensure that the respondent is a representative individual 
for the whole household. the reference population comprised all households in the 
UK, the Netherlands, Germany, France and Italy. the sampling method must en-
sure a representative sample for each country, which means five separate surveys with 
identical characteristics. the sampling unit is the household, and the person in charge 
of food shopping is expected to be the respondent. table . reports the number of 
households in each of the above countries.
table .. Reference population
4.3. the ChoiCe of the tRUSt survey method
the next step requires the choice of the survey method and sample size, taking into 
account the trade-off between costs and sampling error, given a limited budget. For a 
detailed methodological note on sample size determination see Appendix .1.
In determining the survey method, it is worth noting that the difference between 
mail, face-to-face and non computer-assisted telephone interviews is marginal in terms 
of precision, both for sample mean estimates and percentage values. this, despite the 
fact that for the given budget, mail surveys and telephone interviews allow for a sam-
ple size which is almost double that of face-to-face interview. there are two explana-
tions for such a result. the first is related to the fact that the number of respondents 
for the face-to-face interviews is large enough to guarantee an acceptable level of preci-
sion, with confidence interval for the population estimates within a maximum range 
of ± 7.3% for the mean estimate and ± 9.8% for the percentage estimate. the second 
 
Country Great Britain Italy France Germany The Netherlands
Year 2002 2001 1999 2002 2002
One person  % 29 24 31 37 34 
Two people  % 35 26 31 34 33 
Three people  % 16 23 16 14 13 
Four people  % 14 20 14 11 14 
Five or more people  % 7 8 8 4 7 
All households 
(=100%)  
millions 24 22 24 39 7 
Average household 
size  
People 2.4 2.6 2.4 2.1 2.3 
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explanation depends on the way the variables are measured. Despite being regarded 
as a quantitative variables, Likert-type measures, show by definition, a limited range, 
hence a relatively small sample size is sufficient to obtain good estimates.
Some further considerations about the precision level are necessary. the precision 
levels reported in table .3 are computed assuming the maximum possible dispersion 
in the population, so that we can reasonably expect that the actual error will be lower. 
these must be taken as an upper band for the sampling error. Furthermore, the gain 
in precision from a stratified or post-stratified sample can not be computed as the in-
formation about variability within the strata is lacking, but even a simple stratification 
– as a subdivision into two strata, with or without children, will most likely lead to a 
significant improvement in terms of sampling variance and relative error.
table .3. Sample size, sampling variance and maximum sampling error of estimate in the 
tRUSt survey for different survey methods
Note:
(a) Assuming a 7-point Likert scale variable, with a mean value of  and a variance of 9
(b) Assuming a percentage value of 50%, i.e. the point of maximum variability (5%)
It is generally accepted that face-to-face interviews provide higher quality response 
with respect to their mail and telephone counterparts. this is due to personal contact 
with the interviewer and the respondent, even if there are other issues to be carefully 
considered (interviewer bias, wariness of respondents, social desirability of answers). An-
other advantage is that the face-to-face approach should allow a higher sampling control, 
especially in cases where the market research company arranges the interviews in an ap-
propriate way (i.e. agreeing the best time for the interview, providing an accurate expla-
nation of the research purpose, etc.). this reduces significantly the non-response ratio, 
which could be an extremely relevant problem for mail and telephone interviews. Apart 
from the CAtI telephone interview, whose high fixed costs seem to prevent us from 
producing a competitive sample, there is no real sampling difference across the remain-
ing method. thus, it is worth considering other aspects of the different survey methods. 
tables . and .5 estimates the sample error, costs for different sampling sizes as well as 
the budgetary conditions necessary to minimise the level of sampling error.
 
Sampling 
size(a)
Mean(b) Proportion
 
Questionnaires Estimated 
Respondents 
Sampling 
Variance 
Relative 
error (%) 
Sampling 
Variance 
Relative 
error(c) 
(%) 
Survey method 
Mail Survey  3,875 775 0.0116 ± 5.3 0.00032 ± 7.0 
Face-to-face  446 402 0.0224 ± 7.3 0.00062 ± 9.8 
Telephone (no 
CATI)  1,160 870 0.0103 ± 5.0 0.00029 ± 6.6 
Telephone 
(CATI)  167 125 0.0720 ± 13.1 0.00200 ± 17.5 
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table .. Relative sampling error levels and costs for different sampling sizes
Note: (a) Based on cost quotes and response ratios as reported in table .3
table .5. Sample size and costs for different levels of the relative sampling error
Note: Based on cost quotes and response ratios as reported in table .3
Hence, when deciding among different survey type, it is very important to con-
sider quality issues together with the sampling size. If we accept that a minimum level 
for the relative sampling error (i.e. a confidence interval) within ±10% range, a sample 
size of about 00 would guarantee such results for proportion estimates (and the mean 
error. would be ±7.3%). this would lead to a cost of about € 3,800 for a face-to-face 
survey, the preferable option for this survey.
 
Sample size  00001 0001 005 003 052 002 051 001 
Efficiency 
Mean – sampling variance 0.090 0.060 0.045 0.036 0.030 0.018 0.009 0.001 
Mean – relative error (%) ± 14.7 ± 12.0 ± 10.4 ± 9.3 ± 8.5 ± 6.6 ± 4.6 ± 1.5 
Proportion – sampling variance 0.0025 0.0017 0.0012 0.0010 0.0008 0.0005 0.0002 0.0000 
Proportion – relative error (%) ± 19.6 ± 16.0 ± 13.9 ± 12.4 ± 11.3 ± 8.8 ± 6.2 ± 2.0 
Costs(a) 
Mail Survey 8,000 10,000 12,000 14,000 16,000 24,000 44,000 404,000 
Face-to-face  13,200 16,800 20,400 24,000 27,600 42,000 78,000 726,000 
Telephone (no CATI) 9,300 10,950 12,600 14,250 15,900 22,500 39,000 336,000 
Telephone (CATI) 31,000 39,000 47,000 55,000 63,000 95,000 175,000 1,615,000 
 
 
Relative sampling error  ± 1% ± 2% ± 5% ± 10% 
 Mean  
Sample size required  21,609 5,402 864 216 
Mail Survey  868,360 220,090 38,574 12,644 
Face-to-face  1,561,848 394,962 68,234 21,558 
Telephone (no CATI)  719,097 184,274 34,524 13,131 
Telephone (CATI)  3,472,440 879,360 153,298 49,574 
 Proportion  
Sample size required 38,416 9,604 1,537 384 
Mail Survey  1,540,640 388,160 65,466 19,366 
Face-to-face  2,771,952 697,488 116,638 33,660 
Telephone (no CATI)  1,273,728 322,932 56,709 18,677 
Telephone (CATI)  6,161,560 1,551,640 260,862 76,466 
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the adopted sampling method was Random Location Sampling, which provides a 
country-representative subdivision into locations; the locations were selected randomly 
across potential locations and accounted for a national representative sample (e.g. prob-
ability of extraction proportional to population). the sampling unit was the household 
and the respondent the person responsible for the actual purchase of food.
Preliminary research helped to devise an appropriate modelling framework for the 
questionnaire, to investigate the survey design and sampling issues, leading to the devel-
opment of the survey protocol, and providing an example questionnaire. Following the 
theory of Planned Behaviour (tPB) framework a questionnaire was developed in order 
to analyse EU consumers’ behaviour in relation to purchasing chicken. the question-
naire was designed and translated in the various languages using the back-translation 
method to ensure invariance of meaning of questions across countries. A pilot study 
using two products, chicken and eggs, was undertaken across all participating countries 
in April 00 with a minimum of 10 participants in each country. the pilot study was 
particularly useful in assisting with devising the final questionnaire and ensuring that 
cross country issues and translation problems could be kept to a minimum.
the questionnaire was revised following the pilot study to focus solely on chicken 
and a nationally representative survey of 500 to 600 consumers (depending on coun-
try size) was conducted in five countries (UK, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands and 
France) in May 00 on ,75 respondents as face-to-face, in-home interviews (Figure 
.1). the questionnaire took approximately 30 minutes to complete with “prompts” 
on certain questions from the interviewer when required by the respondent. Data was 
subject to a 10% validation. Following the survey a segmentation analysis (Section 6) 
and a causal model analysis (see Chapter 5) were conducted.
Figure .1. Sample size by EU country participants
Country 
FranceNetherlandsGermanyItalyUK
C
ou
nt
700
600
500
400
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4.4. desCriptive analysis and results
this Section examines the data from the survey in descriptive terms and presents 
an overall picture of the sample of each individual country and across the five Euro-
pean countries.
4.4.1. Demographics
As the respondent was the person responsible for the purchase of food, the great-
er proportion were female (69.1%), however this varied between the five countries 
(table .6).
table .6. Country analysis by gender
Within our sample group there was an overall dominance of married respondents 
(60%), which was highest in the Netherlands (68%) and lowest in the UK (51.6%). 
the mean age was 5 years old, with a minimum of 18 and a maximum of 9 years.
Across our EU sample most people (7.3%) had completed a Higher Second-
ary School education. the Netherlands had the highest proportion of people with 
a University Degree or above (15%) and the French respondents had the highest 
proportion of people with no formal education (11.%). 1.% of all respondents 
were employed full time and 19.% were retired. Of the specific categories of em-
ployment, the French had the highest proportion of full time employees (55%), 
followed by the British (9%). the Germans had the highest proportion of unem-
ployed (5.%), the French the highest proportion of retired workers (7.6%), the 
Dutch the highest proportion of part time employees (37%), and the Italians the 
highest proportion of students (7.7%). the majority of respondents were employed, 
working in non-manual jobs (33%) with only 1% of the overall sample employed in 
farming or agriculture. the Germans had the largest proportion of people employed 
in non-manual occupations (50%), the French the highest proportion of manual 
employees (17.%), the highest proportion of executives (19.6%) and the highest 
proportion of farmers/agricultural workers (.1%). the Italians were more likely to 
be self-employed (1%) and the most likely to be employers (3.%).
Across our EU sample 18.9% of people live on their own. 3.6% live with one 
other person and 39.5% of people live in households with 3 or  people (19.7% and 
19.8% respectively). Across individual countries the French are the most likely to live 
Country 
UK Italy Germany Netherlands France 
Total 
Gender Female 87.6 51.0 70.0 70.8 68.0 69.1 
 Male 12.4 49.0 30.0 29.2 32.0 30.9 
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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alone (6.8%), and the UK and Italy are the most likely to have 3 or  people per 
household (5% and 7.% respectively). the largest households (5 or more people) 
are in the Netherlands (1.6%) or the UK (11.6%).
On average, 3% of our EU respondents have children with the Italians the least 
likely to have children (33%) and the British the most likely (57.%). Of our EU 
respondents who have children, 6% of the children are under the age of 16.
Across our EU sample 5% of respondents live in towns with less than 10,000 
people, 5% live in towns between 10,000 and 100,000 people and 30% live in towns 
larger than 100,000 people.
4.4.2. Purchasing habits
Food shopping for households’ home consumption takes place on average (5%) 
between once and twice every week. 60.8% of people across the EU sample spend 
between 5 and 119 Euros (Pounds in the UK) each week on food for the house-
hold’s home consumption. On average this suggests that, since the respondent buys 
food for the consumption of .69 people per week, somewhere between 17 and 
8 Euros (Pounds in the UK) are spent on food for home consumption per per-
son. Interestingly, over 50% of the Dutch spend more than 10 € each week on 
food for their household’s home consumption, although they generally have larger 
households. 15.% of the French spend less than 5 € per week on food, although 
the French have the smallest households. Less than 6% of the EU sample has veg-
etarians in their households. the Netherlands has more vegetarians than the other 
European countries. With regards to chicken, our product of choice for the survey 
(see Section  for justification) less than 10% of EU respondents never buy chicken. 
the British are most likely to buy chicken at some stage (95%) and the Italians are 
least likely to buy chicken (1.6% never buy chicken).
Fresh and frozen chicken are the most commonly purchased chicken products. 
the Germans and French are far more interested in purchasing “fresh” chicken than 
those from other countries. Over 70% of the Dutch, French and Italians never pur-
chase frozen chicken and over 60% of the same groups never purchase chicken as part 
of a prepared meal.
the type of chicken purchased was difficult to measure (Figure .). A scale, 
including an “I don’t know” option, from “value” chicken, “standard” chicken, “or-
ganic” chicken to “luxury” chicken was developed. Interviews were prompted to 
explain that the interpretation was provided as follows (this is typical for the British 
consumer): “Value” chicken is the cheapest variety of chicken you can purchase at a 
supermarket often sold in bulk; “Standard” chicken is the typical chicken you find 
on the shelf of a typical supermarket. “Luxury” chicken is equivalent of corn fed or 
free range chicken or even tesco Finest Chicken, or perhaps chicken from a higher 
class store e.g. Marks and Spencer or Selfridges Food Hall. 50% of the EU sample 
purchases what they believe to be “standard” chicken. the French, and to a lesser 
extent the Germans, are far more concerned with purchasing “luxury” or “organic” 
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chicken. the Dutch appear to be more price conscious purchasing a high propor-
tion of “value” chicken even though they spend more money on food for household 
home consumption than any other country.
Figure .. type of chicken purchased by country
An average of 1 kg of chicken is purchased for a household in a typical week with 
a minimum of none and a maximum of 5 kg per week. the UK shows the high-
est level of consumption in terms of quantity on average. On average 6 € is spent in 
a typical week on chicken, with a minimum of zero and a maximum of 8 €. this 
translates to, on average, a price of 6 € per kg of fresh or frozen chicken. On average, 
the Italians spend the most on their chicken per week, even though they are the least 
likely to purchase chicken.
Overall, 75% of people purchase their chicken at the supermarket, with the Brit-
ish being the most likely to purchase at the supermarket (85%), the Germans are 
the least likely to purchase from the supermarket (%). the Germans are the most 
likely to purchase at a discount store (3%) or a local shop (16%), whilst the British 
are the least likely to purchase from a discount store (95%) and the French the least 
likely to purchase from a local store (97%). the Italians are most likely to purchase 
their chicken from a butcher (57%), the Germans are least likely to purchase from 
the butcher (87%). the French are most likely to purchase from a farmer (7%) or 
a market (3%), the British are the least likely to purchase from these sources (99% 
and 97% respectively).
‘Luxury’ chicken
‘Organic’ chicken
‘Standard’ chicken
‘Value’ chicken
I don’t know
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4.4.3. Quality, safety and risk perception
Food safety is generally considered to be “extremely important” (5.5%) with 
93.7% of people ranking food safety above a 5 on a 7 point scale from “extremely 
unimportant” (1) to “extremely important” (7). the French are the most ambivalent 
towards food safety: 11.9% reported a  or less on the 7 point scale. the Italians ap-
pear to be the most concerned about food safety: 97% concluded that food safety 
should be awarded a score greater than 5.
When looking at general issues other than food safety and how important they 
are to consumers, on a country by country level, we see some interesting results. Fat 
and cholesterol content is considered to be more important (>5 on the 1-7 scale) in 
Italy (86.1% and 85.6% respectively) than the other countries, and less important in 
France (6.5% and 57.9% respectively), suggesting the Italians are the most health 
conscious group in our sample with the French being the least concerned with such 
issues. Most products are perceived to be reasonably safe, apart from GM foods and 
prepared meals. the Italians and the French are most concerned about GM foods; the 
Dutch are the least concerned about GM foods.
the Dutch appear to be the most adventurous when trying different foods and res-
taurants, the Italians are, by far, the least likely to like food from other countries. the 
French and the Italians appear to be the most quality conscious and are always willing 
to pay a little more for quality. the British although appearing quality conscious are 
not prepared to pay the extra money required to purchase higher quality food. the 
Germans appear to be the least quality conscious. Over 50% of Italians try not to 
purchase products with pesticide or antibiotic residues, although they are not quite as 
keen as the French to pay for the privilege.
Moving to focus on chicken specific issues, on average, across all countries, people 
perceive chicken to taste good (the highest score for the attribute which most influenc-
es one’s decision to buy chicken), be low in fat and be a food which is liked by many 
and works well with a lot of other ingredients. Chicken is also generally perceived as 
low in cholesterol, even though there is no recognised link between chicken and cho-
lesterol levels. When examining salience issues it is interesting to report that the three 
most important reasons for buying chicken across the EU (ranked first) were: “chicken 
tastes good”, “chicken is good value for money” and “all the family likes chicken”. 
Within individual countries these three attributes remain the most important (ranked 
first) with the exception of the Dutch. the only attributes ranked at some point in the 
three most important attributes (which coincide with the three highest scores for the 
attribute which influences one’s decision to purchase chicken mentioned at the start of 
this paragraph) were: “chicken works well with lots of other ingredients” and “chicken 
is low in fat”. the taste of chicken truly is the most important attribute that people 
consider when considering whether or not to buy chicken next week.
Safety, not recognised as a deciding factor when purchasing chicken regardless 
of its importance on a general level, is relevant to the investigation. 5.8% of the 
EU sample believes chicken is neither a safe nor an unsafe food, when responding 
to the statement “chicken is a safe food”, with the majority of the respondents 
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(56.6%) seeing it as more safe (> 5 on a 1 to 7 scale from “completely disagree” (1) 
to “completely agree” (7)) than unsafe (17.6%) (<3 on the scale). the Dutch are 
the least likely to view chicken as a safe food with 3% disagreeing (< 3 on the 1 
to 7 scale). the Italians are the most likely to view chicken as a safe food (67.%) 
(>5 on the 1 to 7 scale).
the EU sample view themselves as having low or negligible knowledge of health 
risks related to chicken. French and Italian respondents feel they are more knowl-
edgeable of health problems resulting from antibiotics, pesticides and growth hor-
mones. the Dutch and Germans (and to a lesser extent the British) feel they are 
more knowledgeable about salmonella. Most of respondents claim to recognise 
“safe” chicken as (1) “fresh”; () being clearly labelled; (3) being organic, free-range 
or corn-fed. the majority of respondents (79.8%) feel that they can minimise their 
food safety risks by taking appropriate action (for >5 on a 1 to 7 scale, from “to a 
minimal extent” (1) to “to a large extent” (7)). Interestingly, the Dutch (91%) and 
the British (89%) feel they have more self-control over food safety risks than those 
in the other European countries. the Italians are the most sceptical, as only 70% 
rated a score of 5 or greater.
Interestingly swimming is perceived to be the least risky activity (only 10% of 
respondents perceived a risk greater than 5 on a 7 point scale where 7 is the risk 
is “extremely high”). the most risky activity according to the EU sample is taking 
illegal drugs (93%), closely followed by smoking cigarettes (9%). On average, Ital-
ians appear to be the most risk adverse, while Germans are more inclined towards 
taking risks.
4.4. food safety information, sourCes and trust
television advertising is the least trusted source of information across all coun-
tries on average, followed by political groups, processors, government and maga-
zines (table .7). the most trusted information sources across all countries are, 
on average, doctors and other health authorities, national food safety authorities, 
university scientists and consumer organisations. the EFSA is not as trusted as the 
national authorities. the British appear to be on average the most trusting group 
with no rankings below the mid-point  of “neither trust nor distrust”. However 
the British are also less trusting of their National Food Safety authority than those 
in other countries. the French appear to be on average the least trusting group with 
television adverts and political groups rating .9 out of 7. the French also trust 
speciality stores and farmer/breeders above the average. the Italians are also on aver-
age more distrusting of political groups. Differences across countries emerge when 
trying to quantify the level of trust towards specific actors on average. the French 
are the most trusting of organic farmers, farmers in general and to a lesser extent 
brand producers. the Italians are the least trusting of farmers. the Dutch are the 
least trusting of industrial poultry breeders. On a general trust level, on average, the 
Dutch appear to be the most trusting.
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table .7. trust in information
Note: average scores to Question 3: “Suppose that each of the following has provided information about po-
tential risks associated with salmonella in food. Please indicate to what extent you would trust that information” 
(on a 1 to 7 point Likert scale from 1=‘completely distrust” to 7=‘completely trust’) for each European country. 
the more trusted sources/actors on average and the most trusting country (on average) for each source/actor 
are in bold.
From this, it can be surmised that the Germans are generally more trusting in food 
safety information from a variety of sources/actors, on average, than those from the 
other European countries.
Country
Source UK Italy Germany Nether-
lands
France Total
 45.4 84.4 27.4 46.4  srepeekpohS 5.01 4.69 
Supermarkets 4.99 4.73 4.54 4.49 4.48 4.64 
Organic shop  5.27 5.08 5.27 5.14 5.30 5.21 
Specialty store  5.12 4.05 4.91 5.28 5.70 5.01 
 65.4 09.4 76.4 70.5  sredeerb / sremraF 5.56 4.97 
 59.3  srossecorP 4.01 3.90 3.97 3.00 3.74 
Doctors / health authority  6.24 5.91 5.98 6.08 5.78 5.99 
University scientists  5.53 5.92 5.77 6.04 5.58 5.77 
National authority in charge of food safety  5.80 5.60 5.98 6.01 5.62 5.79 
 76.4 92.4 93.4 tnemnrevoG 5.36 3.90 4.50 
 33.3 55.3  spuorg lacitiloP 4.04 3.98 2.89 3.52 
Environmental organisations  4.86 4.78 5.41 4.51 4.84 4.86 
Animal welfare organisations  4.50 4.69 5.34 4.40 4.67 4.70 
Consumer organisations  5.22 5.58 6.02 5.72 5.91 5.69 
EU authority in charge of food safety  4.62 5.52 5.54 5.41 4.97 5.21 
 48.4 69.4  yratnemucod noisiveleT 5.26 5.05 4.87 4.98 
Television news / current affairs  5.17 5.15 5.55 5.39 4.79 5.19 
Television adverts  4.18 3.56 3.25 3.04 2.95 3.38 
 79.4 33.5 78.4 35.4  srepapsweN 5.01 4.94 
 77.4 43.4 45.4 tenretnI 4.82 4.25 4.54 
 65.4 68.4  oidaR 5.35 5.00 5.13 4.97 
 82.4 55.4  senizagaM 4.81 4.39 4.48 4.49 
Product label  4.81 5.19 4.48 5.01 5.50 5.03 
Average 4.89 4.78 5.03 4.93 4.80 4.88
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4.5. segmentation analysis
the aim of this Section is to attempt to classify consumers from the five European 
countries using a segmentation analysis with respect to the degree of trust they place 
on various information sources about food safety information. Both factor and cluster 
analyses were used to perform the segmentation analysis. Consumers can be segmented 
in several ways, by lifestyles, demographic characteristics, and in this case by their trust 
in sources of information. All three analyses were conducted, but the most significant 
segmentation result is based on trust variables. In fact, taking into account only de-
mographic or lifestyle variables does not provide a very informative classification and 
the interaction between these variables is limited; alternatively, looking at the lifestyle 
characteristics we can observe, more or less, conservative or adventurous consumers 
but their demographic characteristics are not enlightening. Instead, by looking at the 
level of trust people have in food safety information from different sources it is possi-
ble to obtain three distinct groups: “Non-trusters”, especially in independent sources; 
“Mixed trust” characterised by distrust in food chain actors and trust in independent 
sources; and “trusters”, especially in food chain actors and less in media.
4.5.1. Methodology
Segmentation of the statistical units according to a pre-determined set of variables 
is achieved through principal components analysis (PCA) and cluster analysis (CA), 
where the former technique allows a reduction of the data matrix into a reduced set of 
unrelated components and the latter produces the actual classification on the basis of 
the principal components score.
the advantages of performing PCA prior to clustering rather than applying CA to the 
original data set are to reduce the biases implied by the subjective researcher’s initial choice 
of the variables, as the inclusion of highly correlated variables might lead to an excessive 
weight on their common factor. the extracted principal components can be interpreted 
as underlying latent factors. For a more formalised description of the PCA see Krzanowski 
(1988) or Duntemann (1989). through principal components analysis the initial set of p 
indicators observed on n statistical units can be transformed into a reduced set of k prin-
cipal components which are able to explain a significant proportion of the original vari-
ability. In the case study described hereafter, the method of Guttman-Kaiser was adopted 
to choose the number of principal components to be considered. the method advises to 
retain the components whose eigenvalue is equal or larger than 1. Generally this criterion 
led to the selection of a number of components explaining between 65% and 70% of the 
original data variance. the variables obtained through PCA are a linear combination of the 
original indicators and are uncorrelated between variables.
In order to eliminate the effects of different measurement units, it is useful to ap-
ply the PCA to the correlation matrix. Working on the correlation matrix means in 
practice standardising the original data matrix and avoiding that the indicators with 
larger variability exercise a distorting influence on the principal components extrac-
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tion. Operating on the correlation matrix leads to the following formulation of the 
principal components scores that can be computed for each statistical unit.
4.5.2. Cluster analysis
Once the principal components have been extracted, one can proceed to the actual 
aggregation of the statistical units through cluster analysis. the aim of this method 
is the classification of a set of data often classifying people, in a purely empirical way, 
into a set of “mutually, exclusive, exhaustive, groups such that individuals within a 
group are similar to one another while individuals in different groups are dissimilar” 
(Chatfield and Collins, 000, p.1). the final set of groups is called partition.
For this analysis, the number of clusters was determined by comparing the results 
of three different clustering approaches:
a) the Ward hierarchical approach;
b) a repeated application of the non-hierarchical k-means method for different 
cluster numbers;
c) once the numbers of clusters were decided, the actual segmentation was based 
on the k-means method.
4.5.3. Segmentation analysis
From the design of the questionnaire the consumer could be potentially segmented 
in three different ways: lifestyles, demographics or variables explaining their level of 
trust in sources of information (see Chapter 5 for more details). All three types of 
segmentation analysis were performed however the most significant segmentation was 
by trust levels. the two segmentations using demographic or lifestyle variables do not 
return a very informative classification and the interaction between these variables is 
rather limited. We obtained four demographic groups but differences in trust towards 
food safety information across the clusters, albeit statistically relevant, are very mar-
ginal and it is not possible to differentiate distrusters from trusters. Similarly, if the 
multivariate analysis is applied to lifestyles characteristics, we obtain a meaningful 
classification suggesting conservative or adventurous consumers, but again there is no 
real connection between lifestyles and trust levels. therefore the results of a segmenta-
tion based on trust characteristics are reported.
the most significant segmentation was based on trust variables, using the informa-
tion from question 31. the original aim of this question was the understanding of 
consumers’ trust in different food chain actors (shopkeepers, supermarkets, organic 
shop, specialty store, farmers and processors), scientists (doctors, health authority and 
1 Question 3: “Suppose that each of the following has provided information about potential risks 
associated with salmonella in food. Please indicate to what extent you would trust that information”.
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university scientists), public sources of information (government, political groups, na-
tional and European authority in charge of food safety), independent sources (envi-
ronmental, animal welfare and consumer organisation) and media.
Performing a factor analysis through a quantitative PCA (principal component analy-
sis) we obtain five components. Selection of the principal components is based on the 
“method of eigenvalues”, which requires retention of principal components associated 
with an eigenvalue larger than 1. this leads to five principal components (see Chapter 5). 
Hence, trust in food safety information is aggregated through principal compo-
nent analysis to account for correlations across sources perceived as similar and pro-
vides estimates (principal component scores) for the latent trust constructs.
table .8 reports the latent trust dimensions and the relative component loadings 
after Varimax rotation. As shown in table .8, the latent constructs emerge as strongly 
characterised, with the first component emphasising trust in mass media, the second, 
trust in food chain actors, the third one trust in sources likely to be perceived as inde-
pendent (and interestingly including consumer organisations), the fourth was labelled 
as “alternative sources” as it includes specialty and organic stores as well as non-profit 
organisations and the fifth was termed “vested interest” as it includes sources including 
food processors, political groups and television adverts. 
table .8. Principal components loadings for trust in food safety information
Information source T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 
 21.0 srepeekpohS 0.81 0.11 -0.05 0.15 
Supermarkets 0.17 0.74 0.17 -0.06 0.31 
Organic shop 0.11 0.68 0.10 0.40 -0.05 
Specialty store 0.20 0.74 0.08 0.25 0.03 
Farmers / breeders 0.10 0.73 0.11 0.11 0.07 
 11.0 srossecorP 0.47 0.18 -0.04 0.59 
Doctors / health authority 0.18 0.23 0.76 -0.01 0.04 
University scientists 0.18 0.13 0.72 0.10 0.07 
National Food Authority 0.14 0.16 0.79 0.12 0.21 
 60.0 12.0 tnemnrevoG 0.50 0.10 0.64 
Political groups 0.28 0.09 0.19 0.28 0.74 
Environmental organisations 0.21 0.13 0.18 0.83 0.15 
Animal welfare organisations 0.18 0.12 0.10 0.84 0.16 
Consumer organisations 0.30 0.11 0.52 0.51 -0.09 
 50.0 62.0 ASFE 0.62 0.23 0.24 
Television documentary 0.67 0.12 0.22 0.13 0.10 
Television news / current affairs 0.73 0.15 0.30 0.03 0.10 
Television adverts 0.40 0.23 -0.02 0.06 0.60 
Newspapers 0.75 0.15 0.16 0.13 0.13 
Internet 0.63 0.04 0.13 0.17 0.25 
Radio 0.79 0.16 0.18 0.15 0.07 
Magazines 0.71 0.23 0.05 0.15 0.25 
 53.0 lebal tcudorP 0.43 0.18 -0.03 0.12 
Component label Media Food chain Independent Alternative Vested interest 
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table .8. (contd.) Principal components loadings for trust in food safety information
Note: Varimax rotation. Values equal or greater than 0.0 in bold.
However, table .8 results are non-univocal. For k = , where k is the number 
of nearest neighbours employed by the algorithm (using the rule k= log N, being 
N the number of observations), the identified number of clusters is 3. However, 
for in the neighbourhood of k = , and  clusters are also detected. the Ward 
algorithm suggests 5 clusters. the K-means cluster analysis is carried out for anal-
yses from  to 6 clusters; the CCC and pseudo-F statistics suggest respectively 3 
and  clusters.
thus, two criteria out of four suggest using 3 clusters. the following step 
is to perform a cluster analysis with K-means method. this particular tool is 
recommended when there is an a priori hypothesis about the correct number of 
clusters. Specifying initial cluster centres the relative algorithm can handle a large 
numbers of cases. the results of the convergence after 5 iterations are reported 
in table .9.
table .9. Segmentation on trust variables: number of clusters
In order to complete our analysis it is now interesting to explore the main character-
istics of each of these groups. this analysis is mainly performed by looking at the average 
values for the most significant variables in our questionnaire. Looking at the overall results 
K 20 21 22 23 24 25 Ward 
No. of clusters 
(density method) 4 4 3 2 2 2 5 
CCC -80  -65 -48   -38 
Pseudo-F 7.9  8.2 9.2   205 
Pseudo-t2 5.2  7.4 7.1   138 
k* 21.87033       
 )spets-owt( snaem-K
  6 5 4 3 2 
CCC -6.68 -9.17 -11.84 -17.65 -21.65  
Pseudo-F 296.86 301.95 307.79 301.43 308.23  
Internet 0.63 0.04 0.13 0.17 0.25 
Radio 0.79 0.16 0.18 0.15 0.07 
Magazines 0.71 0.23 0.05 0.15 0.25 
 53.0 lebal tcudorP 0.43 0.18 -0.03 0.12 
Component label Media Food chain Independent Alternative Vested interest 
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it is possible to underline many common patterns among the three segments: for instance, 
the food consumption style is not dissimilar (i.e. at the question “in my household we like 
chicken” all “slightly agree” and the values are 5.53 for the first, 5.53 for the second and 
5.9 for the third group: thus we can observe a difference of 0.5 on a seven point Likert 
scale); also the questions concerning the “food neophobia” and the purchasing of product 
of quality reveal a fairly similar perception between the segments. It should be noted that 
these three clusters have very similar demographic profiles, which suggest little connection 
between the level of trust in food safety information and socio-demographic variables.
Examining table .10 it is possible to give a name to these groups: the first seems to 
be composed of people who distrust all the sources (all negative signs) and especially the 
independent ones: university scientists, national and European food authority, govern-
ments and doctors. thus we can qualify this segment as “Non-trusters”. this cluster is 
composed of 507 respondents (5.9% of the valid cases). 8.6% of this group consist of 
people from Italy. the second segment, “Mixed trust”, is characterised by the distrust in 
food chain actors and trust both in independent sources and (even if only slightly) in the 
media. this group is mainly characterised by the presence of people from Germany and 
Netherlands (7.% and 6%) this group includes 9.5% of the sample. Finally the last 
segment seems to be characterised by a general trust in all food sources of information 
and especially in food chain actors: people belonging to this segment can be qualified as 
“trusters”. the group of “trusters” is well balanced across all five countries and overall it 
is considered the most numerous segment (873 cases, .6% of the valid cases). 
table .10. Segmentation on trust variables: factor loadings
these groups are clearly shown in Figure .3 while the distribution of the identi-
fied segments within the countries is reported in table .11.
the analysis shows a significant segmentation based on trust towards food safety 
information. It attempts to measure the trust people have in food safety information 
from different sources; it is possible to obtain three different groups of consumers:
a) “Non-trusters”, especially wary towards independent sources,
b) “Mixed trusters”, characterised by distrust in food chain actors and trust in 
independent sources, and 
c) “trusters”, which especially rely in information provided by food chain actors 
and less in media.
 
 retsulC 
 3 2 1 
Trust in media -0.38536 0.23765 0.06646 
Trust in food chain actors -0.08513 -0.94193 0.67307 
Trust in independent -10.24728 0.55694 0.35563 
Trust in alternative sources -0.16913 -0.17910 0.21680 
Trust in vested interest -0.10538 -0.32443 0.27600 
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Figure .3. Graphical representation of three consumer segments showing trust variable in 
each country
table .11. Segment composition by country
 
Cluster (Trust variables EU) Total 
1 2 3
Country UK Count 111 66 168 345 
% within Country 32.2% 19.1% 48.7% 100.0% 
% within Cluster 
(Trust variables EU) 21.9% 11.4% 19.2% 17.6% 
% of Total 5.7% 3.4% 8.6% 17.6% 
Italy Count 145 132 191 468 
% within Country 31.0% 28.2% 40.8% 100.0% 
% within Cluster 
(Trust variables EU) 28.6% 22.8% 21.9% 23.9% 
% of Total 7.4% 6.7% 9.8% 23.9% 
Germany Count 94 157 180 431 
% within Country 21.8% 36.4% 41.8% 100.0% 
% within Cluster 
(Trust variables EU) 18.5% 27.2% 20.6% 22.0% 
% of Total 4.8% 8.0% 9.2% 22.0% 
Netherlands Count 59 150 163 372 
% within Country 15.9% 40.3% 43.8% 100.0% 
% within Cluster 
(Trust variables EU) 11.6% 26.0% 18.7% 19.0% 
% of Total 3.0% 7.7% 8.3% 19.0% 
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table .11. (contd.) Segment composition by country
the results of this study confirm the mixed degrees of confidence that Eu-
ropean consumers have in their country’s information providers’ ability to deal 
with food safety crises. there are, however, some key differences between the five 
countries that could be considered to be of policy relevance: the French and the 
Italians are generally “Non-trusters” with Italy having the smallest proportion of 
“trusters”; the UK has the largest number of both “trusters” and “Non-trusters” 
and the lowest of “Mixed trusters”; Germany and the Netherlands have high pro-
portions of “Mixed trusters”. However, it is important to note the limitations of 
this cluster analysis as it does not give an in depth understanding of demographic 
characteristics difference across trust-based segments, whose values are generally 
close to the average values of the sample. this suggests that there is need for fur-
ther research in this area.
4.6. ConClusions
A sampling theory framework for assessing the different options available for 
the tRUSt survey has been provided in this Chapter. Some assumptions about 
the costs of different survey types and the question type allowed to quantify the 
expected (minimum) levels of precision (sampling error) for different sample sizes 
and vice versa the sample size (and budget) required for attaining different levels 
of precision. the results show the trade-off between the sampling error and costs 
and the marginal gain in increasing sample size is quickly decreasing. We also ar-
gue that once an acceptable sampling error is guaranteed for the sample size, it is 
preferable to allocate extra budget to the survey quality improvement rather than 
allowing for larger samples. In this respect, face-to- face interviews were consid-
ered the more appropriate methods given the objectives of the tRUSt research. 
Although, limitations always arise and in future more attention should be devoted 
to issues such as the interviewer bias and the risk of socially desirable, or accept-
able, responses.
 
France Count 98 73 171 342 
% within Country 28.7% 21.3% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within Cluster 
(Trust variables EU) 19.3% 12.6% 19.6% 17.5% 
% of Total 5.0% 3.7% 8.7% 17.5% 
Total Count 507 578 873 1958 
% within Country 25.9% 29.5% 44.6% 100.0% 
% within Cluster 
(Trust variables EU) 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 25.9% 29.5% 44.6% 100.0% 
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A sample size of between 50 and 00 units per country provided acceptable levels 
of relative sampling error for the tRUSt survey given the budget constraints. On the 
basis of the above consideration, the adopted sampling method was Random Location 
Sampling, which provides a country-representative subdivision into locations; the lo-
cations were selected randomly across potential locations and accounted for a nation-
ally representative sample (e.g. probability of extraction proportional to population). 
the sampling unit was the household and the respondent the person responsible for 
the actual purchase of food.
the descriptive statistics mainly suggest that television advertising is the least trust-
ed source of information across all countries, on average. this lack of trust in infor-
mation providers is followed by political groups, processors, government and maga-
zines. trust in information from food chain actors loses relevance, but remains an 
important reassuring factor. Information provided by public authorities has a differ-
entiated impact, depending upon the country. the most trusted information sources 
across all countries are on average doctors and other health authorities, National Food 
Safety authorities, university scientists and consumer organisations. the EFSA is not 
as trusted as the national authorities. However, the effect of trust in authorities and 
independent sources of information can be reversed through higher education levels.
the results of the segmentation analysis suggest that it is possible to obtain three 
different groups of consumers who have different degrees of trust in food safety infor-
mation from different sources:
a) “Non-trusters”, especially wary towards independent sources, 
b) “Mixed trusters”, characterised by distrust in food chain actors and trust in 
independent sources, and 
c) “trusters”, which especially rely in information provided by food chain actors 
and less in media.
this confirms the mixed degrees of European consumer confidence in their coun-
try’s information providers’ ability to deal with food safety crises and further suggests 
that communication strategies should be country-specific and take into account the 
cultural differences rather than socio-economic and demographic characteristics of 
the households. 
the causal model estimation and results reported in Chapter 5 support the general 
findings presented in this Chapter and make further policy relevant recommendations.
appendix 4.1.
a methodologiCal note on sample size determination
A list of all the households residing in each of the five countries would be necessary 
in order to have a pure random sampling technique. However, as discussed below, 
practical and economic reasons usually lead to the formulation of stratified and/or 
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multi-stage sampling techniques, as this allows to increase the precision of the esti-
mates with respect to simple random sampling, being sample size the same.
A desirable sampling frame should ensure a perfect correspondence with the population 
of interest. Hence, administrative sources (e.g. registry offices) would be preferable, even if 
there is no guarantee that the lists are updated and complete. An easy alternative is the tel-
ephone book, which involves several risk of inconsistency with the chosen population.
A key issue in the tRUSt survey planning is to gather detailed information about the 
population list, so that a proper sampling can be arranged. Provided that an appropriate 
sampling frame is available, a sampling technique is selected with the following objectives:
a) to obtain a representative sample
b) to obtain an acceptable precision given the budget constraint.
two alternative sampling designs are discussed in this Chapter, in order to provide 
the basis for discussion and selection of the most suitable sampling method for the 
tRUSt project: (a) simple random sampling; (b) stratified sampling.
Sample size varies according to the desired level of the sampling error, the popula-
tion size, and the variability of the target variable(s) in the population. However, a 
major constraint is usually given by the available budget and the trade-off between 
additional precision and marginal costs should be explicitly taken into account.
the classic solution to this problem in sampling theory (Cochran, 1977) consists 
in defining a cost function and a variance function.
the cost function for the tRUSt survey is defined as follows:
C= c
0
 + c
1 
n       (1)
where c
0
 are the fixed cost, c
1
 the variable costs (per interview) and n is the sample 
size to be estimated.
the variance function is specific to the chosen sampling method and expresses the 
variability of the sample estimates as a function of the sample size, the population size 
and the variability of the target variable in the population.
Some further simplifying assumptions are needed before to proceed to the sample 
size computation.
Despite having a wide range of variables to be measured in order to answer to the re-
search questions, most of the questions will be asked on a 7- items Likert scale. this means 
that we can safely assume that the maximum standard deviation for the population mean 
value is 3 (this is the value corresponding to the maximum dispersion). Instead, if we take 
into account the maximum standard deviation for a proportion, this can be fixed at 0.5.
Simple random sampling
the basic choice involves simple random sampling on the population list. For a 
given sample size n
0
=(C-c
0
)/c
1
 simply computed from (1) as the maximum size achiev-
able for a given budget C, the variance of the sample estimate of the population mean 
is given by the following equation:
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this can be converted into a relative precision measure by assuming a normal dis-
tribution for the mean estimate:
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where r is the level of relative sampling error, X  is the population mean and a is the 
level of confidence. From (3) it follows that r can be computed as (Cochran, 1977):
r
t S
n X
n
N
x= ± −a / 1      ()
where ta/ is the critical value from the student-t distribution.
Likewise, one may compute the sample size (hence the cost) for a given sampling 
error level through (Cicchitelli et al., 199):
n
V
N S N0
0
 
1
1= +


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−
     (5)
where V
0
 is the desired variance for the sample mean estimate. An approximation 
in terms of relative error is given by (Cochran, 1977):
n
t S
r X
x
0


= 


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a /       (6)
For the cases when a proportion is concerned, equations () and (6) become re-
spectively (7) and (8):
r t
p
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n
N
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−


a / 0
1
1      (7)
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n
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
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where p is the (estimated) population probability, or – in our case – the probability 
corresponding to the maximum population variability (i.e. p=0.5).
Stratified sampling
the stratified random sampling involves the stratification of the population 
into H strata, where N
h
 is the size of stratum h in the population and n
h
 is the 
sample size in a stratum, with h =1,…,H. Here we assume proportional stratified 
sampling (n
h
/n=N
h
/N).
Assuming that both the cost per unit c
1
 and the population variance are the same 
across the strata, the variance and the relative sampling error for a given overall sample 
size are identical to the case of simple random sampling. the same holds true for the 
estimation of a proportion.
However, as sample means and proportions will probably differ if the stratification 
variable is related to the target variable and stratification is reasonably expected to lead 
to smaller variance, it can be shown that stratification improves the precision of esti-
mates (Barnett, 197). If knowledge on variability within different population strata is 
available (e.g. after a pilot study), then the allocation of the overall sample size across 
strata can be computed through Neyman allocation (Cochran, 1977).
If the required sample size is computed conditional to a desired level of relative er-
ror r, an approximate measure of the sample size for large population is given by:
n
S t N
r N S t
x
x
=
+



 


a
a
/
/
      (9)
where (9) is also valid for proportions, provided that the variance S
x
  is substituted 
with p(1-p).
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5. role of trust and risk in Consumer food 
ChoiCe: the sparta model
Mario Mazzocchi, Alexandra E. Lobb, 
W. Bruce Traill, and Alessio Cavicchi
abstraCt
This paper explores the role of trust in food safety information in determining consumer choice in 
relation to socio-demographic effects and other determinants. We propose a modelling framework 
which extends the Theory of Planned Behaviour to account for risk perception and trust and allows 
for country-specific effects. The model is tested on the impact of salmonella information on chicken 
consumption choices across five European countries, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and the UK, 
based on a nationally representative survey for a total of 2,725 face-to-face interviews. Results show 
that no relationship emerges between socio-demographics variables and the trust placed by consumer 
in food safety information, although country differences are relevant. The findings also suggest that 
the policy priority should be on building and maintaining trust in food and health authorities, and 
research institutions.
Keywords: food consumption, food attitudes, theory of planned behaviour, ordered probit.
5.1. introduCtion
there is considerable empirical evidence that different consumers respond to food 
risk communication in different ways. this implies that policymakers and food firms 
cannot rely on a single strategy for informing the public of an emerging food risk. 
Furthermore, the impact of food safety information varies significantly according to 
the sources who provide it.
the multiple food scares that have hit the European markets in the last decade led 
to the creation of the EFSA, with the responsibility of setting up a rapid alert system 
and managing communication in event of a food crisis. A growing body of research in-
vestigating the factors that determine consumer response has been developed to provide 
some scientific basis to the EFSA tasks. However, the issues surrounding information 
processing and the subsequent food choice in a situation of increased risk perception 
– hence increased levels of involvement, are too varied to be applied at EU level.
While no univocal evidence is available for determining the role of socio-de-
mographic characteristics in processing food safety information and reacting to 
How safe is eating chicken? A study on the impact of trust and food risk communication on consumer 
behaviour in the European Union, edited by Donato Romano, Gianluca Stefani
ISBN-10: 88-853-95-X,  © 006 Firenze University Press
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reactionary news, European-wide scares such as the 1996 BSE scare have clearly 
shown that the country effect is important. According to Faostat data1, 1997 beef 
consumption levels in the UK are now only 1.7% lower than in 1995, while in 
Italy per capita consumption fell by 3.9% and in Germany by 7.%, regardless of 
the fact that cases of BSE in Italian and German cows were absolutely negligible 
as compared to the UK. Again, there is no unique explanation for these cross-
country differences. Media communications were different in each country, for 
example while in most European countries the focus was on the animal disease, 
the German media put more emphasis on the potential links between BSE and the 
related human variant, Creutzfeld-Jakob Disease. Secondly, social networks and 
the preferred sources of information are diverse across EU countries. A third rel-
evant factor which is likely to differ across countries is the level of trust that citi-
zens have in institutions, the media, scientific bodies and other potential sources 
of food safety information.
the aim of this paper is to explore the complex interactions between all of the 
above factors, with a cross-cultural EU case study on the impact of salmonella infor-
mation on chicken consumption choices in five European countries, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Netherlands and the UK, based on a nationally representative survey for 
a total of ,75 face-to-face interviews.
5.2. framing the faCtors behind Consumer response:  
the sparta approaCh
the strategy behind the model introduced in this paper is framed within the 
theory of Planned Behaviour (tPB) (Ajzen, 1985 and 1991), which has proved to 
be a successful analysis tool for a range of behaviours, often associated with risky or 
health-related actions such as smoking, risky driving, physical activities and exercise, 
or contraception (see Conner et al., 003 for an extensive list of applications). the 
tPB framework has also been widely applied to food choices e.g. Cook et al. (00) 
investigate consumer attitudes to GM foods, while Dennison and Shepherd (1995) 
explore adolescent food choice. In another study which looks closely at the impact 
of information on consumer choice, McEachern and Schröder (00) investigate 
the effects of value-based meat labelling on purchasing intentions. the implications 
of applying the tPB model to different countries are discussed in Kalafatis et al. 
(1999), who analyse the intentions of purchasing environmentally friendly products 
in the UK and Greece and find that their determinants have a different weight in 
the two countries. 
the tPB framework, devised from the theory of Reasoned Action (tRA), 
(Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980), defines human action as a combination of three di-
mensions, behavioural beliefs, normative beliefs, and control beliefs. Behavioural 
1 Cf. http://www.fao.org.
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beliefs (i.e. beliefs about the outcome of the action), produce either a positive or 
a negative attitude towards behaviour; normative beliefs refer to subjective norms 
or perceived social forces; and control beliefs lead to perceived behavioural con-
trol. All these produce intentions to behave (Ajzen, 00), a pre-determinant of 
behaviour.
Attitudes to behaviour are noted as being principally different from the broad-
er concept of attitude towards an object. For example, one may like chicken (an 
attitude to chicken), yet choose not to purchase chicken because of a specific 
dietary requirement. Subjective norm is a concept based on how one “should” act 
in response to the views or thoughts of others. Subjective norm influences may 
include friends, family members, colleagues, doctors, religious organisations, etc. 
Perceived behavioural control can be described as “the measure of confidence that 
one can act” (East, 1997), for example one may not be able to purchase chicken 
if it is not available.
Integrating risk perception and trust into the tPB framework and considering the 
influence of different individual (or household) characteristics leads to the develop-
ment of the SPARtA approach. the acronym SPARtA comes from the initials of the 
global variables used to explain behavioural intentions:
• subjective norm (S),
• perceived behavioural control (P),
• attitudes (A),
• risk perception (R),
• trust (t),
• alia, other variables, e.g. socio-demographics, psychological and cultural (coun-
try-specific) characteristics, which may lead to shifts in the weight of the above 
global variables (AL).
the interaction between these components can be expressed pictorially in Figure 
5.1, noting that the relationships hypothesised in this model between risk perception 
and trust can be tested statistically within the SPARtA framework. three modelling 
levels are identified: (1) global variables (S, P, A, R, t) relate to their specific deter-
minants (beliefs, risk factors and trusted sources); () the level of interaction between 
the global variables is quantified; and (3) intention to purchase (ItP) relates to the 
global variables obtained. the influence of different consumer characteristics (AL) is 
investigated by allowing the relationships estimated in level () and (3) to vary as a 
function using them as shifters of the behavioural parameters estimated in level (), as 
discussed more in detail in the methodology Section. 
Chicken was chosen as the product to be investigated in the survey as it is a widely 
consumed food across Europe and it is not usually associated with high risks despite 
being potentially subject to a number of hazards. A further reason is that chicken 
consumption is not as sensitive to food safety concerns as beef following the BSE 
crisis, hence it is expected to be more representative of standard food safety issues and 
consumption behaviour.
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Figure 5.1. the SPARtA modelling approach
5.3. methodology
A nationally representative survey based on probabilistic area sampling was conducted 
in fi ve countries (UK, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands and France) in May 00 on ,75 
respondents as face-to-face, in-home interviews. the sampling unit was the household and 
the respondent the person responsible for the actual purchase of food. the questionnaire 
took approximately 30 minutes to complete with “prompts” on certain questions from the 
interviewer when required by the respondent. Data were subject to a 10% validation. the 
questionnaire was based on the SPARtA model specifi cation. the questions were built 
following the tACt (target, action, context, time) guidelines discussed in Ajzen (00).
the behaviour of interest is purchasing fresh or frozen chicken in the week follow-
ing the interview. Since the survey does not allow a check on actual behaviour, the 
intention to do so was measured on a 7-point Likert scale, from extremely unlikely 
(1) to extremely likely (7). Global variables such as attitudes, subjective norm and 
perceived behavioural control were elicited (a) directly through a seven-point Likert 
Scale and anchored with a corresponding statement and, (b) indirectly through a set 
of specifi c questions to identify their sub-determinants (following previous research, 
e.g. East, 1997; Cook et al., 00). Each respondent was also asked to identify up to 
three specifi c chicken attributes considered to be most relevant when deciding wheth-
er to purchase chicken. this allows us to take into account the issue of saliency, as it 
is recognised that in normal circumstances consumers take into account only a small 
number of product characteristics in choosing food products (East, 1997). Questions 
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measuring perceived risk were adaptations of previously used questions (e.g. Slovic, 
199), again posed as 7-point Likert scales. the trust questions were measured as 7-
point Likert scales based on a set of food safety information sources in relation to the 
risks of salmonella in food. A second behavioural intention was included in the ques-
tionnaire to check for the impact of a food scare. the respondents were asked to state 
their purchasing intentions (again on a 7-point Likert scale) assuming that they had 
just discovered, by reading an article in the newspaper, that high rates of salmonella in 
chicken had been found in their area, leading to the hospitalisation of several people.
Applied studies based on the tPB have used a variety of methods for estimating the 
relationship between behavioural intention and its determinants. Most articles (e.g. Con-
ner et al., 003; Kalafatis et al., 1999) rely on structural equation modelling, rather than 
multiple linear regression (Povey et al., 000; Shaw and Shiu, 00; tonglet, 001) or 
tobit regression (Lynne et al., 1995) when the data are censored. Cook et al. (00) base 
their estimate of a tPB model on an ordered discrete choice model. the ordered probit 
model is used for estimating the third level of the SPARtA model, i.e. relating purchasing 
intentions to the global determinants. Given that we measure behavioural intentions with 
a 7-point Likert scale, standard multiple regression is not applicable. As the dependent 
variable is discrete, nominal, ordered and non-continuous, the ordered probit model is 
appropriate (Liao, 199). this model belongs to the class of discrete choice probability 
models widely used in the analysis of attitudes, behaviours and choices and the likeli-
hood of their occurrence. the ordered probit model is estimated by the BFGS (Broyden-
Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shannon) maximum likelihood algorithm in the LimDep package. 
two main outputs can be produced: estimates of the coefficient for the ordered probit 
equation, i.e. the relative weight of each intention determinant, and a table of marginal 
effects. the latter measures the change in probability for a given value of the dependent 
variable induced by a unit change in one of the determinants. the marginal effects tables 
are not shown in this paper, but are available on request from the authors.
two other statistical methods are employed within the overall SPARtA model-
ling strategy: simultaneous equations modelling and principal components analysis. 
A simultaneous equations model is employed in the second level of the analysis, since 
endogeneity (feedbacks) among the dependent variables is recognised. A consistent 
and asymptotically efficient estimator for the coefficients in this model are provided 
by three-stage least squares (3SLS). the model satisfies the order and rank conditions 
that ensure proper identification. Principal components analysis (see e.g. Duntemann, 
1989) is needed for obtaining the latent trust determinants as discussed in Chapter .
5.4. results
Trust
the level of confidence in the information provided by different sources was meas-
ured by the following question: “Suppose that each of the following has provided 
information about potential risks associated with salmonella in food. Please indicate 
to what extent you would trust that information” and the answer was measured on a 
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7-point Likert scale from “completely distrust” to “completely trust”, where  is the 
neutrality point and explicit non-responses were allowed. table 5.1 reports the means 
of the trust measures by country.
the level of trust in information is generally high, above the neutrality threshold 
for all but a few sources, namely information provided by processors (especially in 
France), television adverts (less in Italy and the UK) and political groups (especially 
in France, less in UK and the Netherlands). On average, doctors and health authori-
ties are the most trusted source of information (5.99), although Germans and French 
show the highest degree of confidence in consumer organisations.
table 5.1. trust in food safety information
While it should be noted that there is a very high degree of consistency across items 
(which leads to an overall Cronbach-Alpha of 0.9), Principal components analysis is 
Country 
Source
UK Italy Germany Netherlands France Total 
 96.4 10.5 45.4 84.4 27.4 46.4 srepeekpohS
 46.4 84.4 94.4 45.4 37.4 99.4 stekramrepuS
 12.5 03.5 41.5 72.5 80.5 72.5 pohs cinagrO
 10.5 07.5 82.5 19.4 50.4 21.5 erots ytlaicepS
 79.4 65.5 65.4 09.4 76.4 70.5 sredeerb / sremraF
 47.3 00.3 79.3 09.3 10.4 59.3 srossecorP
Doctors / health authority 6.24 5.91 5.98 6.08 5.78 5.99 
University scientists 5.53 5.92 5.77 6.04 5.58 5.77 
National authority in charge of food safety 5.80 5.60 5.98 6.01 5.62 5.79 
 05.4 09.3 63.5 76.4 92.4 93.4 tnemnrevoG
 25.3 98.2 89.3 40.4 33.3 55.3 spuorg lacitiloP
Environmental organisations 4.86 4.78 5.41 4.51 4.84 4.86 
Animal welfare organisations 4.50 4.69 5.34 4.40 4.67 4.70 
Consumer organisations 5.22 5.58 6.02 5.72 5.91 5.69 
EU authority in charge of food safety 4.62 5.52 5.54 5.41 4.97 5.21 
Television documentary 4.96 4.84 5.26 5.05 4.87 4.98 
Television news / current affairs 5.17 5.15 5.55 5.39 4.79 5.19 
 83.3 59.2 40.3 52.3 65.3 81.4 strevda noisiveleT
 49.4 10.5 79.4 33.5 78.4 35.4 srepapsweN
 45.4 52.4 28.4 77.4 43.4 45.4 tenretnI
 79.4 31.5 00.5 53.5 65.4 68.4 oidaR
 94.4 84.4 93.4 18.4 82.4 55.4 senizagaM
 30.5 05.5 10.5 84.4 91.5 18.4 lebal tcudorP
 88.4 08.4 39.4 30.5 87.4 98.4 egarevA
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a helpful tool to identify the latent trust components, i.e. the groups of sources which 
tend to attract a similar level of trust (or distrust). Five components with eigenvalues 
larger than 1 were extracted as it was discussed in Chapter . the PCA results identify 
five groups of sources that are the targets of consumer trust or distrust. A cluster analysis 
is then applied to the component scores to identify homogeneous groups of consumers 
with respect to the level of trust in these sources. the three identified clusters are: truster, 
mixed truster and non truster and their profiles are described in Chapter .
One result is particularly striking: the three clusters are practically identical in terms 
of demographic characteristics. In other words, no links emerge between the level of 
trust in food safety information and socio-demographic variables. Instead, some differ-
ence emerges when looking at the cluster distribution across the five countries. the UK 
has the highest percentage of trusters and distruster and the lowest of mixed trusters. the 
distrusters group is also relevant in Italy and France, and Italy has also the lowest portion 
of trusters. Germany and the Netherlands have high percentages of mixed trusters.
Level 1: The SPARTA determinants
the last step consists in obtaining the statistical estimates for the SPARtA model 
described in Figure 5.1. the average values for the model variables are shown in table 
5.. these variables were built by aggregating the questionnaire items in step 1 accord-
ing to the expectancy-value formulation by Fishbein and Ajzen (1976).
table 5.. Average values of variables in the SPARtA model
 
Country UK Italy Germany Netherlands France All sample 
Behavioural determinants
Subj. Norm 3.85 3.66 3.54 2.62 3.01 3.33 
 22.3 14.4 96.3 15.3 80.4 CBP 3.76 
 00.6 28.5 06.5 60.6 41.6 edutittA 5.94 
Risk perception 1.88 2.62 3.48 2.77 2.36 2.60 
Average trust 4.89 4.78 5.03 4.93 4.80 4.88 
Trust in information provided by different sources
Mass-media -0.11 -0.17 0.23 0.02 0.04 0.00 
Food chain 0.19 -0.08 -0.19 -0.18 0.35 0.00 
 71.0- 62.0 30.0 40.0 22.0- strepxE 0.00 
Organisations -0.15 -0.16 0.37 -0.23 0.14 0.00 
Vested interest 0.21 0.12 0.03 0.17 -0.60 0.00 
Behavioural intentions
Standard purchase 
intention 5.57 5.00 4.85 4.94 4.49 4.97 
P.I. after salmonella scare 3.41 2.53 2.88 2.87 2.80 2.89 
% change (average) -22.52 -40.89 -30.48 -11.69 -5.53 -21.58 
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It is worth noting the characteristics of the overall sample and some country specifici-
ties. the tPB determinants and the purchasing intentions are measured on a 1-7 scale, 
 being the neutrality point. this means that on average, the average respondents has a 
high likelihood of purchasing chicken in the week following the interview (especially in 
the UK, less in France) and that the attitude towards buying chicken is very positive (with 
the highest value again in the UK). the subjective norm (i.e. the referent beliefs) have a 
marginal impact and are close to neutrality, although in the Netherlands and in France 
it would seem that the average referent belief has a slightly negative influence towards 
purchasing chicken. Perceived control on behaviour is also neutral on average, while risk 
perception is low and average trust in food safety information is above the neutrality 
threshold. trust in information is measured through standardised principal components 
scores, so positive value indicate trust above the sample average. this means that average 
trust in mass media is higher in Germany and lower in Italy, while food chain actors are 
especially trusted in France and the UK. the same countries have less trust than others 
in experts’ opinions on food safety (this includes governments). Consumer, animal wel-
fare and environmental organisations are especially trusted in Germany and France, less 
in other countries, while France has a much lower confidence in information provided 
by those with a potential vested interest, i.e. processors and adverts, political parties, etc. 
Finally, it is interesting to notice that the wider impact of a (potential) salmonella scare 
is measured in Italy (where intentions to purchase fall by 1%) and Germany (-30%). 
this result is consistent with the reaction to beef purchases in these countries after the 
BSE news, as compared to the rest of Europe, and, at least in the case of Italy, it is con-
sistent with the sharp drop in consumption triggered by the avian flu epidemic.
Level 2: Interaction among determinants and demographics
the second step consisted of estimating a simultaneous equations system for evalu-
ating the strength and direction of the relationships between the global variables, i.e. 
attitudes, subjective norm, perceived behavioural control, risk perception and trust. 
the number of endogenous relationships was determined in order to ensure proper 
identification and the overall R-square for the overall model varied between 0.15 and 
0.1. table 5.3 shows the results for the aggregated sample and at a country level.
the results reported in table 5.3 highlight some relevant relationships and some 
differences across countries. 
the subjective norm, i.e. the relevance of referent beliefs, is positively influenced by 
trust in food safety information from all sources. this means that those who have a higher 
degree of confidence in information provided by external sources, also rely on their refer-
ent beliefs more than others. No clear demographic influences emerge. this is consistent 
across countries. As shown by the estimated intercepts, attitudes towards buying chicken 
are very high in all countries. these attitudes are negatively related to risk perception, as 
expected, but the influence of risk perception is weaker in UK and Italy. the presence of 
children in the household increases attitudes on average (especially in France), while larger 
town sizes are associated with lower attitudes. the most interesting equation is probably 
the one relating risk perception to trust in food safety information. On average, there is a 
negative association between risk perception and trust in information provided by the food 
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All sample UK Italy Germany Netherlands France 
R-square 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.20 0.17 0.21 
Subjective norm 
Intercept 0.67 * 2.03 * -0.66  1.75 *** 0.52  3.47 ***
Attitudes 0.41 *** 0.25  0.62 *** 0.24 *** 0.36 *** -0.15  
Trust in media information 0.29 *** 0.28 *** 0.25 *** 0.51 *** 0.35 *** 0.22 ***
Trust in food chain information 0.15 *** 0.25 ***   0.40 *** 0.18 ** 0.20 ***
Trust in expert information 0.11 ***     0.17 * 0.19 ** 0.26 ***
Trust in alternative information 0.27 *** 0.49 ***   0.38 *** 0.22 *** 0.21 ***
Trust in “vested interest” 
information 0.36 
*** 0.30 *** 0.55 *** 0.34 *** 0.34 *** 0.25 ***
Age 0.11 *** 0.17 *     0.12    
Education           0.14 ***
Kids         -0.26 *   
Income   0.06  -0.13 * 0.15 **     
Town 0.10 *   0.55 ***       
Attitudes 
Intercept 6.48 *** 6.35 *** 6.77 *** 6.22 *** 6.75 *** 6.48 ***
Risk perception -0.21 *** -0.06  -0.07 * -0.24 *** -0.23 *** -0.18 ***
Age   0.14 **         
Education   -0.09 *         
Kids 0.16 ***         0.24 **
Income   0.07 *   0.10 ** -0.06    
Town -0.09 ** -0.13 * -0.37 ***   -0.18 * -0.21 ***
Risk perception 
Intercept 3.02 *** 1.72 *** 2.57 *** 3.44 *** 3.74 *** 2.51 ***
Trust in media information   0.22 *** -0.22 ***       
Trust in food chain information -0.29 ***   -0.25 ***   -0.15  -0.33 ***
Trust in expert information -0.10 ** -0.13  -0.23 *** -0.22 **     
Trust in alternative information 0.16 *** 0.22 *** -0.40 ***   0.22 ** 0.27 ***
Trust in “vested interest” 
information       -0.23 
**   0.12 *
Education -0.09 ***       -0.20 **   
Kids     0.30        
Income         -0.14 **   
Town -0.10 * 0.18 *         
Trust 
Intercept -0.44 *** -0.54 *** -0.38 ** -0.42 *** -0.46 *** -1.03 ***
Subjective Norm 0.17 *** 0.16 *** 0.11 *** 0.17 *** 0.22 *** 0.37 ***
Age -0.04 *** -0.09 ***         
Education     0.10 ***   -0.04  -0.04 *
Kids             
Income       -0.04 **     
Town -0.06 ***   -0.21 ***       
 
Note: *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. the following 
instrument were employed to estimate the system: the direct measures of the global variables, a simple average 
of the risk factors and the trust components 
table 5.3. Interaction among global variables
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chain or by expert sources, while trust in information provided by “alternative” sources 
such as consumer or animal welfare organisations tend to increase risk perception. Risk 
perception is lower in larger towns and for higher education levels. However, there are 
relevant country differences. For example, the model, when applied to Italian respondents, 
shows negative signs for all trust coefficients, which implies that those who trust food 
safety information in Italy have on average a lower risk perception.
Finally, the overall level of trust in food safety information is related to subjective 
norm and demographics. Again, a positive link between trust in food safety informa-
tion and subjective norm is shown. In general trust seems to (marginally) decrease 
with age and town size, although demographics are hardly relevant in most countries. 
this confirms the previous finding that trusting food safety information is unrelated 
to socio-demographic characteristics.
Level 3: Purchasing intentions
Our final step consists of estimating the ordered probit equations relating purchas-
ing intentions to the SPARtA model determinants. the model was estimated sepa-
rately for the three clusters of respondents allowing for a country-specific intercept. 
Both behaviours of interests were investigated, the standard likelihood of purchase 
and the likelihood of purchase conditional on news about a salmonella incident. Re-
sults are shown in table 5..
table 5.. Determinants of purchasing intentions by trust segment (ordered probit estimates)
Note: *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level.
 
Standard situation Salmonella scare  
Determinants Non-trusters 
Mixed 
trusters 
Trusters Non-trusters Mixed 
trusters 
Trusters 
C UK -0.97 *** -0.39  -0.78 * -1.08 *** -0.32  -0.37  
 Italy -1.22 *** -0.97 ** -1.16 *** -1.49 *** -1.03 ** -0.67 *
 Germany -1.40 *** -0.86 * -1.15 *** -1.16 *** -0.61  -0.30  
 Netherlands -1.36 *** -0.71  -0.89 ** -1.20 *** -0.36  -0.61 *
 France -1.46 *** -0.97 ** -1.47 *** -1.14 *** -0.85 ** -0.66 *
S Subjective norm 0.02  0.03  0.02  0.09 *** -0.01  0.02  
P Perceived 
behavioural 
control 
0.11 *** 0.07  0.07 * 0.11 *** -0.02  -0.03  
A Attitude 0.36 *** 0.32 *** 0.40 *** 0.13 *** 0.20 *** 0.20 ***
R Risk perception -0.01  0.06  0.00  -0.03  -0.09 ** -0.12 ***
Chi-square 142.45 *** 45.30 *** 94.71 *** 67.42 *** 54.49 *** 51.39 ***
Log-lik -
1,721.43 
-
878.96 
-
1,202.22 
-
1,835.71 
-
870.73 
-
1,355.25 
Correct pred. 0.32  0.27  0.33  0.43  0.44  0.36  
Correct pred. (three 
categories) 
0.60 0.59 0.72 0.61 0.66 0.62 
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In a standard situation, and holding other determinants constant, the intercepts 
show that “Non-trusters” are the least likely to buy chicken, whilst “Mixed trusters” 
(i.e. trusting mass media and experts but less the other sources) are, on average, more 
likely than “trusters” to purchase chicken. Attitude is the main determinant for all 
groups and has a stronger effect on “trusters”. Perceived behavioural control has a 
lower impact, while subjective norm is not significant in any of the clusters.
More indications can be found by comparing the standard situation models 
with those assuming a salmonella food scare. If one considers the group of “Non-
trusters”, while most of the determinants (including intercepts) change only mar-
ginally, attitudes lose a major part of their weight, while the subjective norm 
becomes significant and almost as relevant as attitudes. this could suggest that in 
the case of a food scare, “Non-trusters”, who rely on referent beliefs, are less likely 
to reduce consumption, emphasising the relevance of social networks, specifically 
for this group. For “Mixed trusters” and “trusters”, the loss of relevance of at-
titudes is slightly less prominent, but risk perception has an increased impact. In 
facts, “trusters” and “Mixed trusters” are on average less affected by the scare as 
compared to their non-trusting counterparts, especially if they have positive at-
titudes. the impact is more relevant for those who declare higher perceived risks 
even in the standard situation.
the fit of the models is acceptable and becomes relatively good if behaviours are 
classified into three categories (unlikely to buy, neutral, likely to buy) reaching values 
between 59% and 7% of correct predictions.
5.5. disCussion and ConClusions
the complexity of factors influencing the way a consumer processes food safety in-
formation makes it difficult to develop adequate risk communication strategies. this 
is, however, a priority for current European policy and this paper tries to answer some 
key questions: (1) Can the consumer be segmented into socio-demographic groups 
in relation to their trust in food safety information? () Are country and cultural dif-
ferences relevant in the way food safety information is processed? (3) How do risk 
perception and trust in food safety information influence food choice in relation to 
other determinants? () How does a food scare alter the weight of these determinants? 
(5) How do information sources differ in terms of how they impact on consumers’ risk 
perception and behaviours? to provide some answers to the above questions, this pa-
per suggests a modelling framework based on an extension of the theory of Planned 
Behaviour, the SPARtA model.
the empirical work discussed in this paper, based on a survey of ,75 face-to-
face interviews across five European countries, and on the theoretical framework of 
the theory of Planned Behaviour, provides some answers. While the survey and the 
questionnaire focus on a single product – chicken – in order to guarantee consistency 
in consumer responses, we expect that the implications of the results can at least be 
extended to other fresh food products with a low risk perception.
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A first major result is that no relationship emerges between socio-demographics 
variables and the trust placed by a consumer in food safety information. this finding 
appears to be robust as it manifests from both the segmentation analysis (consumer 
that differ in terms of sources they trust do not show relevant differences in terms of 
demographics) and the behavioural modelling (only a few socio-demographic vari-
ables are statistically significant and they are not consistent across countries). there 
are major implications for this outcome, as it would suggest that the impact of food 
safety information depends on the source and its reliability, rather than the individual 
characteristics of the consumer processing it.
Risk perception is directly affected by trust in information provided by the food 
chain, by experts and by alternative sources such as consumer, environmental and 
animal welfare organisations. In general, information from experts and food chain 
actors reduces risk perception, while information provided by alternative sources 
tends to increase it. this however depends on the (positive or negative) content is-
sued by these sources. Hence, a successful risk communication strategy should start 
from the consideration that people significantly differ in terms of the sources they 
trust but this is unrelated to characteristics such as age, education, income, etc.
On the other hand, the survey results and the subsequent modelling efforts place 
emphasise that within Europe there are relevant differences across countries. Germans 
place more trust in mass media and alternative sources than other countries, while 
Italians are the least predisposed to trust these same sources. the British trust the 
EFSA and other scientists to a lesser extent and the French and British place a higher 
degree of trust in information provided by food chain actors. Furthermore, trust in 
food safety information does not necessarily influence risk perception in the same di-
rection. In all countries, except Italy, those who trust alternative sources tend to have 
a higher risk perception. this suggests that risk communication strategies should be 
country-specific and take into account the cultural differences rather than socio-eco-
nomic and demographic characteristics of the households. Consequently, while the 
performance of the SPARtA model is satisfactory when allowing for country-specific 
effects, the application shows that the effects and interactions of behavioural determi-
nants may vary significantly within the EU.
Results also show that risk perception is unlikely to affect consumer choices 
when there is no related food scare, although when there is a scare the intention to 
purchase is affected by differing levels of risk perception. Again, this depends on the 
trust characteristics of the consumer. those who have less trust in food safety infor-
mation, independently by the source, tend to be less sensitive to risk perception and 
rely more on their social network. those who are most inclined to trust information 
from any source are the most sensitive to changing risk perception levels, but those 
who have a mixed trust attitude also react significantly to changing risk perceptions. 
these two groups have a relatively high level of trust toward experts in common (i.e. 
food standard, safety and health authorities, scientists) which gives these sources a 
key role in communicating risk especially considering that this survey has shown 
that these sources are the most trusted across all five countries. A key priority should 
be to build and maintain trust in food and health authorities and research institu-
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tions. Furthermore, the communication of risk through these sources should be 
privileged as they seem to have easier and broader access to a wide range of consum-
ers, independent of their personal characteristics.
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6. a simulation program for analysing soCial 
diffusion of trust after a food safety inCident
Volker Saggau, Claus-Hennig Hanf, and Paolo Patelli
abstraCt
The Chapter investigates consumer behaviour in risky markets with reference to the case of food scares. 
Risk perception, trust and the role of the media are investigated by using agent-based modelling. 
A multi-agent simulation is implemented to analyse the impact of different information strategies 
released by the media, defined as risk communication strategies. These strategies are evaluated by the 
recovery of the aggregate trust of an artificial consumer population. Artificial consumer agents follow 
a Bayes’ rule to update the trust in a supplier of the food item under observation by considering food 
safety information released by the media. The multi-agent simulation is then used to derive implica-
tions for risk communication strategies. 
Keywords: food crises, agent-based models, risk communication, information.
6.1. introduCtion: Consumer response to food sCares 
 – a multi-agent simulation
Human beings live in a world of uncertainty, facing various risks every day. In the 
long run, these risks influence trust. Information can reduce uncertainty and risks, 
and thus ensure trust. the media pass information to consumers, which face con-
sumption decisions within the food market every day.
this Chapter investigates consumer behaviour within risky markets, especially in 
the case of a food scare, using a multi-agent simulation.
these risks are manifold, from negligible risks up to perilous individual risks. Peo-
ple participate in various different markets. these markets are also characterised by 
uncertainties. Incomplete information about quantities, qualities and price develop-
ments make future-oriented planning difficult. Competition concerning resources 
leads to strategic behaviour which is abundant. the resulting dynamics bear risks in 
the sense of uncertainty for everyone.
Human beings as consumers have to decide about consumption every day. 
the single is responsible for his single household whereas the parents, mother 
or father, the one who is doing the every day shopping, is responsible for the 
children and for the entire household. Children trust their parents that they keep 
How safe is eating chicken? A study on the impact of trust and food risk communication on consumer 
behaviour in the European Union, edited by Donato Romano, Gianluca Stefani
ISBN-10: 88-853-95-X,  © 006 Firenze University Press
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care of them. Consumers or purchasers have to trust that suppliers and producers 
are reliable. Hence risk and trust are somehow interconnected and influence each 
other and both influence the behaviour of the individuals and the consumers (see 
Chapters 3 and 5).
Information is one important mean to reduce risk and uncertainty. today there 
is an immense amount of information present so that each individual can find its 
own personalised information package – theoretically. In former times informa-
tion was scarce, now, due to the information overload, it is the consumer’s, respec-
tively the listener’s attention that is scarce. thus this effect leads to an increase of 
uncertainty. Hence the problem is that, on the one hand, too little information 
cannot decrease uncertainty, on the other hand, too many information leads to an 
increase of uncertainty.
Uncertainty can also be found in the food market. this kind of risky market is 
relevant to every individual since food consumption has to be done by everybody. 
this is a very sensitive area of risky markets. the case of food scares is combined 
with a high degree of uncertainty of the consumers. this uncertainty is influenced 
by food safety information released by the media. Germany was for a long time offi-
cially declared free of BSE. But in the winter 000/001 when the first cases of BSE 
infected cows was discovered in Germany, the country went into a national BSE-
crisis. the market for beef broke down and whole herds of cattle were culled if only 
one BSE infected cow was discovered. the survival of many farmers was challenged. 
the politicians in charge made quick and momentous decisions and initiated ac-
tions to cope with the crisis at the same time. the media spread increasing numbers 
of alerting news and they also triggered a discussion regarding the overall safety of 
food. the uncertainty of the consumers increased and as a reaction to this health 
risk which was not assessable by them, they changed their buying and consumption 
behaviour at least in the short-term. the appearance of BSE in Germany was fol-
lowed by massive economic consequences which were noticeable in the economic 
markets as well as in politics (Egenolf, 00).
Consumption decisions of consumers, risky markets and the media as the sources 
of information are strongly interconnected. they form a complex system. A recent 
interdisciplinary research approach which is highly engaged in the investigation of 
complex economic phenomena is called “econophysics”. the idea of this research di-
rection is to combine physical research methodologies – especially simulation tech-
niques – with economic and social research fields. Some economic and social phe-
nomena are viewed to have similar characteristics with physical phenomena, which in 
turn are investigated in the field of complex systems research. Economic research is 
linked to people and their behaviour in economic decision situations. It is closely re-
lated to social sciences where human beings and their relations and networks are in the 
focus of the investigations of researchers. the network aspect and the collective social 
behaviour is a domain of social sciences whereas economic research is more engaged 
in topics like decision finding and making.
In recent time, networks also became of more interest for economic research. 
this is due to the fact that decision makers faced problems which became more 
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and more complex – also because of the development of information technol-
ogy within the last decade. Network effects become increasingly important. One 
example of econophysics is the application of simulation methods to investigate 
economic phenomena. the decision makers can be modelled as artificial agents 
in a network. they are connected to several other agents which more or less in-
fluence the decision making process. the agents act at the individual level but 
they are influenced by reciprocal network relations. the entire system has a non-
linear behaviour which seems to be a collective behaviour governed not by one 
single “market maker” but by the sum of individual actions. If researchers want 
to investigate the behaviour of such complex systems it is reasonable to choose 
an agent-based approach. this approach offers the possibility to reproduce and 
analyse patterns which can be observed in the real world. Agent-based modelling 
is a technique which was used in physics to investigate the behaviour of multi-
particles or to analyse research questions in thermodynamics and which is now 
adopted by econophysics and social sciences. 
the aim of this Chapter is to investigate consumer behaviour in risky markets, 
especially in the case of food scares. Risk perception, trust and the role of the 
media are investigated by using agent-based modelling which is illustrated in the 
next Sections.
6.2. the theoretiCal frameWork of the simulation model
the multi-agent simulation software is designed to model the diffusion of food 
safety information within the artificial consumer population and their impacts on 
trust and demand after a food safety incidence. Hence, it offers the opportunity to 
illustrate the variability of trust in the course of time and can provide valuable infor-
mation about the recovery process of trust and the time that has to elapse before pre-
incidence sales are recovered.
As depicted in Figure 6.1, the simulation software comprises three interde-
pendent spheres. these are firstly a set of n individual consumers who more or 
less frequently decide whether to adopt of not a specific behaviour (to buy or not 
to buy). these decisions are based on a general decision framework based on the 
theory of Planned Behaviour (tPB) by Ajzen (1991) considering the special fea-
tures of the agent’s affiliation to a consumer group, the current state of the agent’s 
information about food safety and risk, and the corresponding trust in food chain 
actors. Secondly, the n individual consumers are summarised into a demographic 
network and into social networks in which they exchange information about food 
safety issues. Finally, a set of m media agents that supplies the consumers’ network 
with either positive or negative information about the food under investigation 
is introduced. the impact of information on consumers is assumed to depend on 
their addressees, that is their position within the network, and the media’s trust-
worthiness represented by the specific network weight of the information source 
(the media agent).
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Figure 6.1. the distribution of food safety information within the demographic network and 
the social networks
Within the network part of the model, it is determined which consumers receive 
new information about the risk and safety of the investigated food.
the task of consumer agents is to translate this information into trust and ulti-
mately to make a buying decision. Hence, these artificial consumer agents must have 
been constructed in such a way that they are able to accomplish these tasks. As the 
transformation process certainly varies from person to person, the artificial consumer 
agents had to be modelled so that they can correspond in their structural and behav-
ioural characteristics to different consumer segments.
the multi-agent simulation in this case is a computer program. More precisely, it 
is an object oriented code written in Java where a certain number of repeated interac-
tions between parts of the program generate a complex systems structure.
6.3. model building
the modelling started with the construction of an economy which consists of an ini-
tial population of agents. there are primary agents like consumers and auxiliary agents 
which often represent different social and environment objects, e.g. media agents.
First the initial state of the economy has to be specified, i.e. the agents will be 
equipped with their initial attributes. these attributes are type characteristics, internal 
behavioural norms and internal information about themselves and other agents like 
the network connections.
the development of the economy unfolds by interaction and updating of internal 
states of the agents, i.e. updating the trust value for a specific good or supplier. the 
Media Agent
Consumer 
Media Agent
Consumer 
Consumer Consumer 
Consumer 
Consumer 
Receival ~x% 
Receival ~x% 
Receival ~x% 
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simulation model adequately reflects the development of trust or distrust within a 
population of consumer agents after a food safety incident occurred.
6.3.1. The networks and the information sources
the model consists of several networks which serve as information sources for the 
agents (Saggau and Patelli, 00). there are decentralised and centralised networks. 
Both types of networks serve as information sources for the agents. the decentralised 
networks are social networks which again are several networks like the demographic 
network or friend’s networks. these networks are endogenous, i.e. the information 
processing is endogenous whereas the centralised networks are exogenous in the sense of 
spreading information exogenously via the artificial consumer population. they spread 
the information from one single information source via the population of agents.
An initial population of consumer agents provides the basis for the simulation. 
they are connected to the networks. they communicate information about the safety 
of food and their own trust regarding this food item.
there can be two or three kinds of social networks differentiated. Each network 
serves as an information source for the agents. the networks are differentiated by 
unique identifiers so that the information sources are well known to the agents.
In the demographic network each agent of the population finds its place in a fam-
ily structure. the demographic network consists of three generations: the grandparent 
generation, the parent generation and the children generation. the agents are con-
sistently assigned to this network, i.e. the family relations are kept, and there are no 
inconsistent states (see Figure 6.).
the demographic network can be varied by changing three parameters: the popu-
lation size, the average number of offspring in the second generation and the average 
number of offspring in the third generation.
Figure 6.. Demographic network
1st Generation
2nd Generation
3rd Generation
1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
9 10 11
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the population size determines the size of the adjacency matrix which will be used 
as the connections matrix. this connections matrix is quadratic and the size corresponds 
to the number of agents in the population. this matrix will initially be filled with zeros. 
the zeros change to one when the generations will be set up and only if the connections 
are determined. During this phase the initial parameters for the agents will be set.
the size of the first generation is given by the population size divided by the product 
of the average number of the nd and 3rd generation. the size of the second generation is 
the product of the first generation and the average number of children per family in the 
second generation while the size of the third generation is given by difference.
the “marriage” in the first generation will be done by an algorithm which over-
writes the zeros in the connections matrix by a one if two partners are found. In the 
next step another algorithm generates the offspring of the first generation and con-
nects this second generation with the first generation. the marriage in the second 
generation is a little bit more complicated the reason being that it has to be excluded 
that there are no brothers and sisters marrying each other. Finally the grandchildren 
have to be included into the family structure, i.e. the third generation will be assigned 
to the second generation.
All these connections will be done in one adjacency matrix by overwriting the zeros 
with ones. In this way the demographic network will be set up whilst the agents will 
be initialised and assigned to the network.
Furthermore, each agent can also be part of a friend’s network. these are random 
networks that are not determined like the family network, i.e. each agent randomly 
receives a variable number of links which connects him to agents that are no family 
members. the members of these social networks are again the members of the agent 
population, which already form the family (demographic) network. the connection 
to other agents can be chosen differently. It’s possible to choose between different 
distributions of the links to the friends.
the uniform distribution for example sets up a connection matrix where the 
number of connections results from the product of the average connections and the 
population size. An algorithm then sets up the connections matrix according to the 
uniform distribution. Figure 6.3 shows a possible structure of this network.
Figure 6.3. Social networks
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Agents can be related in groups, that is clusters, where the nodes or agents are 
interconnected in a bidirectional way. Some agents have links to agents which are 
outside their own cluster and belong to another cluster. In this way the friend’s net-
works can be created.
Colleague’s networks are technically similar, but they have a different weight in the 
information processing of the single agent, depending on the weight of the network. 
Both of these networks have a unique identifier so that the agents exactly know where 
their information comes from. the centralised networks can be shops, media, the 
government, etc. (see Figure 6.).
Figure 6..  Centralised networks
there is a differentiation between global and segment centralised networks. In 
the global centralised networks each agent receives a message which is released by 
these information sources. Conversely, the segment centralised networks are just 
segment specific and segment exclusive. Media agents are newspapers, television, 
internet and radio. television and Internet are global centralised networks whereas 
newspapers and radio can be either global or local or segmented depending on the 
definition adopted by the user.
Each centralised network also has a unique identifier. the information release dis-
tribution is a time related distribution – one iteration is one day.
the user can choose between different media sources. Depending on the media 
source the data from the survey (mainly weights of information sources for different 
population segments) will be loaded into the active run of the simulation. 
the segment centralised networks refer to specific segments of the population. the 
data analysis of the tRUSt survey (see Chapter ) identified three segments: “trust-
ers”, “Mixed trusters” and “Non-trusters”. For these three segments a cross country 
comparison was made, i.e. the five EU countries (UK, Italy, Netherlands, France and 
Germany) have different sizes of the segments.
the population of consumer agents will be assigned to the segments according to 
the respective percentage distribution.
TV
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6.3.2. The agents
the consumer agents are the core elements of the multi-agent simulation. they are re-
sponsible through interaction and communication for the results of the simulation runs.
“An agent is a system that tries to fulfil a set of goals in a complex, dynamic environment. 
An agent is situated in the environment: it can sense the environment through its sensors 
and act upon the environment using its actuators”. 
(Maes, 199, p.)
this statement also comprises, on an abstract level, the consumer agents in this multi-
agent simulation which are interconnected in networks of other agents and media agents.
Starting point is an agent who maximises his expected utility. Böcker and Hanf 
(000) have investigated consumer response to food scares. they have proposed a 
model of individual information processing which is based on a two step risk percep-
tion process. they capture differences in the reliability between single types of sup-
pliers by subjective failure probabilities. And then trust in an individual supplier J is 
defined as the subjective probability that he is the reliable one (P
J
):
a) probability of supplier J being of type A who is supposed to be reliable: P
J
;
b) probability of supplier J being of type B who is supposed to be unreliable: 1-P
J
.
the aim was to analyse the effects of incorporating trust in a consumer’s risk perception 
on food purchase decisions. Böcker and Hanf use a Bayes’ rule for this purpose where the 
Bayesian updating is carried out by revising trust in a supplier of a potentially unsafe food 
based on new food safety information. It is assumed that consumers apply decision rules 
which are based on experience as well as on personal and mass media communication (here 
modelled by the different types of networks in which the consumer agents are situated). 
these aspects are supported by satisfactory results until the agents receive a signal which is 
strong enough to make them revise their prior beliefs or established decision rules. thus 
the subjective probability of purchasing a hazardous unit of a certain product is given by1:
P P P G A P P G BG J J= ( ) + −( ) ( )| |1    (1)
where P(G|A) and P(G|B) are respectively the conditional probability of receiving 
a hazardous unit given the type of supplier.
It is assumed that the purchase decisions of consumer agents depend on four param-
eters: the utility from a safe unit of a certain product (U X
+ ), the subjective probability 
to purchase a hazardous unit of that product (P
G
), the subjectively presumed disutility 
from consuming a hazardous unit of that product (U X
− ), and the expected utility from 
consuming a substitute which is perceived to be safe (U
Y
) with (U UY X<
+ ).
1 With P(G|A) < P(G|B) and P(G|A) + P(G|B) < 1.
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the consumer agent only buys and consumes the product if its expected utility is 
higher than the expected utility of the substitute, under consideration of the possible 
disutility of a harmed product X:
( ) .1− + >+ −P U U P UG X X G Y      ()
Further, the artificial consumer agent responds to information about risk and 
safety of the product. Positive or negative information regarding food safety changes 
the subjective probability that the agent relates to purchasing a hazardous unit of this 
product. For this updating of the prior subjective probability, the Bayesian updating 
is employed. Böcker and Hanf have implemented a two step risk perception process. 
the scenario can be described in the following way: 
“One or more units of X sold by J have caused health problems or J has violated health 
regulation and the consumer K learns about that either through personal experience, per-
sonal communication or media reports” (which will actively be done in the multi-agent 
simulation model). “He now revises his prior belief about the reliability of J according to 
Bayes’ rule to the posterior probability P
PJ
. this is the conditional probability of the state 
‘J is of type A’ after having observed the event ‘X is unsafe’”.
(Böcker and Hanf, 000, p.76)
In this case the Bayes’ rule for negative information was implemented. And the 
second step is that:
“Now K observes the event ‘X is safe’ – once again either through personal experience, 
personal communication or media reports. He revises his confidence in supplier J, with 
the posterior probability P
PJ
 entering the Bayesian revision process as the new a priori 
probability. the result is the posterior probability P
PPJ
, which can also be interpreted 
as the conditional probability of the state ‘J is of type A’, after having observed the two 
consecutive events ‘X is unsafe’ and ‘X is safe’”.
(Böcker and Hanf 000, p.78)
In this case the Bayes’ rule for positive information was implemented. the trust 
updating mechanisms (revised trust in supplier J ) is thus given by:
a) initial negative information:
P
P P G A
P P G A P P G B
PJ
J
J J
= ( )( ) + −( ) ( )
|
| |1
   (3)
b) subsequent positive information:
P
P P G A
P P G A P P G
PPJ
PJ
PJ PJ
=
− ( )( )
− ( )( ) + −( ) −
1
1 1 1
|
| |B( )( )    ()
11 Donato Romano – gianluca stefani
“Confidence is always – at least partially – regained: P
PPJ
>P
PJ
 always holds, however, 
trust is not fully restored”.
(Böcker and Hanf, 000, p. 78)
Differently from the Böcker and Hanf model, this multi-agent simulation uses 
the Bayes’ rule as a reinforcement learning instrument for the agents which is simi-
larly used in artificial neural networks. this updating rule leads the consumer agents 
to revise their trust based on new information which comes in each iteration of the 
simulation as an input form the information sources of the agents. the trust P
J
 will 
always be assigned the new P
PJ
 value after each revision so that there is no more 
a two step risk perception process but a permanent updating until the end of the 
simulation, i.e. each day the trust will be revised according to the news which are 
around in both network types – the exogenous and the endogenous. Hence if the 
aggregated information value is positive then the positive updating will be selected 
which now looks like (5):
P
P P G A
P P G A P P G B
PJ
J
J J
=
− ( )( )
− ( )( ) + −( ) − ( )
1
1 1 1
|
| |( )    (5)
After each updating P
J
 will be assigned the value of P
PJ
 so that P
J
 can enter into the 
next revision process P PJ PJ← . this allows for a permanent updating based on daily 
news releases of media agents. Hence the dynamics of information release distribu-
tions or strategies can be investigated based on these mechanisms.
A further extension of the Böcker and Hanf model is the possibility to work with 
heterogeneous agents in the sense of different risk attitudes and different trust levels. 
Furthermore, each agent participates in at least one network, the demographic network, 
but can also belong to other networks. So that, on the one hand, network effects can 
also be analysed and, on the other hand, the agents act under bounded rationality condi-
tions, since they have different status of information. Each consumer agent is registered 
in the networks it belongs to. It can go through the networks and ask for information. 
Additional to the basic model there is the possibility to “see” how other agents behave 
in risky situations in the sense of registering the changes in the information states of the 
related agents which serve as the basis for the direction of the trust updating.
6.3.3. Updating algorithms and micro data of the simulation model
the updating of the information value which is the basis for the trust revision is guid-
ed by a number of updating algorithms. the updating algorithms allow for the differen-
tiation between different information sources, i.e. the differentiation between the type of 
the network, the media source (credibility and influence), the intensity and the range of 
the information release. Information sources in centralised networks like media have far 
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more influence regarding the aggregate outcomes than a single information source in a 
single social network but on a micro level the single connections are also relevant.
the micro data of the multi-agent simulation model come from an EU-survey which 
was accomplished in the tRUSt project. the SPARtA model developed in Chapter 5 
is derived from the tPB. this model is based on socio-economic differences across the 
population dependent on classification of trust in information. Chapter  describes five 
information categories based on a principal component analysis which are (1) trust in 
media information; () trust in food chain actors; (3) trust in public authorities; () 
trust in independent organisations and (5) trust in alternative sources. these trust values 
serve as the weights for the information sources regarding the information weighting. 
Furthermore they have performed a segmentation analysis based on the tRUSt survey 
data. It categorises consumers into three distinct “trust groups” (1) “Non-trusters”; () 
“Mixed trusters” (those that are neither particularly trustful nor distrustful); and (3) 
“trusters”. these segments are implemented in the multi-agent simulation and can be 
addressed by the segment specific information sources. the model offers the possibility 
to assign different trust values to the three identified consumer segments. together with 
the standard deviations of the segmented trust values the system assigns normal distrib-
uted trust values around the mean value of the respective segment to each single agent.
6.3.4. Intensity of information releases
the multi-agent simulation works with numerical information values hence the in-
formation regarding the safety of food has to be shaped as a numerical value. the reason 
for this technical issue is that the consumer agent needs to know which updating shall 
be performed, the negative trust revision or the positive trust revision. this means that 
the choice about which of the two equations for the Bayesian updating (1 or ) has to be 
implemented is based on the updated and aggregated information value. 
the range for the information values released by either the centralised media 
agents (exogenously) or the agents in the networks (endogenously) is between -1 for 
negative information and 1 for positive information. these are the highest values for 
both directions. the smaller the values for either directions or say the absolute value, 
the weaker is the intensity of the information release. Besides the weighting of the 
information sources this is a second way of weighting the information. 
the intensity of the information can be influenced in different ways. If a central-
ised information source like a local newspaper for example should release information 
then the intensity of the information is probably less than the intensity of the informa-
tion release from the television, e.g. for positive information – local newspaper may 
weight 0.5 and television 0.8. Another example within the same centralised informa-
tion source can be 0.6 for the news reportage at the prime time and 0.3 for the news 
reportage in the afternoon for the television information source.
With this variety of information release possibilities and the possibilities for the 
shaping of different information distribution scenarios, information strategies can be 
produced and tested with respect to the aggregate outcomes.
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6.3.5. Information updating and trust revision
the weight of one network can be interpreted as a proxy for the importance of 
this information source among the agents. the higher the weight for the information 
source, the higher is the influence of it with respect to the trust building process of the 
agent. the empirical data from the tRUSt survey regarding trust in different infor-
mation sources will feed into the multi-agent simulation. they are the weights for the 
different centralised information sources. 
the updating of the information value for each consumer agent follows an algo-
rithm: each agent i n∈{ }1  3, , ,...,  collects the information values of its neighbours 
C(i) in his networks and also the information values of the centralised information 
sources. then he computes the mean information value v. this will be done for each 
network, i.e. asking the family, asking the friends from the social networks and asking 
the information values from the centralised media agents. Each aggregated informa-
tion value from each network in which the agent is present will be weighted with its 
corresponding weight, then the mean of these weighted information values will be 
assigned to the updated information value of this agent. this will be done for every 
agent (Figure 6.5).
Figure 6.5. Information collection
thus, each iteration begins with information collection followed by trust updating 
according to a two step process:
Media I
Agent
Network I
Agent
Agent
Agent
I
Agent
Network II
Agent
Agent
Agent
I
Media II
Agent i
Information time t
Decentralised
Centralised
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Step 1 – Information collection and processing
In each time step the agents collect information from their neighbours, i.e. from 
the decentralised information sources and also the agents collect information from the 
centralised information sources (media, government, etc.).
Step 2 – Bayesian updating
After the information collection the agents update their P
J
 according to Bayesian 
updating (see above). the old P
J
 enters into the equation and revises P
J
 which is the 
next P
J
 value which will enter in the following updating and so on.
the aggregation rule for the information aggregation is closely related to the aggrega-
tion of weights of the information sources. Each agent permanently updates his infor-
mation status in the time horizon of the simulation run. the updating of the informa-
tion status results in the aggregation of only one information value (newInfoValue). this 
is necessary because this is the decision parameter for the trust revision. Based on this 
information value, i.e. positive or negative information value, the trust value Pj will be 
updated according to Bayes’ rule – more trust or less trust compared to the previous trust 
value. For this reason the agent has to aggregate and weight the information values of the 
information sources, i.e. he forms a new opinion based on the information collection re-
garding the safety of the food item and the trust in the supplier. Each information source 
h k∈{ }1 , ,...  (family, friends, media etc.) has its own information status and a network 
weight and is registered in the connection list of the respective agent. Both values will be 
asked by the updating agent. the information values and the network weights will then 
be multiplied and summarised ( ( * )inFoValues weighth hk∑ ). Additionally the network 
weights will be summarised ( ( )weighthk∑ ). Finally the new information value of agent 
i (newInfoValue
i
) will be computed:
        (6)
the trust value will then be revised based on newInfoValue, i.e. if newInfoValue 
< 0 then the trust value will be decreased and vice versa. Since the agents perma-
nently update the information status and subsequently the trust value there is a slight 
adaptation of the trust value following the information environment of the single 
consumer agent. this agent specific information environment results from the endog-
enous network connections of this agent and also from the news which comes from 
his connected media agents. Hence the information environment of each agent differs 
to a certain extend. However the agents are communicating and consequently they 
converge after a certain time.
newInfoValue
inFoValues weight
weighi
h hk= ∑ ( * )
( thk )∑
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6.3.6. Information strategies (information policies)
the impact of different information strategies on the development of the aggregate trust 
which in turn leads to the aggregate demand changes is the focus of the investigation. the 
aim is to evaluate different risk communication strategies; this will be done in Chapter 7.
Since we investigate food scares and the corresponding changes in the demand, we 
focus on information strategies starting with negative information releases, followed 
by positive information spread by stakeholders using the media.
the distribution of the information releases by centralised media can be chosen 
by the user of the simulation. Consider the example when centralised media agents 
spread negative information over the network or the population, i.e. the media reports 
about a food safety incident. As time goes on and the program iterates the communi-
cations steps, the intensity of the information release decreases following an exponen-
tial distribution. At a certain point in time – the breakpoint – the information release 
changes from negative to positive (e.g. it was discovered that the food is now safe). 
Positive information also follows an exponential distribution, beginning with a high 
intensity which decreases as time elapses (see Figure 6.6).
Figure 6.6. Information release strategy by media agent 3
the information release strategy is selected and parameterised by the user and 
is visualised by the simulation in an output graph. In the case illustrated above the 
information release distribution starts with an intensity of -1, i.e. a very strong nega-
tive news reportage regarding a food scare. In this example at day 10 this informa-
tion source (the centralised media agent) no longer reports about this food safety 
issue. At day 30 this media agent reports that the food under investigation is safe, 
i.e. positive information again with strong information intensity (may it be in the 
television at prime time).
  the time scale is the x-value times 10, e.g. 0.1⋅10=10.
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the agents update their own trust value based on the new information from time 
to time randomly; they are equipped with the starting parameters heterogeneously.
On the aggregated level the development of the average trust value of the popula-
tion emerge by taking the new information release into account at the micro level and 
by communicating and updating trust accordingly (see Figure 6.7).
Figure 6.7. Development of the aggregated trust value of the consumer population after 100 days
this double exponential distribution of information releases is just one possibility 
among many others. the user of the simulation can implement self created informa-
tion distributions and can also test information strategies by targeting specific con-
sumer segments with information policies.
6.4. model validation
the validation of a model implies that the behaviour of the model must be con-
forming to the behaviour of the targeted real feature. If a pattern is observed in reality 
then the simulation must reproduce this pattern. the model validation of this multi-
agent simulation was based on a real world example of a food scare for which some 
data are available, that is the BSE crisis in Germany.
the BSE crisis was one of the most influencing cases of a food scare which 
brought about dramatic changes in meat demand. the idea behind the validation 
of this kind of multi-agent simulation is that there was a food scare, the media re-
ported about this food safety incident (information distributions and diffusions) 
and demand changed significantly. Hagenhoff (003) analysed how the impact 
of the media news reportage concerning BSE in the print media influenced the 
opinion of the population in Germany. She counted the number of articles re-
garding BSE for a representative number of German newspapers for the time of 
1990 until 001 (see Figure 6.8). With these data it is possible to display the 
distribution of articles (information releases) over this period. this distribution 
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was fed into the model to test how the artificial consumer population reacts in 
their trust behaviour. In this case trust serves as a proxy for demand. 
Source : Hagenhoff (003)
Figure 6.8. Newspaper reportage concerning BSE 
the output of the multi-agent simulation must be tested in order to validate the sim-
ulation. this means that the simulation model must reproduce the pattern which was 
observed in reality. the development of demand of beef in Germany for the same period 
serves as the pattern which should be reproduced by the multi-agent simulation.
In November 000 the fi rst case of a mad cow disease was discovered in Germany. 
the media reportage in the print media as well as in all the other media was immense. 
the shock for the population to face such a disease with its unknown incubation 
time and the result for the human being was sustainable. the minister of agriculture 
had to give up his position and also the ministry switched dramatically its focus from 
agricultural to consumer and food safety issues.
the demand of beef in Germany over the time from 1990 until 00 was decreas-
ing. the trend to consume less beef can be explained by the demographic change. there 
is an increasing number of single households who are consuming more convenience 
food which does not contain beef. But there is one sharp drop in the year 000 which 
breaks temporarily the trend recovering back by the end of 001. Right at that time the 
fi rst mad cow was discovered in Germany. Based on the information released by the cen-
tralised media the demand in beef decreased rapidly after the food scare and recovered 
more slowly into the direction of the former level when time elapsed. this pattern in 
the consumption must be reproduced by the simulation given the information release 
distribution by the print media in Germany. the information release starts with negative 
information at the time of November 000. In the following months the information 
about the mad cow disease increased rapidly until a peak was reached and subsequently 
decreased again in time.
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Since there was no positive information during the first two months after the first 
discovered BSE case in Germany but only a decline in the number of articles as the 
crisis went on it is reasonable to choose an exponential distribution with only negative 
information values decreasing in time (see Figure 6.9).
Figure 6.9. Negative news release simulation for BSE reportage (time: 100 days)
Figure 6.9 displays such a news release scenario: there are negative information re-
leases each day. As time elapses the intensity of the information decreases (reasons may 
be less interest by the public or other more interesting news or information overload 
by the recipients of the information).
Figure 6.10. Average trust value – rapid decline in trust and slower recovery
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the output, i.e. the aggregated P
J
 trust value, under this information scenario is 
displayed in Figure 6.10.
In this case trust is assumed as a proxy for the demand thus the pattern looks like 
the pattern of demand of beef in Germany in that time and under this information 
environment. the recovery of the trust respectively the demand seems to be consist-
ent with the real data identified by Bruhn (001) who stated that after seven months 
the discovery of the first mad cow in Germany the trust was nearly at the level from 
before this event. Seven months are approximately 10 days – Figure 6.10 shows ap-
proximately 50% after 100 days are recovered, if this development will be interpolated 
then the starting value will nearly be reached after seven months.
the pattern in Figure 6.10 is only one example of one simulation run but the pattern 
was always reproduced in the sensitivity analysis in a number of simulation runs.
the development of the trust value for each agent depends on the one hand 
on the updating algorithm (the Bayesian updating), on the other hand on various 
other factors. the agents are heterogeneous in their parameter equipment and in 
their network relations. they update randomly and not every day and this is one 
reason why the development of the individual trust values is different. No agent is 
fully informed, i.e. each agent is rationally bounded regarding the updating of trust 
and the decision making. this issue is the interesting point in this methodology of 
using a multi-agent simulation. Individually the behaviour of the agents is not al-
ways conforming but on the aggregate level, i.e. the macro level, the pattern which 
evolves seems reasonable.
6.5. ConClusions
Information strategies can be formulated as risk communication strategies. 
Chapter 7 investigates how different information scenarios influence the behaviour 
of the artificial consumer population. the model provides a tool to economically 
assess risk communication strategies. Depending on the form of the risk communi-
cation strategy, i.e. the duration of strategies, the segments addressed, the selected 
media, the shape of the information distribution, etc., the recovery of trust and 
consequently of demand can be a measure of the effectiveness of risk communica-
tion strategies.
Several simulation runs under controlled conditions have to be done in order to 
evaluate the different information strategies. A cost-effectiveness analysis of differ-
ent risk communication procedures will be done in the next Chapter. A quantitative 
monetary measure of benefits will be provided by the outcome of the alternative com-
munication strategies using the simulation model.
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7. trust lost and regained: a Welfare analysis of 
food risk CommuniCation strategies
Gianluca Stefani, Donato Romano, 
Paolo Patelli, and Alessio Cavicchi
abstraCt
Drawing on previous work on simulating the diffusion of information and consumption changes 
within an artificial agents society, an assessment of the magnitude of consumers’ welfare losses due to 
needless avoidance behaviour is proposed, with an application to the Italian and UK poultry sectors. 
A demand shifter is added to simulate a food scare in the poultry industry. Following a one shot 
outbreak, alternative temporal patterns of consumption are generated in order to mimic the impact 
of different risk communication strategies (speed of centralised information shocks, type of media 
employed, intensity of information) on the speed of consumption recovery. Then, a “cost of ignorance” 
measure of welfare changes due to improved risk communication strategies is estimated taking into 
account both price and substitution effects that arise in a system of demands.
The main findings can be summarised as follows. As welfare loss arises because of misallocation of 
consumption and production, the less elastic the supply, the narrower the scope for consumption real-lo-
cation, and consequently the lower the loss. Moreover, the simulated information campaigns show little 
differences across media and type of campaign although the pace of information release is important, 
given the structure of the hypothesised beliefs updating process. The reduction of the needless losses such 
as the one resulting from the performed simulation wouldn’t generate benefits greater than the likely 
cost of the information campaign. However, it should be borne in mind that all simulations run for 
this work refer to a 10% drop in consumption at the heat of the scare. More dramatic drop would 
have cause higher losses and greater scope for welfare gains from risk communication policies.
Keywords: public health, risk communication, welfare analysis.
7.1. introduCtion
the way in which consumers evaluate food safety and make food choices can 
change dramatically in situations of crisis such as those occurring in the case of a food 
scare (e.g. BSE) or a food poisoning outbreak (e.g. E. coli). the release of information 
about a food crisis is likely to cause a fall in demand for that food. Depending on the 
way governments and food industries react to the food scare through risk communica-
tion and depending on consumer trust in the risk information sources, demand will 
take a certain amount of time to re-adjust after the downturn following the crisis. As-
How safe is eating chicken? A study on the impact of trust and food risk communication on consumer 
behaviour in the European Union, edited by Donato Romano, Gianluca Stefani
ISBN-10: 88-853-95-X,  © 006 Firenze University Press
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suming that objective risk will return to its pre-scare level, the speed of readjustment 
of demand determines the scale of misallocation of resources and welfare losses for 
both producers and consumers. In the case of a food scare or poisoning outbreak, both 
consumer trust in risk information sources and effective communication are likely to 
play a significant role in bringing back perceived risk to the “normal” level existing 
before the crisis occurred. Perceived risk, in turn, influences the way in which demand 
re-adjusts after the drop occurred as a consequence of the crisis. 
Drawing on the work on simulating the diffusion of information and consump-
tion changes within an artificial agents society (Chapter 6), this Chapter provides 
an assessment of the magnitude of consumers’ welfare losses due to needless avoid-
ance behaviour by simulating an hypothetical scare within the Italian and British 
poultry sectors.
the Chapter is organised as follows. the next Section is a brief review of the 
literature analysing models of risk information processing. then we will discuss the 
analytical framework for assessing the welfare impact of changing risk perceptions on 
demand and the implications of imperfect risk information. In the next Section we 
provide an example of how welfare losses due to risk misperceptions can be computed 
from the standard data used to estimate demand curves, using poultry scares in Italy 
and UK as case studies. this framework is then used to perform a welfare analysis. 
Finally, some general conclusions on the impact of alternative risk information strate-
gies on consumers’ behaviour are drawn in the last Section.
7.2. food sCares, risk perCeption, and information
One of the main causes of demand shifts due to the occurrence of a food scare 
is the change in the perception of risk across consumers. Most papers that deal 
with demand shifts following a food safety crisis analyse risk information process-
ing within a Bayesian learning framework either as a stand alone process or as a 
consequence of information flows mainly triggered by the media. In Böcker and 
Hanf ’s (000) paper for example, consumers are Bayesian agents that update their 
prior beliefs about supplier reliability following news of product failure. Liu et al. 
(1998) and Smith and Johnson (1988) rely upon the prospective reference theory 
firstly proposed by Viscusi (1979) according to which ex post perceived risk is a 
weighted average of ex ante perceived risk and stated (or sample) risk estimates 
based on new information. Böcker and Hanf (000) incorporate consumer trust 
in suppliers’ reliability as a new variable in the Bayesian model describing the tem-
poral updating of risk perceptions and then estimate the impact of risk perception 
changes on demand.
When information about a food crisis is first released, perceived risk suddenly rises 
and remains high even after the hazard has been removed or settled. Studies examin-
ing the impact of risk information on food purchases show that negative information 
released by the media has an immediate negative effect on sales, whereas positive me-
dia coverage does not seem to have any effect on sales (see, for example, Smith et al., 
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1988). Liu et al. (1998), on the other hand, argue that it is not necessarily true that 
positive media coverage does not generate any effect on risk perceptions, but rather 
that the effect of positive information is likely to be delayed over time. those authors 
argue that positive and trusted information “can help adjust the subjective risk down 
to the normal (objective) level”. Conversely, distrust slows down the process by which 
risk perceptions return back to “normal” levels. 
the type of information matters as well. Verbeke and Ward (001) for example 
find that advertising had only a minor impact on meat demand in Belgium during the 
BSE scare with respect to negative media coverage. In the same vein, Herrmann and 
thompson (00) report that the negative press coverage on BSE largely offset a ge-
neric advertising program on Bavarian beef in Germany. time can play a further role 
in the process of moving back to a state of normality, with the impact of information 
fading as time elapses (Kask and Maani, 199).
Psychologists have also extensively studied changes in individuals’ risk percep-
tions and the impact of media coverage on the formation of such perceptions. 
Although, parallelisms exist between models developed by economists and those 
proposed by other social scientist (see, for example, Liu et al., 1998), this Chap-
ter focuses mainly on economic approaches. For other approaches the interested 
reader may wish to refer to the extensive literature on social amplification of risk 
(see, for example, Kasperson et al., 1988; Renn et al., 199; Burns et al., 1993; 
Frewer et al., 00).
7.3. Welfare measures of ignoranCe 
Several works have dealt with welfare losses due to incidental outbreak of animal 
disease (Mangen and Burrell, 003; Mahul and Gohin, 1999; Herrmann and thomp-
son, 00; Caskie et al., 1999) or more generally to food contamination (Foster and 
Just, 1989; Swartz and Strand, 1981). In a recent survey (Pritchett et al., 005), the 
literature on the economic impacts of animal disease has been classified according to 
the scope of the analysis: producers, allied agribusiness activities, consumer, regional, 
national and international. Most of the welfare analysis on animal disease at the sector 
or national level focuses on producer costs or assess economy-wide losses (Mangen 
and Burrell, 003).
to some extent the impact on market equilibrium of a food safety outbreak is 
similar to that of a generic advertisement program as it supposes a structural change in 
demand albeit of different sign (see, for example, Alston et al., 000 and the literature 
there quoted). Indeed, single or multimarket equilibrium displacement models are 
used in both cases (Piggott, 003; Hermann et al., 00).
While the cited literature assesses the welfare losses resulting from deterioration 
of objective food safety, the focus of this work is on the misallocation of resources 
induced by biased perceptions about the level of safety (Foster and Just, 1989; Swartz 
and Strand, 1981). A first classification of welfare losses due to biased perceptions of 
food safety is provided by Swartz and Strand (1981) who classify losses as “unavoid-
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able” and “needless”. the former occurs when consumers are perfectly informed and 
their welfare is reduced by an objective lowering of some food safety index. the latter 
are due to imperfect information about the actual level of food safety so that resources 
are misallocated as consumed quantities are higher or lower than they would be if the 
consumer had perfect information (e.g. consumers avoid consuming food that is safe 
believing that it is risky). this type of loss deserves particularly attention, especially 
when risk communication policies need to be developed or assessed.
Swartz and Strand provide a measure of needless losses with reference to a case of 
seafood contamination in the USA. In the case investigated by the authors, consumers 
living in an area far away from the place where contamination occurred, incorrectly 
believe that the safety of seafood is jeopardised and reduce the level of consumption, 
thus incurring welfare losses. the welfare loss deriving from such erroneous beliefs is 
given by the difference between the total surplus area (given by the sum of consumer 
and producer surplus) under perfect information and the total surplus area under im-
perfect information as is depicted in Figure 7.1, where the higher curve (D*) refers to 
the demand of safe food under perfect information, whereas the lower curve (D) refers 
to the demand in a situation of imperfect information.
Figure 7.1. Welfare losses associated with demand shifts (according to Swartz and Strand, 1981)
However, the Swartz and Strand’s measure seems to be affected by a sort of “bliss 
ignorance”. to illustrate the problem we take into consideration the case in which a 
reduction in the level of food safety is underestimated by consumers. In this case, the 
welfare level in condition of ignorance could be higher than the measure obtained in 
the informed state (thus ignorance is bliss) as the demand curve would shift down-
wards when correct information were released. Foster and Just (1989) point out that 
a welfare measurement related to choices made under ignorance should be always 
referred to a perfect information state. Indeed, as soon as welfare is measured in a 
condition of perfect information it reveals that choices made under ignorance were 
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x*x 0
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p
p 0
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not optimal given the actual state of the world. thus “ignorance is bliss only if the 
individual never learns the correct information” (teisl and Roe, 1988, p.15).
this argument is shown in Figure 7. where θ* represents the objective level of a 
safety parameter whereas θ is the subjectively perceived level of the same parameter. 
In the case of an improvement with underestimation of the safety level the observed 
demand curve D (function of price (p), perceived safety (θ) and income (m)) lies un-
der the curve D* that would be observed in condition of perfect information. thus, 
the correct measure of needless welfare losses due to ignorance is given by the area 
between the informed demand and supply curve on the right of the (lower) quantity 
actually exchanged.
Figure 7.. Welfare losses associated with demand shifts under full information
What makes the correct measure different from the previous one is that the de-
mand curve under ignorance is no longer considered. the only economic variables 
that are relevant for the measure are the demand curve under perfect information, the 
quantity exchanged under ignorance and the corresponding price (x
0
 and p
0
), the price 
p
1
 at which the quantity x
0
 would be demanded under perfect information, and the 
new equilibrium quantity and price (x* and p*).
It is worth noticing that the shaded triangle represent the social losses resulting 
from the algebraic sum of consumer surplus changes (+ b −  d) and producer sur-
plus changes (− b + c). Interestingly, while producers always experiences a real loss 
because under ignorance a low quantity is demanded, consumers may gain from the 
ignorance status even if considered under perfect information. Indeed, the lower 
quantity exchanged under ignorance causes a loss given by the shadowed triangle d 
but the lower price paid under ignorance (p
0
) with respect to the perfect informa-
tion equilibrium (p*) gives rise to a gain equal to the rectangular area b. this is a 
“virtual” gain as it would be perceived only if consumer were fully informed, but 
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it is consistent with the assumption that all welfare measure should be taken under 
full information conditions. Apparently, previous works on the cost of choices made 
under ignorance (Foster and Just, 198 and 1989; teisl and Roe, 1998) missed this 
point because the measure of welfare they used simply considered a horizontal sup-
ply curve (see below).
A similar measure can be framed in term of compensating variation (CV) and 
compensating surplus (CS). Suppose that the objective level of food safety changes 
following the time pattern of the solid line in Figure 7.3. 
Figure 7.3. Subjective perception and objective level of food safety in a food scare
At time t
1
 an outbreak causes a drop in the level of safety from θ*
 
to θ
1
. As the gov-
ernment intervenes to solve the problem, the objective level of safety returns back to 
normality at time t

. Now, let the subjectively perceived level of safety be represented 
by the dotted line in the same figure. As communication about the objective level of 
risk is not completely trusted, the perceived safety recovers to the initial level more 
slowly and lags behind the objective level for some time. For example, at time t

 the 
perceived safety level is θ
0
, still lower than the objective level θ*. 
taking as reference the utility (U
0
) at time t

 with safety level equal to θ
0
, the com-
pensating variation for a change in safety from θ
0
 to θ* is given by:
CV e p U e p U= ( ) − ( ), , , ,*θ θ0 0 0     (1)
where e(p,θ,U
0
) is the minimum expenditure needed to attain utility U
0
 at price p 
and safety level θ. If at safety level θ
0
 the optimal consumption of food is x
0
, then the 
compensating surplus for a change from θ
0
 to θ* is:
CS e p U x x e p U= =( ) − ( ), , , ,*θ θ0 0 0 0    ()
Time
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*
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0
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where e p U x x, ,θ 0 0=( )  is the constrained expenditure function indicating the 
minimum expenditure needed to attain utility U
0
, given safety level θ, price p and 
consumption of quantity x=x
0
. As the value of a constrained minimisation problem 
is never lower than the value of the unconstrained problem, e p U x x, ,θ 0 0=( )  is 
greater than or equal to e(p,θ,U
0
) and, consequently CV CS≤ , in absolute terms. In-
tuitively, the welfare improvement related to a change of safety level from θ
0
 to θ*>θ
0
 
is lower whenever consumers are “forced” to consume the same quantity of food they 
consumed in the lower safety state. thus they would pay a smaller amount of money 
to obtain the change with respect to the case when they are free to adapt their con-
sumption (that is a smaller negative amount of money needs to be added to income 
in order to keep utility at the original level). Indeed, an improvement in food safety is 
likely to increase consumption of the safer food and the impossibility to exploit this 
opportunity lowers consumers’ welfare gain.
the needless welfare loss in the case depicted above can be measured by the “cost 
of ignorance” (COI), a measure first developed by Foster and Just (198 and 1989), 
given by the difference between CS and CV:
     .   (3)
COI measures the welfare losses incurred by the consumers since at time t

 they 
don’t choose the optimal consumption level of food given the objective safety level 
θ*. Rather, believing that safety level is θ
0
 instead of θ* they are likely to consume a 
lower quantity of food (x
0
) giving raise to a needless welfare loss. Noticeably, meas-
urement of welfare gains and losses takes place in condition of perfect information. 
that is, consumer welfare is measured under condition of improved information 
by comparing the consequence of informed actions with those of misinformed 
ones (i.e. consumption of quantity x
0
). As it is difficult to empirically retrieve con-
strained cost function, Foster and Just (1989) proposed the following alternative 
formula for the COI:
        ()
thus the COI measure is given by two components (Figure 7.). the first is the 
area below the demand curve under full information condition (θ*) between the two 
price lines corresponding to the actual price (p
0
) and the price necessary to consume, 
under full information condition (p
1
) the same quantity observable under ignorance 
(x
0
). to calculate the COI the rectangular area given by (p
0 
-
 
p
1
) times x
0
 should be 
subtracted from the first component obtaining the triangular area depicted in Figure 
7.. As both x
0
 and x
1
 (the quantities consumed under ignorance and full information, 
respectively) are calculated at the same observed level of price (p
0
), an infinite elasticity 
supply curve is assumed. On the other hand the measure depicted in Figure 7., apart 
from being framed in term of uncompensated demand curves, assumes an upward 
sloping supply curve.
COI e p U x x e p U= =( ) − ( ), , , , .* *θ θ0 0 0
COI e p U e p U p p x= − + −( , , ) ( , , ) ( ) .* *1 0 00 0 1 0θ θ
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It is easy to show that the Foster and Just measure is an upper limit of the actual 
COI when supply is not perfectly elastic. Indeed, in presence of a perfectly inelastic 
supply curve COI tends to zero as quantity exchanged is supply driven only and no 
misallocation can take place on the demand side. 
Furthermore, the shaded triangle in Figure 7. represents the deadweight loss for 
the whole society rather than for consumers only. In the general case, consumption 
under ignorance always causes producer losses but may result either in consumer loss-
es or gains depending on the elasticity of the demand curve. thus misallocation of 
consumption shows also distributional effects.
Figure 7.. Welfare losses associated with demand shifts (according to Foster and Just, 1989)
7.4. methods
the modelling framework is made up by two components. the first consist of 
a multi-agent simulation model (Simtrust) designed to model the diffusion of trust 
in food safety information across an artificial society. the second is a simple partial 
equilibrium displacement model that calculates changes in consumer and producer 
surplus in the poultry sectors in UK and Italy. Only a brief account of the first model 
is given here (for details, see Chapter 6 and Saggau, 005) followed by a description of 
the equilibrium displacement model and a summary of the welfare calculations.
7.4.1. Simtrust
Simtrust is an agent-based model whereby a set of n individuals (that are built 
as Java objects) update their beliefs about the safety of a food category (or about 
h* (p, *,m )
x*x
h (p, ,m )
x
p
p 0
p *
p 1
x 10
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the safety of food provided by a retailer or other agent) following a Bayesian like 
process. Beliefs are stylised as a single parameter (P
j
) that represents the agent’s 
subjective probability that a unit of a given food is safe.
Information about the safety of the food spreads across this artificial society 
in two ways. Firstly, a number of centralised information sources (such as tV 
news, newspapers, internet) makes public either positive or negative informa-
tion about that food following a temporal pattern that specifies both timing and 
intensity of the information release. Each source is characterised by a degree of 
trustworthiness (at the society level actually a random variable identified by mean 
and standard deviation) which determines how the source is weighted within the 
updating process.
Secondly, each agent belongs to two types of network through which the informa-
tion is spread by a sort of word of mouth process. Within the first kinship network 
each agent is placed in a family structure consisting of three interlinked generations. 
the parameters of this network are the means of the Poisson distributions used to 
sample the offspring in the second and third generation. the other network models 
the relationships among friends and colleagues. Differently from the previous one, 
this network is built by randomly assigning to each agent a number of links to other 
agents that are not members of the same family network. the average number of 
connections at the society level and its standard deviation are parameters that can be 
modified by the researcher.
At each simulation step the agents collect information about the safety of the 
food category from their neighbours (kinship and friends network) and from the 
centralised information sources. Information coming from other agents is aggre-
gated according to some rule (mean value or max value), while information from 
centralised source is weighted according to the source trustworthiness. After this 
stage, the agent’s subjective probabilities (P
j
) are updated according to the follow-
ing rule:
         (5)
where, a, β and γ are parameters which can be calibrated on real time series, I is 
information intensity which is defined on the interval [0,1], δ is 0 when information 
intensity I is negative, while it is 1 when the information intensity is positive, and Pj
*  
is the initial level of belief about the safety of the food of the j-th agent.
the first term of the formula aims at modelling the updating process that force 
the subjective probability about safety towards 1 or towards 0 depending on the in-
tensity and the sign of the information. Conversely, the second term of the formula 
describes the forgetting process whereby agents tend more or less slowly (depending 
on a) to recover their initial beliefs. After all agents have updated their P
j
 a new step 
begins. the outcome of the model is a matrix of P
j
 of dimension n × t where n is 
the number of agents in the society and t is the number of steps through which the 
simulation is run.
P P I P Pj t j t t j t j t, , , ,( )= −( ) + −  + +− − −1 1 1 1β γ δ β a P Pj j t* ,−( ) −1
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7.4.2. Equilibrium displacement model
to simulate the impact of supply elasticity on the COI measures the following 
simple partial equilibrium model has been specified with reference to both Italy 
and UK:
        (6)
        (7)
        (8)
where Q
s
 is the poultry meat supply, Q
d
 is demand, P
w
 and P
r
 are wholesale and 
retail prices, a is the margin rate, and ε and η are supply and demand elastici-
ties, respectively. the impact of changing food safety perceptions are modelled 
through an intercept shifter of the demand curve, δ. the model was calibrated 
employing average figures observed in the first quarter of 003 (see table 7.1). 
Short run supply elasticities were estimated econometrically using monthly data 
and dynamic specifications in differences to deal whit autocorrelations in residu-
als. Demand elasticity for Italy were estimated through a dynamic double loga-
rithmic specification in levels employing two stage least squares to account for 
endogeneity of price (Stefani et al., 005). All equations being estimated with data 
for 1997-003, the impact of the BSE scare was modelled with dummy variables. 
Conversely, demand elasticity for UK has been retrieved from Lechene (000) 
who also used monthly data. the use of short run specifications and monthly data 
was suggested by the nature of the production process in the poultry sector where 
food scares usually last few months.
table 7.1. Italian and UK data
the shifter δ is built from the vector of P
j
 that results from Simtrust runs, taking 
the monthly averages and standardising the vector of the means to some predefined 
value as specified in the following Section.
 
Italy UK
Per capita exchanged quantity (Kg) Q 1.56 0.72
Consumer price Pr 7.83 1.69
Producer price Pw 0.75 0.44
Marketing Margin rate 0.90 0.74
Elasticity of demand -0.55 -0.52
Elasticity of supply 0.14 0.08 
Q BPs w=
ε
Q A Pd r= +( )1 δ η
P Pw r= −( )1 a
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7.4.3. Welfare change estimation
In the COI framework, consumer and producer surplus are computed under 
perfect information but are related to the equilibrium displacement caused by re-
sources allocation under ignorance. In the case of underestimation of the safety 
level of food, choices under ignorance will typically produce a smaller quantity 
exchanged and a lower price with respect to the equilibrium of the informed market 
(see Figure 7.).
Accordingly, producer surplus is computed as the usual wedge between the prices 
lines above the supply curve. In this simulation all measures are at the retail market 
level; therefore, producer surplus includes marketing margins. On its turn, con-
sumer surplus is given by the difference between two components: 1) the wedge 
between the price lines corresponding to p* and p
1
 under the demand curve; ) the 
area given by the quantity exchanged under ignorance (x
0
) times the differences 
between the prices p
0
 and p
1
.
Cost of ignorance is thus given by the algebraic sum of producer and consumer 
surplus corresponding to the shaded triangle in Figure 7.. Conversely, the tradi-
tional COI measure proposed by Foster and Just (1989), which assumes perfect 
elasticity on the supply side, allows only consumer surplus with p
0
 equal to p* (see 
Figure 7.).
7.4.4. Simulated scenarios
the simulation of risk communication policies was carried out hypothesising 
that a scare (such as a dioxin contamination) took place on February 003 in the 
poultry industry with a widespread negative press coverage. It was supposed that 
a single event scare took place, that is the actual contamination lasted for just one 
month, while the countermeasures taken by the food safety authority succeed in 
recovering the previous level of safety as soon as from the second month of the scare. 
However, public concerns took longer to slow down and do not mirror the pattern 
of actual food safety, giving rise to welfare losses due to misallocation of resources 
(COI). Measures of welfare were estimated over a six month period. Separate simu-
lation were performed for the UK and the Italian case. two benchmarks and four 
policy scenarios were set up to illustrate the possible impacts of risk communication 
policies on social welfare.
Benchmarks
the pattern of recovery of trust depends on the effectiveness of food risk commu-
nication policies. In the full information scenarios (Scenario A) it is assumed that con-
sumers perceive exactly the actual level of safety, that is there is no cost of ignorance 
and consumers recover their initial pre-scare level from the month after the crisis. 
Hypothesising that contamination in the first month affects 10% of the production, 
this scenario produces a negative multiplicative shift of the demand intercept that in 
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the first month equals to -0.10 and subsequently is set to 0. this scenario is used as an 
upper benchmark against which welfare losses due to ignorance are measured.
Another scenario (Scenario B) can be built up as the “blind” scenario, whereby 
consumers never recover the pre-crisis level of consumption and stabilise the con-
sumption pattern developed as a consequence of the crisis. Under the assumption that 
this behaviour results because of permanently incorrect risk perceptions rather than 
a change in utility functions for chicken consumption, the behaviour hypothesised 
under scenario B will give rise to the largest welfare losses.
Policy scenarios
Policy scenarios were designed separately for each country (Italy and UK) setting 
the main parameters of the Simtrust model in order to simulate the initial perception 
of safety level (P
j
), the structure of the family and social networks, the number and 
type of centralised information sources and the sign, timing, and intensity of informa-
tion release. A period of 6 months and a population of 500 agents were selected for 
all simulations.
the average initial P
j
 and its standard deviation were set in order to reproduce 
the differences among UK and Italy regarding safety perception of poultry meat. 
Data were obtained from the cross-country survey (see Chapter ) carried out with-
in the tRUSt project, where respondents had been asked to state their perceived 
degree of risk of poultry meat using a 7 point scale (from 1 – very risky – to 7 – not 
risky at all). the average scores were then transformed and standardised to the 0-1 
interval. For example, as the sample average in UK is 5.6 and .9 in Italy, P
j
 values 
were set to 5.6/7 = 0.75 for UK and .9/7 = 0.71 for Italy. the same holds for 
standard deviations.
the average number of children per household (1.71 for the UK and 1.9 for 
Italy) was retrieved from the total fertility rate statistics of Eurostat, while the average 
number of friends and colleagues that influence food purchasing decisions (0.6 for 
the UK and 0.0 for Italy) was estimated from the survey1.
the media types from whom centralised information spreads were selected among 
the survey most cited sources where people go for further information when a food 
crisis occurs. According to the tRUSt project survey these were tV news, newspaper 
and internet for both UK and Italy. the weights of each source were drawn again from 
the tRUSt project survey, that investigated the degree of trust of several information 
sources on food risk. Mean scores and standard deviations (see table 7.) were trans-
formed and standardised to the 0-1 interval.
Having set the main parameters of the artificial society in order to mimic some real 
features of British and Italian society, four different risk information policy scenarios 
were implemented: 1) fading away; ) counterbalancing tV news; 3) counterbalanc-
ing newspaper information; ) budgeted newspaper Ad campaign.
1  In fact, the survey questions no. 1 and  respectively state “How many friends influence your 
purchasing decision?” and “How many colleagues influence your purchasing decisions?”. An average of 
the two responses was retained as a parameter for the model.
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table 7.. Degree of trustworthiness of information sources on food risk in Italy and UK (1 
completely distrust – 7 completely trust)
In the fading away scenario all centralised information sources release negative 
information starting from the first day of the scare with information intensity set 
to -1 and declining according to an exponential law. Scenarios  and 3 are similar 
to the previous one but from the thirtieth day of the crisis onward positive in-
formation is released from tV and newspapers respectively. Even in this case the 
intensity of information is initially set to +1 and then it declines exponentially. 
the last scenario hypothesises the allocation of a fixed budget newspaper advertis-
ing. the cost of a typical campaign for these media was estimated drawing on data 
collected across countries on Ad campaigns costs (Cavicchi, 005). the amount 
considered is of the same magnitude as the budget allocated to health informa-
tion campaigns in Italy and UK by Government Agencies, that is around 5 Mio 
Euro. the intensity of information for each day of campaign is standardised with 
respect to the tV Ad (set to 1) accounting for the different number of people 
reached through this media (see table 7.3).
table 7.3. Scenarios’ Budget Allocation Simulation
 ylatI KU 
 .veD .dtS naeM .veD .dtS naeM 
Television documentary  4.96 1.39 4.84 1.55 
Television news / current affairs   5.17 1.30 5.15 1.47 
Television adverts  4.18 1.60 3.56 1.71 
 84.1 78.4 74.1 35.4 srepapsweN
 48.1 43.4 35.1 45.4 tenretnI
 
Country Original Budget Typology of campaign 
Message 
typology  Frequency Costs per contact 
UK  5 
million 
Newspaper only 
campaign with full page 
ads on 3 nation wide 
newspapers  
Full page 
Daily campaign 
(35,300*3*7)= 
741,300 per week 
Intensity = 0.35 (1.2 
million person reached 
in one day) 6 weeks 
and 5 days 
Italy  5 
million 
Newspaper campaign 
with full page ads on 3 
nation wide newspapers 
Full page 
Daily campaign 
(67,200*3*7)= 
1,411,000 per week 
Intensity = 0.32 
(700,000 persons 
reached in one day) 3 
weeks and 4 days  
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7.5. results
the main results of the policy simulations are presented as follows. First the out-
come of the simulation of alternative risk communication policies with the multi-
agent network is illustrated. then the impact on both consumer and producer welfare 
of the alternative communication strategies is assessed according to the equilibrium 
displacement model.
7.5.1. The artificial agents network: mean food safety beliefs
Policy simulation within the artificial agents network was carried out according to 
the settings discussed in the previous Section. Figures reported in tables 7. and 7.5 
refer to the mean P
j
 observed on a monthly basis.
table 7.. Results of artificial agents network: absolute Pj values (monthly averages)
table 7.5. Results of artificial agents network: relative Pj values (monthly averages, pre-scare 
level = 100.00)
 
 KU ylatI
Month 
Fading Newsp Tvnews Bud_nw Fading Newsp Tvnews Bud_nw 
0 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
1 0.48 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
2 0.50 0.58 0.59 0.54 0.53 0.61 0.62 0.57 
3 0.54 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.57 0.64 0.65 0.66 
4 0.56 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.59 0.66 0.66 0.71 
5 0.58 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.61 0.66 0.67 0.73 
6 0.59 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.62 0.67 0.68 0.73 
  
 
 KU ylatI
Month 
Fading Newsp Tvnews Bud_nw Fading Newsp Tvnews Bud_nw 
0 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
1 67.16 66.61 66.61 66.61 66.96 66.96 66.95 66.95 
2 70.94 81.97 82.59 76.06 70.81 80.72 82.05 76.05 
3 76.19 87.00 87.59 87.87 76.19 85.86 87.12 87.84 
4 79.17 88.40 88.89 90.09 79.29 87.50 88.57 94.76 
5 81.15 89.42 89.84 90.71 81.35 88.66 89.61 97.36 
6 82.60 90.19 90.57 91.28 82.87 89.54 90.40 96.91 
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According to the fading away scenario, a slow recovery from the negative peak 
reached in the first month results in the Italian case. Conversely, the release of positive 
information for one medium leads to a faster pace of recovery, although simulation 
results don’t appear to be so differentiated across media types. Interestingly, the adver-
tisement budget scenario shows a stronger impact from the fourth month onwards. 
However, it should be noticed that neither the multi-agent simulation model, nor the 
questionnaire provide a specific weight for newspaper ads so the generic weight for 
newspapers (that is noticeably higher than the one for tV Ad) has been used.
the same comments could apply to results from the UK simulation exercise. Even 
in this case the newspaper advertising campaign seems to be more effective. this is likely 
due to the longer period the campaign can last in UK with the same budget as allocated 
in Italy.
table 7.5 shows the relative fall of the mean P
j
 value with respect to the pre-scare 
values. the differences that can be observed between the two countries are caused by 
the different weights on the information sources and on the agents networks. Overall, 
even through these simple scenarios the complex pattern of interaction between net-
work effects and centralised sources is self-evident.
7.5.2. Welfare estimates
In order to estimate the welfare impact of the changing risk perceptions on poultry 
meat the original P
j
 values were scaled down to obtain a -10% shift of the demand curve 
in the first month of the scare. the A scenario then represents the full information con-
text and subsequently the shift disappears starting from month  while all other scenarios 
produce negative shifts in the subsequent months giving rise to misallocation of resources 
in the society. Assuming that for small changes in the neighbourhood of the equilibrium 
point demand and supply function are linear, welfare measures of the cost of ignorance 
corresponding to the shaded triangle in Figure 7. were calculated. Moreover, consumer 
and producer surpluses (the latter measured at retail prices) were estimated to provide an 
assessment of the likely distributive impacts. Finally, the traditional COI measure that as-
sumes a completely elastic (horizontal) supply curve was provided as well.
table 7.6. COI Estimates: Italy equilibrium displacement model (euro per month per capita)
 
Blind (benchmark) Fading Newsp Tvnews Bud_nw 
Month 
Cs Ps COI Cs Ps COI Cs Ps COI Cs Ps COI Cs Ps COI 
1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 1.682 -1.706 -0.024 1.500 -1.510 -0.010 0.929 -0.933 -0.004 0.897 -0.901 -0.004 1.224 -1.230 -0.007 
3 1.682 -1.706 -0.024 1.237 -1.244 -0.007 0.673 -0.675 -0.002 0.643 -0.645 -0.002 0.629 -0.631 -0.002 
4 1.682 -1.706 -0.024 1.087 -1.092 -0.005 0.602 -0.603 -0.002 0.577 -0.578 -0.001 0.515 -0.516 -0.001 
5 1.682 -1.706 -0.024 0.986 -0.991 -0.004 0.550 -0.551 -0.001 0.528 -0.529 -0.001 0.483 -0.484 -0.001 
6 1.682 -1.706 -0.024 0.912 -0.916 -0.004 0.510 -0.511 -0.001 0.490 -0.491 -0.001 0.454 -0.455 -0.001 
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COI estimates for Italy are reported in table 7.6. the values for the fading away 
scenario are initially close to those of the benchmark B, that is the blind scenario with 
no recovery of risk perceptions. When negative information fades away following an 
exponential law its initially strong impact becomes weaker and weaker and eventually 
is overshot by the forgetting process that drives risk perceptions towards their initial 
values. Conversely, the release of positive information after the first month seems to 
halve the losses due to ignorance as early as from the second month of the scare accel-
erating the recovering process. As stated above, the budgeted newspaper Ad campaign 
although less effective in the second month of the scare gives slightly lower value of 
welfare losses from the second month onwards. However, the absolute welfare gain 
retrievable from counterbalancing information appears to be quite low.
Considering a population of 50 million, an average monthly per capita gain of 0.005 
euros, that is of the same magnitude of the difference between losses under the fading 
away and other “intervention” scenarios, amounts to a monthly countrywide figure of 
50,000 Euro only. Such a figure, even if multiplied times the number of months the 
scare lasts, falls well short of the hypothesised cost of an information campaign. How-
ever, even if the loss reduction seems negligible it is worth noticing that, for the partial 
equilibrium case a global welfare loss is considered. It’s easy to see from inspection of 
table 7.6 that the deadweight loss results from the combination of a negative producer 
surplus with a positive consumer surplus. Indeed the outcome of the simulation show 
that far heavier losses are borne by producers for whom the gains deriving from more 
favourable pattern of recovery of safety perceptions are not at all negligible.
table 7.7. COI Estimates: UK Equilibrium displacement model (euro per month per capita)
In the UK case (table 7.7) COI figures are even lower than in the Italian case. 
Indeed, as the short run supply curve is rather inelastic in UK, only a minor change in 
the quantity exchanged is observed thus reducing the scope for misallocation of con-
sumption. Notwithstanding a reallocation of resources takes place even in this simula-
tion as producer losses are strongly reduced when positive information is assumed to 
be released from the second month onwards.
tables 7.8 and 7.9 provide an illustration of how the Foster and Just (1989) tra-
ditional COI measures (COI*) differs from the loss calculated within an equilibrium 
displacement model. As the former version of the COI relies upon the assumption 
 
Blind (benchmark) Fading Newsp Tvnews Bud_nw 
Month 
Cs Ps COI Cs Ps COI Cs Ps COI Cs Ps COI Cs Ps COI 
1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 0.192 -0.194 -0.002 0.167 -0.168 -0.001 0.099 -0.099 0.000 0.090 -0.090 0.000 0.131 -0.132 -0.001 
3 0.192 -0.194 -0.002 0.130 -0.131 -0.001 0.063 -0.063 0.000 0.054 -0.054 0.000 0.049 -0.049 0.000 
4 0.192 -0.194 -0.002 0.109 -0.109 0.000 0.051 -0.051 0.000 0.044 -0.044 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 
5 0.192 -0.194 -0.002 0.095 -0.095 0.000 0.043 -0.043 0.000 0.036 -0.036 0.000 -0.020 0.020 0.000 
6 0.192 -0.194 -0.002 0.084 -0.084 0.000 0.037 -0.037 0.000 0.031 -0.031 0.000 -0.017 0.017 0.000 
How safe is eating cHicken?
of perfect elasticity on the supply side it gives rise to higher losses as it was discussed 
in Section 7.3. the traditional measure is about tenfold higher than the equilibrium 
displacement measure but it doesn’t take into account the distributive effects of the 
demand shifts. this suggests that we should be cautious in using this measure for 
policy analysis at least in contexts where supply is known to be rather inelastic.
table 7.8. COI estimates, Italy: comparison between partial equilibrium and traditional COI 
(euro per month per capita)
table 7.9. COI estimates, UK: comparison between partial equilibrium and traditional COI 
(euro per month per capita)
Note: all values are pounds per month per capita
7.6. disCussion and ConClusions
Even if the aim of this Chapter is just to assess the magnitude of consumers welfare 
losses due to needless avoidance behaviour, the use of a mix of an hypothetical artifi-
cial society with a real, albeit simple, equilibrium displacement model makes possible 
to draw some conclusions that may be relevant for either the methodological debate 
or the policy analysis of risk communication campaigns.
First of all, the intrinsic complex pattern of interaction between centralised and 
decentralised information that characterise scare behaviour (and more generally all 
 
 
Blind Fading Newsp Tvnews Bud_nw 
Month 
COI COI* COI COI* COI COI* COI COI* COI COI* 
1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 -0.024 -0.120 -0.010 -0.093 -0.004 -0.034 -0.004 -0.031 -0.007 -0.060 
3 -0.024 -0.120 -0.007 -0.062 -0.002 -0.017 -0.002 -0.016 -0.002 -0.015 
4 -0.024 -0.120 -0.005 -0.047 -0.002 -0.014 -0.001 -0.013 -0.001 -0.010 
5 -0.024 -0.120 -0.004 -0.038 -0.001 -0.011 -0.001 -0.011 -0.001 -0.009 
6 -0.024 -0.120 -0.004 -0.032 -0.001 -0.010 -0.001 -0.009 -0.001 -0.008 
 
 
Blind Fading Newsp Tvnews Bud_nw 
Month 
COI COI* COI COI* COI COI* COI COI* COI COI* 
1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 -0.002 -0.013 -0.001 -0.009 0.000 -0.003 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.006 
3 -0.002 -0.013 -0.001 -0.005 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
4 -0.002 -0.013 0.000 -0.004 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
5 -0.002 -0.013 0.000 -0.003 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
6 -0.002 -0.013 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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cases of herding behaviour) makes more valuable an approach in terms of adaptative 
agents society. the model adopted in this work is rather simple, but further refine-
ments are possible for example by taking into account the different speed of informa-
tion diffusion through networks of friends depending on the agents belonging to the 
same cluster of friends or not. More generally a wider array of behavioural models is 
available to model complex patterns of information diffusion that cannot be studied 
employing traditional analytic tools.
Second, the welfare assessment exercise has pointed out that, depending on the 
adopted framework, different measures of the cost of ignorance are obtained. Notice-
ably, as welfare loss arises because of misallocation of consumption and production, 
considering perfectly elastic supply functions leads to overestimation of the welfare 
loss. the less elastic the supply, the narrower the scope for consumption reallocation, 
and consequently the lower the loss. Moreover, the traditional COI* measure fails to 
take into account the distributive impacts. When these impacts are relevant an equi-
librium displacement model should be used.
Finally, the simulated information campaigns show little differences across media 
and type of campaign, although the pace of information release is important, given 
the structure of the beliefs updating process hypothesised. A pattern of reduction of 
the needless losses such as the one resulting from the simulation wouldn’t generate 
benefits greater than the likely cost of the campaign. However, it should be borne in 
mind that all simulation run for this work refer to only a 10% drop in consumption at 
the heat of the scare. More dramatic drops would have caused higher losses and greater 
scope for welfare gains from risk communication campaigns.
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8. the trust projeCt: summary of main findings
Donato Romano and Gianluca Stefani
the major achievement of the tRUSt project is its contribution to the under-
standing of the nature, determinants and processes of social diffusion of trust in food 
risk information. Aiming at this, a multidisciplinary research approach was adopted. 
Specific results of researches carried out by psychologists, sociologists, consumer sci-
entists, and economists have been reported in Chapters  through 7. this body of 
knowledge can be summarised addressing the research questions raised in Chapter 1 
(Figure 8.1), namely:
a) Why do food scares determine a change in people’s behaviour?
b) How do these changes happen across the population?
c) When do these changes happen?
d) What are the effects determined by these changes?
this final Chapter is devoted to present the main project results with reference to 
each specific question and to provide some policy recommendations drawn on the 
project experience.
8.1. Why do food sCares determine a Change in people’s behaviour?
the project has investigated the determinants of trust at the psychological level, 
the evaluation strategies and cognitive models individuals adopt in context where 
they are exposed to food risk information. Moreover, the role of social interaction 
and culture has been examined in relation to the process of trust building regarding 
food risk management.
Psychological experiments (Chapter ) pointed out that people often use heuristics 
(that is “rules of thumb”) to make judgements and choices rather than relying on ana-
lytical information processing. For example, commitment (“I already ate it, therefore 
this means that there is no danger”) seems to play a role in attenuating the impact of 
risk information on consumer choices even if the extent to which this heuristic drives 
food choices varies across food types.
Also attitudes strongly affect people’s food choices. Attitudinal components such as the 
consumption experience (“it tastes good”) and the moral evaluation (“it is shameful”) ap-
pear to be more relevant than rational or instrumental considerations (“it is convenient’).
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trust seems to be relevant only in its shared-value components. Neither, compe-
tence nor perceived truthfulness of the information appear to influence people inten-
tion to purchase a supposedly contaminated food. On the contrary, when information 
providers are trusted because they share the same values with consumers, trust posi-
tively affects the intention to purchase the risky food. thus, even in this case, it is the 
affective and normative components that play a key role in explaining food consump-
tion in a risky context such as a food scare. 
Sociological research (Chapter 3) showed that the overall picture of the connections 
between trust, food safety, risk information and consumption is “somewhat blurred”. 
Recent major food scares are not the cause of general mistrust and pessimism even if 
they worsened both. Food scares are understood to be extraordinary events. However, 
people do not understand them as something totally unpredictable and independent 
from the broader context of present food production, commercialisation and con-
sumption nor are food scares obsessively present in people’s minds.
Indeed, group discussions showed that “reflective” responses to food safety issues 
predominate, with “reactive” ones mostly concentrated in the initial phases of a cri-
sis. this reflective behaviour is linked to a more general worldview which drawn on 
attitudes, values, opinions and normative and factual beliefs on more general mat-
ters than just food related crisis, such as the pros and cons of science and technology, 
the reliability of public authorities, the role of the EU, the reliability of one’s own 
network of relations.
In a sense the scenario is a complex one and any policy aimed at restoring people 
trust in the food chain should deal with a broader set of value commitment and fac-
tual consideration about political, economic, scientific and cultural institutions, that 
is the complex world within people live and make, among others, food choices. Cred-
ibility and trust – including consumers’ trust in their own ability to choose safely and 
responsibly – are unlikely to be obtained without a sustained effort to behave consist-
ently and reliably on the part of the political, economic and scientific parties in the 
food sector. this finding supports the prevalence of the value sharing aspect of trust 
highlighted by the psychological research (Chapter ).
8.2. hoW do Changes in people’s behaviour happen aCross the 
population?
the project has investigated how trust in alternative information sources and in 
risk managers varies across segments of consumers identified by levels of trust, social, 
demographic, and psychographic characteristics across five EU countries. the cross-
country survey (Chapter ) pointed out that food safety is generally considered to be 
“extremely important” (5.5%) with 93.7% of people ranking food safety as above a 
5 on a 7-point scale of degree of importance. the French are the most ambivalent to-
wards food safety (11.9% reported a  or less on the 7-point scale). the Italians appear 
to be the most concerned about food safety (97% concluded that food safety should 
be awarded a score greater than 5).
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television advertising is the least trusted source of information across all countries 
on average, followed by political groups, processors, the government and magazines. 
the most trusted information sources across all countries are on average doctors and 
other health authorities, National Food Safety authorities, university scientists and 
consumer organisations. the EFSA appears to be not as trusted as the national food 
safety authorities. However, the average level of trust towards food chain actors shows 
differences across countries. the French are the most trusting farmers in general and 
organic farmers in particular, while they trust to a lesser extent brand producers; the 
Italians trust the farmers least; the Dutch trust the industrial poultry breeders least, 
but on average appear to be the most trusting people.
Food behaviour and trust in the food chain was analysed adopting two different 
analytical strategies. On one hand research has been carried out in order to obtain 
a sensible segmentation with respect to food behaviour; on the other hand a causal 
model has been set up to provide insights about the determinants of intention to pur-
chase a common food such as chicken, under standard and food scare situations.
Consumers can be segmented in several ways, i.e. according to lifestyles, demo-
graphic characteristics, and trust in sources of information. However, taking into ac-
count only demographic or lifestyle variables does not provide a very informative 
classification and the interaction between these variables is limited. Indeed, the weak 
relevance of socio-demographic variables in explaining trust and food behaviour in 
risky contexts was found in the psychological research too (Chapter ), suggesting that 
the impact of food safety information depends on the source and its reliability, rather 
than on the individual characteristics of the consumer processing it.
Conversely, the most significant segmentation is based on trust variables that is 
classifying people according to the type of information source or media they trust 
more. three different groups of consumers can be identified: “Non-trusters”, espe-
cially in independent sources, “Mixed trusters”, characterised by distrust in food chain 
actors and trust in independent sources, and “trusters”, especially confident in all 
sources of information, although with different intensity (they trust more food chain 
actors and less media sources).
the determinants of purchasing a standard food such as chicken have been inves-
tigated both in a day to day situation and under a hypothetical salmonella outbreak 
(Chapter 5). In a standard situation attitudes toward chicken (“it tastes good”, “it is 
good value for money”, etc.) are the most important determinants of intention to 
purchase the food while risk perception does not appear to be relevant.
Country specific models highlight somewhat different patterns across Europe. 
In the UK increased trust in food safety information from media (tV and newspa-
pers) appears to lower the likelihood to purchase chicken. It looks as if food safety 
information from these sources tend to negatively affect intention to purchase. this 
effect is partially outweighed by an increasing level of education. In Italy, trust in 
food safety information provided by food chain actors (farmers, processors, retailers, 
etc.) has a very large positive effect on purchasing intentions. this effect becomes 
smaller as age increases. In France, trust in food chain actors can positively affect 
purchasing behaviour. 
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Socio-demographic factors play a significant role in moderating such effects (higher 
income levels) or amplifying them (age and education). However, in a food scare situation 
attitude are still relevant but perceived social control (what the others think one should 
do) and perceived capacity to act and control one’s own behaviour become important 
determinants of intention to purchase. Differently from the day to day context, risk per-
ception shows a relevant (and negative) impact under a food scare, this is more significant 
for those who are “trusters”, French or Italian, reducing their intention to purchase.
trust in media negatively affects intention to purchase across all countries while trust 
in information from food chain actors loses relevance, but remains an important (and reas-
suring) factor. Alternative sources of information, such as consumer organisations, play a 
relevant role after a food scare, especially in Germany as well as in Italy’s larger towns. those 
that trust information from these sources are less likely to purchase chicken in this context. 
Overall, the trust project research suggests that socio-demographic groups are not 
relevant in relation to their trust in food safety information. the impact of this in-
formation depends mainly on the type of source and on its reliability rather than 
on socio-demographic characteristics of the targeted audience. Moreover, the causal 
model points out that information from experts and food chain actors reduces risk 
perception, while information provided by alternative sources tends to increase it, 
depending on the (positive or negative) content issued by these sources. thus, people 
significantly differ in terms of the sources they trust even if this is not related to socio-
demographics. Rather, cultural specificities within Europe have to be stressed giving 
rise to different impacts of the different information sources across countries.
Finally, food choice behaviour differs between standard and food scare contexts 
depending on the segment consumers belong to. Non trusters tend to be less sensitive 
to risk perception and rely more on their social network, while trusters and mixed 
trusters (especially in food safety authorities) are the most sensitive to changing risk 
perception levels. thus public authorities can and should play a key role in reassuring 
food consumers during a scare.
8.3. When do Changes in people’s behaviour happen?
the project investigated the evolution of a food scare, through an adaptive agent 
simulation model, with emphasis on the social diffusion of trust (Chapter 6). the 
study drew on the empirical evidence that past food scare cases all had showed a sud-
den dramatic drop in consumption of the affected food, followed by a slow recovery 
that in certain cases failed to recover to the pre-crisis level leaving a permanent down-
ward shift in demand. A similar pattern of behaviour was acknowledged also by the 
sociological studies (Chapter 3) that pointed out how people show an array of differ-
ent individual reactions to food scares that can be summarised as follows:
a) temporary change of behaviour: this is the prevailing and most immediate re-
action and it ranges from temporary interruption to reduction of consumption 
of “hazardous” foods; 
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b) durable change of behaviour: this is a rather frequent response. It may be the 
consolidation of an already present consumption pattern (e.g. eating less meat) or 
a change in shopping preferences. Once taken up, new habits are generally con-
sidered healthier than the previous ones, beyond the specific protective function 
(for example, some consumers became vegetarian after the BSE scare); 
c) no change of behaviour: this reaction characterises a minority of participants, 
who judge problems as minor ones, while a few declare their “antagonism” 
towards official warnings.
Reasons for resuming original behaviours are multifaceted as well. A first reason 
is about tedium with the issue, feeling that “enough is enough”. this is usually con-
nected with an overload of information from unremitting media coverage. Others 
feel a sense of forgetfulness, a gradual “fading away” of personal concern. this usu-
ally parallels a decline in media coverage. A further reason deals with the issue of 
practicality, i.e. difficulties in persisting with diet restrictions. Few mention reassur-
ance from the media, friends, shopkeepers as a motive to resume normal behaviour 
or judge it as the least relevant, although several complain about the lack of clarity 
as to the end of a crisis.
the above mentioned features can be replicated through simulation, employing 
an agent-based model (artificial society), whereby a set of individuals update their 
beliefs about the safety of a particular food category (Bayesian updating) follow-
ing the release of information from media and word of mouth through a network 
of friends and relatives. Empirical temporal patterns of demand changes during a 
food scare can be reproduced by setting to appropriate levels the population param-
eters (such as the fading away or tedium parameter, the intensity of the network 
of friends or the initial level of trust in the safety of food). timing of information 
release (both positive and negative) mirrors possible policy instruments affecting the 
time and scope of demand recovery.
8.4. What are the effeCts determined by Changes in people’s 
behaviour?
the project reviewed current public information campaigns across Europe and 
assessed the economic impacts of alternative risk communication strategies evaluating 
their costs and benefits employing a market model (Chapter 7).
Public communication campaigns are implemented to shape food consumption 
and/or food processing behaviour towards socially desirable outcomes. Even if pub-
lic intervention is not always exclusively related to the use of media channels (for 
example some information policies rely on educational programs targeted at pri-
mary schools), the research focussed on the cost of providing information through 
these channels.
In order to assess the average budget of food information campaigns, fourteen 
public information campaigns across the five involved EU countries were investi-
4How safe is eating cHicken?
gated. Most campaigns adopted a scientific approach for the developing of good 
communication through qualitative and quantitative market research methods, 
mainly with the help of external marketing agencies. the costs of information 
campaigns ranged from € 800,000 to € 7 million, depending on the communica-
tion media employed, the scope of the campaign, the targeted population and the 
country’s specific advertising market structure. A dataset with average costs across 
countries and media type was set up showing noticeable differences in unit costs 
across countries.
A market model of the poultry sector was estimated to simulate the impact on 
demand of information campaigns drawing on estimates of elasticities of supply 
and demand obtained for Italy and UK (Chapter 7). Shifts in demand and timing 
of the recovery process after a scare provides a measure of social benefits of infor-
mation campaigns. Indeed, the loss of social welfare caused by underestimation of 
the actual level of safety are caused by reduced market exchanges under asymmetric 
information. A likely assumption of an initial drop of 10% in consumption in the 
first month of the crisis was maintained. Recovering of demand towards pre-crisis 
levels was simulated drawing on the agent based simulation model described in 
Chapter 5 and taking into account the impact of information release from a budg-
eted media campaign.
In a country of 50 million people, such as Italy, an information campaign that 
speeds up the recovery to 80% of the pre-scare consumption within  months (by 
nd instead of the 6th month since the beginning of the scare) would save about 
50,000 Euro a month only, that is short of the average cost of an information 
campaign. Indeed the model assumes a constant marketing margin and perfect price 
transmissions. Different results would be obtained when asymmetric price transmis-
sion is in place.
Furthermore, things look differently when examining producer losses. the same 
impact on the speed of demand recovery could save up to 5 million Euro a month 
about % of the value of poultry consumption at current consumer prices. Similarly, 
in the UK the savings would amount to a figure of about -5% of poultry consump-
tion valued at consumer prices.
8.5. reCommendations
Such findings call for a comprehensive and articulated food risk communication 
strategy. Noticeably, the tRUSt project highlighted several issues that should be taken 
into account in designing risk communication such as: the relevance of emotional and 
normative, rather than cognitive aspects in shaping intention to purchase; the relation-
ship between trust in the food chain and wider attitudes towards institutions, technology 
and society at large; the importance of shared values in building up a trust relationship; 
the need to differentiate information policies due to cultural differences across countries; 
the key role played by food safety authorities. taking into account such aspects, the 
building blocks of a possible risk communication strategy are as follows:
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a) design and implement different actions according to different temporal horizons:
- before the food scare it is necessary to create and cultivate a trustful re-
lationship between risk managers and citizens not only limited to food 
safety issues;
- during a food scare the risk managers should provide clear and accessible 
information using the most trusted sources and the most trusted media for 
each country-culture. In this respect, experts and independent agencies can 
play a crucial role. Furthermore, information campaign should leverage on 
the diffused networks (relatives, friends) that play a crucial role in the social 
amplification of risk;
- after the food scare the risk managers should act to recover and maintain a 
trustful relationship.
b) with specific reference to the content of communication during a food scare:
- it is crucial to be credible. this means to focus the communication cam-
paign on shared values. the emotive and normative aspects of the issues as 
well as the cognitive ones should be taken into account;
- in terms of contents, the campaign should describe the issue clearly, avoid-
ing the use of technical jargon and without providing too many data. Also 
important is to state clearly what is known and what is not, acknowledging 
explicitly the risks and levels of uncertainty, identifying its nature and ex-
plaining what actions are put in place to deal with it;
- people during a food scare need practical information on what to do and 
why. In providing such information, risk managers should make reference 
to sources, e.g. where does this information come from and who is respon-
sible for it (accountability);
- people feel reassured if they will get credible information about risk man-
agement measures, e.g. what are the actions currently put in place, who is 
in charge of such actions, what is expected to happen and when, and if they 
do not feel abandoned, e.g. it is crucial to describe the next steps, including 
when updated information will be provided and who will provide the next 
information.
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